Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of \u3ci\u3eTrinko\u3c/i\u3e by Spulber, Daniel F & Yoo, Christopher S.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2007 
Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side 
of Trinko 
Daniel F. Spulber 
Northwestern University 
Christopher S. Yoo 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications Law Commons, Courts 
Commons, Digital Communications and Networking Commons, Internet Law Commons, Law and 
Economics Commons, Other Economics Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, 
and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Spulber, Daniel F. and Yoo, Christopher S., "Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden 
Side of Trinko" (2007). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 778. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/778 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
\\server05\productn\C\COL\107-8\COL802.txt unknown Seq: 1 20-NOV-07 8:19
MANDATING ACCESS TO TELECOM AND THE INTERNET:
THE HIDDEN SIDE OF TRINKO
Daniel F. Spulber*
Christopher S. Yoo**
Antitrust has played a major role in telecommunications policy, demon-
strated most dramatically by the equal access mandate imposed during the
breakup of AT&T.  In this Article we explore the extent to which antitrust
can continue to serve as a source of access mandates following the Supreme
Court’s 2004 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP decision.  Although Trinko sharply criticized access reme-
dies and antitrust courts’ ability to enforce them, it is not yet clear whether
future courts will interpret the opinion as barring all antitrust access claims.
Even more importantly, the opinion contains language hinting at possible
bases for differentiating among different types of access, in contrast to previ-
ous analyses, which have generally grouped all of the forms of access into a
single category.  We build upon this language to offer an analytical frame-
work that captures the manner in which different components of a network
can interact with one another as parts of a complex system.  Our analysis
also offers a basis for classifying the different types of access into five catego-
ries:  retail, wholesale, interconnection, platform, and unbundled.  We then
employ this framework to analyze a range of policy and doctrinal issues,
including the current debate over network neutrality.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust courts have played a pivotal role in shaping the telecommu-
nications industry, most significantly through the private antitrust suits
brought against AT&T by MCI and the predecessor to Sprint in the
1970s1 and the case brought by the federal government against AT&T
1. See S. Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. AT&T Co., 740 F.2d 980, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(affirming lower court decision finding no antitrust liability); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v.
AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1174 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming lower court decision finding
antitrust liability while remanding for new trial on damages).
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that culminated with the breakup of AT&T in 1984.2  All three of these
cases relied upon the essential facilities doctrine, which requires owners
of bottleneck elements unavailable elsewhere in the marketplace to make
those elements available to competitors on reasonable terms.3
The essential facilities doctrine has proven quite controversial, in-
spiring a welter of largely critical commentary challenging its conceptual
validity, its administrability, and the extent to which it actually benefits
consumers.4  After years of signaling ambivalence about the doc-
2. United States v. AT&T Co. (Modification of Final Judgment), 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).  This
suit was the third case brought by the federal government against AT&T.  See United States
v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1956); United States v.
AT&T Co., No. 6082 (D. Or. Mar. 26, 1914) (decree), reprinted in Decrees and Judgments
in Federal Anti-Trust Cases, July 2, 1890–January 1, 1918, at 483 (Roger Shale ed., 1918).
3. See S. Pac., 740 F.2d at 1007–09; MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132–33, 1147–48; Modification of
Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 1352–53, 1360–61; see also Lawrence A. Sullivan & Warren
S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust:  An Integrated Handbook § 14.7(a)(1), at 817 (2d ed.
2006) (arguing that government suit against AT&T settled in 1956 was based on essential
facilities doctrine).
4. See, e.g., 3A Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶ 770–774, at
164–227, ¶ 787(c)(1), at 301–10 (2d ed. 2002) (criticizing essential facilities doctrine as
incompatible with underlying purposes of antitrust law and difficult to administer);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy § 7.7, at 309 (3d ed. 2005) (calling essential
facilities doctrine “one of the most troublesome, incoherent and unmanageable of bases
for Sherman § 2 liability” and arguing that “[t]he antitrust world would almost certainly be
a better place if it were jettisoned”); Philip Areeda, Essential Facilities:  An Epithet in Need
of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L.J. 841, 841 (1990) (calling essential facilities doctrine
“less a doctrine than an epithet” that needs limiting principles to bring it back into line
with antitrust policy); Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and Essential Facilities, 1991 BYU
L. Rev. 1243, 1245 (finding that in many cases essential facilities doctrine does not
promote competition and arguing for presumption against claims that application of
doctrine will enhance consumer welfare); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak,
Essential Facilities, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1187, 1195 (1999) (“[M]andatory access remedies, such
as the essential facilities doctrine, do not fit comfortably within antitrust law.”); David
McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age:  Computer Software as an
Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 771, 781–806
(1996) (arguing that essential facilities doctrine “embodies some of the most unfortunate
tendencies of antitrust” and proposing limiting doctrine to natural monopolies); David
Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revisited:  Foreclosure of an Essential
Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?, 33 J.L. & Econ. 419, 421–25 (1990) (claiming
that economics of vertical exclusion render essential facilities doctrine superfluous and
ineffective); Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine,
32 St. Louis U. L.J. 433, 480 (1987) (arguing that Supreme Court was “wise” not to
recognize essential facilities doctrine and that lower courts should reject it); David J.
Gerber, Note, Rethinking the Monopolist’s Duty to Deal:  A Legal and Economic Critique
of the Doctrine of “Essential Facilities,” 74 Va. L. Rev. 1069, 1071, 1113 (1988) (arguing for
narrow essential facilities doctrine).  More sympathetic assessments of the essential
facilities doctrine also exist.  See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities
Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 Antitrust L.J. 443, 444 (2002) (noting importance
of essential facilities doctrine to control of monopolies arising out of intellectual property);
James R. Ratner, Should There Be an Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
327, 367–68 (1988) (supporting reformulated essential facilities doctrine); John T. Soma
et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Deregulated Telecommunications Industry,
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trine,5 the Supreme Court once again returned to the subject in Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.6  Although the
Court found “no need either to recognize . . . or to repudiate” the doc-
trine,7 it endorsed many of the criticisms advanced in the commentary.
Most striking is the language in Trinko questioning the antitrust
courts’ institutional competence to implement access remedies.  Since
the opinion was issued, courts and commentators have struggled to deter-
mine how broadly to read this language.  Some have suggested that the
presence of a regulatory regime leaves no role for antitrust courts.8
Others have read Trinko more narrowly, arguing that the scope of judicial
authority depends on a more nuanced assessment of the nature of the
regulatory regime.9  Until the Court resolves this uncertainty, it remains
possible that courts will use the antitrust laws to compel access to telecom-
munications networks.
The lingering possibility of antitrust enforcement in this area makes
understanding the scope of compelled access permissible after Trinko ab-
solutely critical.  The commentary on the essential facilities doctrine has
generally treated access as a unitary concept without analyzing in suffi-
cient detail how differences in the type of access can affect its costs and
benefits.  The Trinko opinion contains tantalizing hints suggesting how
the nature of the party seeking access, the number of network elements
to which access is sought, the technological complexity of the interface,
and whether the access sought is already being provided to other custom-
ers can each affect the analysis.10  Unfortunately, the opinion merely of-
fered these observations in passing without developing them in a system-
atic way.
We intend to correct this shortcoming by providing a framework for
analyzing the different types of access that have fallen within the larger
umbrella of the essential facilities doctrine.  The classification system that
we advance offers a basis for differentiating among different types of ac-
cess based on the nature of the party seeking access, the portion of the
network to which access is sought, and the nature of the services that the
party seeking access intends to provide.  We identify five major types of
access to telecommunications networks and the Internet:  retail, whole-
13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 565, 580–613 (1998) (arguing that essential facilities doctrine
represents viable alternative to existing government regulation).
5. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999) (declining to address
whether 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000) incorporated essential facilities doctrine); id. at 428
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that Court has “never
adopted” essential facilities doctrine); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 611 n.44 (1985) (finding it “unnecessary to consider the possible relevance
of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine”).
6. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
7. Id. at 411.
8. See infra notes 254–256 and accompanying text. R
9. See infra notes 257–265 and accompanying text. R
10. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410, 414.
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sale, interconnection, platform, and unbundled.  This framework allows
us to evaluate the effect that each form of access has on the demand for
network services, the network’s maximum carrying capacity, its optimal
configuration, and its cost structure.  At the same time, our framework
underscores the impact that the differences between the forms of access
can have on transaction costs, both by increasing the cost of obtaining the
information needed to manage the network and by forcing the network
to deviate from its natural institutional boundaries.  In the process, our
framework offers the first systematic basis for understanding how the pre-
cise nature of each type of access should guide the actions of antitrust
courts.
We begin in Part I by discussing the origins of the essential facilities
doctrine and the manner in which it has been applied to the telecommu-
nications industry.  Part II reviews the scholarly criticism that has been
leveled at the doctrine.  Part III analyzes the extent to which these criti-
cisms are reflected in the Trinko opinion and discusses the controversy
over Trinko’s impact on antitrust courts’ authority to compel access.  Part
IV analyzes how the essential facilities doctrine in fact encompasses many
different types of access, each with a distinctly different impact on the
optimal configuration of a network, its total carrying capacity, and the
transaction costs associated with imposing access.  It then employs a disci-
pline of mathematics known as graph theory to construct a five-part classi-
fication system through which these different types of access can be
analyzed.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
The principal provision of the antitrust laws governing unilateral ac-
tion taken by firms is section 2 of the Sherman Act, which provides that
“[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”11  The use of the active
verb, “monopolize,” is generally interpreted as criminalizing not the mere
possession of monopoly power, but rather the anticompetitive conduct
used to create and sustain monopolies.12  Thus, courts have generally
concluded that section 2 was not meant to reach monopolies obtained
through natural features of the market or through competition on the
11. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1911) (noting that
statute “omi[tted] . . . any direct prohibition against monopoly in the concrete,” while
“reach[ing] every act bringing about the prohibited results”); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting that prior courts had
emphasized “the use of the active verb, ‘monopolize,’” when concluding that section 2 did
not penalize those who “unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monopoly . . .
without having intended . . . to put an end to existing competition”).
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merits.  In the words of Learned Hand’s landmark decision in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa):
A market may, for example, be so limited that it is impossible to
produce at all and meet the cost of production except by a plant
large enough to supply the whole demand.  Or there may be
changes in taste or in cost which drive out all but one purveyor.
A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active
competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and
industry.13
Proposals to criminalize “no fault” monopolization have appeared
from time to time, based on the grounds that the mere existence of a
monopoly increases price and reduces quantity regardless of whether it
arises innocently or through anticompetitive acts.14  Courts, however,
have declined to condemn the mere possession of monopoly power out
of concern that doing so would deter firms from engaging in the compe-
tition on the merits (through product innovation and cost reduction)
13. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430; accord United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953) (noting that section 2 does not criminalize monopolies
obtained through “superior skill, superior products, natural advantages, . . . economic or
technological efficiency, . . . low margins of profit maintained permanently and without
discrimination, or licenses conferred by, and used within, the limits of law, (including
patents on one’s own inventions, or franchises granted directly to the enterprise by a
public authority)”), aff’d mem., 347 U.S. 521 (1954).  This reading of section 2 also draws
support from the scant legislative history that exists.  In the words of Senator George
Frisbie Hoar:
I suppose, therefore, . . . a man who merely by superior skill and intelligence . . .
got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a
monopolist, but that it involved something like the use of means which made it
impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition, like the engrossing,
the buying up of all other persons engaged in the same business.
21 Cong. Rec. 3152 (1890).
14. See Nat’l Comm’n for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, Report to the
President and the Attorney General viii, 141–42, 151–59 (1979) (proposing antitrust
liability for persistent monopoly power even in absence of culpable conduct); Phil C. Neal
et al., Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy (1968), reprinted in
Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev., Winter 1968–69, at 11, 24–33 (arguing for subjecting
concentrated industries to antitrust liability even absent evidence of predatory or abusive
conduct); 3 Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶ 623(a), at 63–64 (1st ed.
1978) (arguing in favor of antitrust condemnation of substantial and persistent market
power even in absence of anticompetitive conduct); Ratner, supra note 4, at 368–70 R
(arguing for using essential facilities doctrine to redress inefficient output reduction and
supracompetitive pricing even absent steps to maintain or obtain market power); Oliver E.
Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem:  Market Failure Considerations,
85 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1522–25 (1972) (arguing in favor of antitrust liability for firms that
achieve dominance through innocent conduct).  These proposals draw support for their
position from language in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (“[M]onopoly
power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand
condemned under § 2 even though it remains unexercised.”), and Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 428
(suggesting that monopolist violates antitrust statutes simply by existing and conducting
business).
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that the antitrust laws are designed to foster.15  As Hand so eloquently
put it, “[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must
not be turned upon when he wins.”16
As a result, courts have long held that a section 2 violation requires
more than just proof of monopoly power; it also requires proof of exclu-
sionary conduct, defined in one case as “the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent.”17  As a general matter, then, monopolists do not violate section 2
simply by charging monopoly prices18 or by refusing to deal with a partic-
ular party.19  At the same time, the Court has indicated that “[t]he high
value that we have placed on the right to refuse to deal with other firms
does not mean that the right is unqualified.”20
The essential facilities doctrine, which made its first explicit appear-
ance in a judicial decision in 1977,21 is the result of treatise writers’ ef-
forts to make sense of early decisions requiring monopolists to deal with
their rivals.22  The doctrine imposes a duty on firms controlling effec-
15. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547–49 (9th Cir.
1991) (rejecting call to penalize firms that achieve monopoly through superior competitive
performance without engaging in predatory conduct); 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note
4, ¶ 630(a), at 44–46 (rejecting condemnation of monopolies that arise without R
anticompetitive conduct because doing so would create disincentives to compete on
merits); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, § 6.3, at 275–76 (same); Sullivan & Grimes, supra note R
3, § 3.4, at 113 (same). R
16. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430.
17. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
18. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging
of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market
system.”); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276, 294 (2d Cir. 1979)
(noting that “a large firm does not violate [section] 2 simply by reaping the competitive
rewards attributable to its efficient size” and that no violation has occurred “unless the
monopoly has bolstered its power by wrongful actions”).
19. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600 (1985)
(noting that “even a firm with monopoly power has no general duty to engage in a joint
marketing program with a competitor” and approving of jury instruction stating that “a
firm possessing monopoly power has no duty to cooperate with its business rivals”); United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“In the absence of any purpose to create
or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.”).
20. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 601.
21. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
22. See, e.g., A.D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the United States of America 68–72,
131–37 (1st ed. 1960) (synthesizing early cases in attempt to develop coherent doctrine
surrounding monopolistic refusals to deal); Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Handbook of the
Law of Antitrust § 48, at 125–32 (1977) (“A firm which holds a lawful monopoly by virtue
of ownership of a unique resource is guilty of monopolization if it exploits that resource in
ways which exclude or disadvantage customers arbitrarily or invidiously.”).  For an overview
of the early history of the essential facilities doctrine, see Daniel E. Troy, Note, Unclogging
the Bottleneck:  A New Essential Facility Doctrine, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 441, 447–52 (1983).
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tively irreproducible bottleneck resources to share those resources with
their competitors on reasonable terms.23  Since 1977, lower courts have
invoked it with respect to many different facilities.24
This doctrine is typically traced to the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n,25 which is usually described as aris-
ing from a monopolist railroad’s refusal to allow other railroads to run
their rolling stock over the only bridge crossing the Mississippi River near
St. Louis.26  A close examination of Terminal Railroad’s facts, however,
reveals its inaptness as a foundation for limiting a monopolist’s unilateral
refusal to deal.  As an initial matter, the bottleneck in question was con-
trolled not by a monopolist, but rather by a consortium of fourteen of the
twenty-four railroads terminating traffic in St. Louis.27  As such, the con-
duct in question is more properly analyzed under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act, which governs “combination[s] . . . in restraint of trade,”28 than
section 2, which applies to single-firm action.  Furthermore, the initial
bridge owned by the supposed monopolist actually faced competition
from a second bridge as well as three ferry companies, each of which the
consortium acquired as part of a concerted effort to foreclose competi-
tion.29  Thus, as the Supreme Court would ultimately recognize in Trinko,
the conduct at issue in Terminal Railroad cannot be characterized as the
unilateral actions of a solitary monopolist, but rather as the efforts of a
cartel pursuing a conscious plan of merger to monopoly.30
23. See, e.g., Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992 (“‘[W]here facilities cannot practicably be
duplicated by would-be competitors, those in possession of them must allow them to be
shared on fair terms.’” (quoting A.D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the United States of
America 67 (2d ed. 1970))).
24. See Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 4, at 1191–93 (collecting lower court cases R
applying essential facilities doctrine).
25. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
26. See, e.g., Adam Candeub, Trinko and Re-Grounding the Refusal to Deal Doctrine,
66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 821, 828, 836 (2005) (emphasizing domination of consortium of
railroads by single financier and noting lack of alternatives to bridge at issue); Richard A.
Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing Field?  The New Antitrust Paradox, 72 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 49, 66 (2005) (treating Terminal Railroad Association as single firm).
27. See Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 4, at 1189. R
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 2004).
29. For example, when Congress authorized the construction of the second bridge, it
attempted to protect against merger to monopoly by prohibiting anyone from owning
stock in both bridges.  This was repealed in what the United States described as a
“mysterious manner” before the Association obtained control of the second bridge.  See
Statement and Brief of the Attorney General of the United States at 53, Terminal R.R., 224
U.S. 383 (No. 386); see also Reiffen & Kleit, supra note 4, at 426–27 (describing acquisition R
of second bridge by Association).  The Association acquired the ferry companies only after
a rival railroad, the Rock Island, attempted to purchase one of the ferries as part of a plan
to begin providing service in St. Louis.  The bidding war between the Association and the
rival railroad ended when the Association acquired the ferry while simultaneously agreeing
to admit the Rock Island and seven other railroads to the consortium.  See id. at 427–29.
30. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410 n.3 (2004); see also 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 772(b)(1), at 176–78, R
¶ 772(d), at 192–95 (describing Terminal Railroad Court’s emphasis on combination of
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Two other Supreme Court decisions offer more appropriate modern
foundations for the essential facilities doctrine.  The first case, Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, involved a power company that provided three
types of services to a number of cities in Minnesota and the Dakotas.31
First, it generated electric power.  Second, it provided wholesale distribu-
tion of electric power via its long-haul lines, either by transporting elec-
tric power from its generation facilities to individual cities or by “wheel-
ing” power generated by third parties located outside Otter Tail’s service
area.  Third, it provided retail distribution under municipal franchises
obtained from cities that did not operate their own municipal distribu-
tion grids.  Four towns that had previously granted Otter Tail retail distri-
bution franchises terminated those franchises and announced plans to
establish their own municipal distribution systems.  Otter Tail responded
by refusing to sell any power to those systems or to wheel power obtained
from other sources.32  The Supreme Court held that Otter Tail was using
its monopoly position in wholesale distribution to foreclose potential en-
trants in retail distribution.  Accordingly, the Court upheld a decree en-
joining Otter Tail from refusing to sell wholesale power to these cities,
leaving it to the Federal Power Commission to resolve disputes over the
particular terms and conditions of interconnection.33  Although the dis-
trict court had based its decision on reasoning similar to the essential
facilities doctrine,34 the Supreme Court did not mention it at all.
Otter Tail has been heavily criticized for both the thinness of its rea-
soning and its conceptual incoherence.35  As Professors Philip Areeda
and Herbert Hovenkamp note in their leading antitrust treatise, claims
seeking wholesale access so that the purchased products can be resold at
retail “would ordinarily be rejected in the unregulated setting. . . . Anti-
trust would not ordinarily countenance the intending car dealer’s claim,
for example, that it has a right to purchase the monopoly manufacturer’s
cars at wholesale and resell them at retail, when the manufacturer prefers
companies operating bridge and attempting to exclude rivals); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, R
§ 7.7, at 309 (pointing out that because Terminal Railroad “involve[ed] an agreement
among multiple firms who controlled the facility,” it “makes a poor ancestor for the
essential facilities doctrine”); Ratner, supra note 4, at 336–37 (arguing that Terminal R
Railroad is more appropriately classified as “a classic group boycott” or “horizontal
agreements in restraint of trade in violation of section 1”).
31. 410 U.S. 366, 368–72 (1973).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 375–78.  Interestingly, the Court did so even though Congress had explicitly
refused to give the Federal Power Commission the authority to require companies like
Otter Tail to wheel power.  Id. at 374.
34. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D. Minn. 1971)
(invoking “bottleneck” theory), modified, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
35. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 787(c)(1), at 303 (noting that Otter R
Tail court did not “adequately elaborate[ ]” upon underlying grounds for decision);
Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act:  The Search for Standards, 93 Geo.
L.J. 1623, 1627 (2005) (“Virtually no discernible principle can be found in Otter Tail . . . .”).
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to retail them directly.”36  As a result, Areeda and Hovenkamp suggest
that Otter Tail is best understood in light of its “peculiarities.”37  The man-
date to wheel power ought to be read in light of the historical common
law duty to deal imposed on public utilities.38  The case is also “unique in
its remedial aspects,” in that the Federal Power Commission was available
to oversee the terms and conditions of the interconnection mandate.39
The second decision, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
arose from a dispute between operators of ski areas near Aspen,
Colorado.40  Starting in 1962, the three independently owned ski facilities
in the area—Ajax, Buttermilk, and Highlands—jointly offered a multi-
day, all-Aspen ticket that could be redeemed at any of the facilities.  The
owner of Ajax eventually acquired Buttermilk and opened a new ski area
called Snowmass.  The combined entity, now known as Ski Co., continued
to cooperate with Highlands to offer a multi-area pass, now covering all
four ski areas.  Revenues were divided based on the number of tickets
redeemed at each mountain, with the share of the revenue allocated to
Highlands ranging from a high of 18.5% during the 1974–75 season to a
low of 13.2% in 1976–77.  For the 1977–78 season, Ski Co. asked
Highlands to fix its compensation at 13.2% of the multi-area pass’s reve-
nues.  Subsequent negotiations increased Highlands’s compensation to
15%.  The following year, Highlands rejected a proposal that would have
reduced its share of the total revenue to 12.5%.  In response, Ski Co.
terminated the all-Aspen ticket and instead offered a three-area ticket
covering only the ski areas that it owned.  In addition, it frustrated High-
lands’s attempts to reconstruct the four-area ticket by refusing to sell its
three-area tickets to Highlands at the full retail price.41  The Supreme
Court held that Ski Co.’s termination of the joint venture constituted mo-
nopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.42  In the process, it
upheld the district court’s injunction, which required that the parties
jointly offer an all-Aspen ticket modeled on a multi-area ticket that Ski
Co. offered at another nearby resort area.43  In so concluding, though,
the Supreme Court declined to follow the doctrinal lead of the court of
appeals, which explicitly based its decision on the essential facilities
doctrine.44
The decision in Aspen Skiing, like the decision in Otter Tail, has been
subject to extensive scholarly criticism.  Perhaps the most trenchant criti-
36. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 787(c)(1), at 306. R
37. Id. ¶ 772(b)(3), at 181.
38. Id.
39. Id. ¶ 787(c)(1), at 305; accord id. ¶ 774(e), at 225 (describing tendency of courts
imposing access remedies to “submit the matter to a regulatory agency” in cases involving
regulated industries).
40. 472 U.S. 585, 587 (1985).
41. Id. at 587–94.
42. Id. at 605–11.
43. Id. at 598 n.23.
44. Id. at 599, 611 n.44.
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cism involves the definition of the appropriate geographic market.  The
jury found that the relevant product market was “destination ski re-
sort[s],” whose primary clientele is out-of-town vacationers, as opposed to
“day ski area[s],” which cater to local residents.45  By definition, patrons
of destination ski resorts are free to choose from among the many ski
areas in the western United States and Canada.  By implicitly assuming
that these customers were locked into Aspen, the Supreme Court thus
appears to have defined the geographic market too narrowly.46
Furthermore, there is some evidence that Highlands was free riding
on Ski Co.’s facilities and marketing efforts.  For example, Highlands’s
inability to attract more than 18.5% of the overall business suggests that
its ski area was below average in attractiveness.  From this perspective,
Highlands was simply diverting revenue from skiers attracted by the
higher quality mountains provided by Ski Co.47  Furthermore, Ski Co.
purchased national advertising to bring vacationers to Aspen; Highlands
did not.  If Ski Co. were to advertise optimally, it should increase its adver-
tising until the marginal return no longer exceeds the marginal cost of
increasing advertising any further.  To the extent that Highlands siphons
off some of the business generated by this advertising, Ski Co.’s returns to
advertising will look artificially low and will cause Ski Co. to stop further
advertising even when it would be efficient to continue to do so.
Highlands’s free riding would thus ultimately impede Ski Co.’s ability to
compete with other ski areas.48
Another possible problem is that the pro rata division did not reflect
the marginal benefits provided by each ski area.  Although Highlands ac-
counted for between 13.2% and 18.5% of the usage while the four-area
45. Id. at 587, 594, 596 n.20 (1985).
46. See 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 533(g), at 207–09 (describing R
inability of party with control over one local ski area to exert market power and charge
monopoly prices for destination skiing); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, § 3.2(c), at 90 R
(arguing that trial judge should have explicitly instructed jury “to consider whether
downhill skiing in Aspen was a relevant market”); Thomas J. Campbell, The Antitrust
Record of the First Reagan Administration, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 353, 360 (1985) (claiming that
market definition adopted in Aspen Skiing “is open to question because Aspen competes
with many other ski resorts both in Colorado and in other states”); Frank H. Easterbrook,
On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 972, 973 n.2 (1986) (arguing
that Ski Co. failed to make use of one of “its strongest points” by “not challeng[ing] the
definition of the market”); Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 4, at 1209 (“[P]roducer R
substitutability should have made the relevant market not Aspen, Colorado but rather a
larger universe of ski resorts in the United States, Canada, and perhaps even Europe.”);
John Shepard Wiley Jr., “After Chicago”:  An Exaggerated Demise?, 1986 Duke L.J. 1003,
1007 (noting that Ski Co.’s conduct is best understood as “attempt to improve its position
in the national skiing market” by eliminating free riding, which requires national
geographic market).
47. See Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 975–76 (“[Ski Co.] might have said that R
Highlands was an inefficient ‘fringe’ firm taking a free ride on the fact that Skiing had
developed the resort’s principal mountains and attracted tourists . . . .”).
48. See Wiley, supra note 46, at 1005–06 (noting negative impact of Highlands’s R
conduct upon Ski Co.’s ability to compete with other resorts in national market).
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pass was in use, its share eventually dropped to 11% after discontinuation
of the pass.49  This suggests that its marginal contribution might be some-
what smaller than its pro rata usage might suggest.  In other words, the
value that skiers place on a four-area pass might be only 11% more than
the value they would place on a three-area pass.  Thus, the proportion in
which skiers actually distribute their custom may overstate Highlands’s
incremental contribution.  From this perspective, the dispute between
Highlands and Ski Co. may have been nothing more than a disagreement
over what the proper baseline was for dividing the benefits created by
their joint venture.  This is precisely the type of dispute in which antitrust
courts should avoid becoming entangled.50
Lastly, Ski Co.’s history of selling multi-area tickets both in Aspen
and at its other resorts greatly facilitated the remedy in Aspen Skiing.51
The Court could use these parallel transactions as a basis for fashioning a
remedy without having to establish the terms and conditions for such a
multi-area ticket out of whole cloth.  In cases in which such external
benchmarks do not exist, courts will doubtlessly find fashioning appropri-
ate remedies in duty-to-deal cases to be much more difficult.
These criticisms, and the decisions’ failure to rely upon the essential
facilities doctrine, have not stopped lower courts from invoking Otter Tail
and Aspen Skiing when requiring monopolists to provide competitors with
access to their facilities.  What remains controversial is the precise scope
of the duty to deal mandated by these cases.
II. THE CRITIQUE OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
Even supporters of the essential facilities doctrine recognize that it
“has long been a controversial subject under U.S. antitrust law.”52  Essen-
tial facilities claims posit that a firm is using its control of a monopoly
input to restrain competition in a vertically related market, either by
charging companies requesting access to that resource excessive prices or
by denying those companies access to the resource altogether.  Rather
than selling the input into the open market and allowing other purchas-
ers to combine it with other inputs and sell their finished products on a
competitive basis, the input monopolist excludes certain purchasers ei-
ther by internalizing production, and thereby becoming the sole source
of finished goods, or by entering into strategic partnerships with certain
purchasers and giving them preferential terms.
49. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 595.
50. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 774(e), at 227 (noting reluctance R
of courts “to interfere when the claim is that the defendant is actually dealing, but only on
disadvantageous or onerous terms”).
51. See supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text. R
52. Pitofsky et al., supra note 4, at 443; accord Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d R
843, 846 (6th Cir. 1980) (calling doctrine “one of the most unsettled and vexatious in the
antitrust field”).
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The central concern of the essential facilities doctrine is thus vertical
exclusion.53  As such, the essential facilities doctrine is susceptible to—
and, therefore, should reflect—the economic critique of vertical exclu-
sion that has emerged over the past half-century.54  In addition, the doc-
trine must take into account the emerging debate over the proper divi-
sion of authority between antitrust courts and regulatory agencies in
supervising access mandates.
A. The Economics of Vertical Exclusion
The conventional wisdom about vertical integration once generally
accepted the notion that firms could use monopoly power in one level of
production to reduce the competitiveness of vertically related levels of
production.55  Over time, economic theorists began to realize that this
approach is subject to several conceptual limitations.  This scholarship
has raised questions about an input monopolist’s ability and incentive to
attempt to harm competition in a vertically related level of production.
Furthermore, modern analysis has noted that bars upon vertical exclu-
sion can impair dynamic efficiency by paying too little attention to the
impact that mandated sharing can have upon long-run incentives to in-
vest in alternative sources of supply of the bottleneck resource.
1. The Ability to Engage in Vertical Exclusion. — As a threshold matter,
certain structural preconditions must generally be met before the pro-
ducer of an input can plausibly have any ability to harm competition in a
vertically related market.56  First, the firm must possess monopoly power
over the input market.  If not, any attempt to charge supracompetitive
prices in any market will simply lead the firm’s customers to turn to other
sources.57  In addition and more importantly for our purposes, the verti-
cally related market must be concentrated and protected by entry barriers
for a threat to the competitiveness of that market to be credible.  If not,
any attempt to raise price in the vertically related market will cause ex-
53. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 771(a), at 169–71 (discussing R
relationship between essential facilities doctrine and vertical exclusion); Werden, supra
note 4, at 462 (“The essential facility doctrine . . . involve[s] vertical integration.”). R
54. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in
the New Economy, 19 Yale J. on Reg. 171, 187–205 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, Vertical
Integration] (reviewing critiques of vertical exclusion).
55. See, e.g., Carl Kaysen & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy:  An Economic and
Legal Analysis 132 (1959) (arguing that vertical mergers “can, through the leverage effects
of firms in one market on those in another to which they stand in the relation of supplier
or customer, enhance existing power, or enable it to be applied in a new market”).
56. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 773(c), at 205–06 (noting that firm R
must be “actual or potential monopolist of a realistically defined market” with high entry
barriers in order to harm competition in vertically related market).
57. See, e.g., Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future:  Trade
Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 281, 290 (1956) (“Firms that are competitive cannot impose
coercive restrictions on their suppliers or their customers as a means of obtaining a
monopoly.  They lack the power to do this effectively.”).
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isting competitors to increase their production or will attract new com-
petitors until the price is forced back down to competitive levels.58
To use an example based on one of the leading Supreme Court cases
on vertical integration,59 suppose that a shoe manufacturer whose output
comprises 10% of the overall shoe market decides to stop distributing its
products through the one hundred available independent shoe retailers
and instead purchases ten shoe retailers and sells its shoes only through
those outlets.  Would this decision reduce competition in either shoe
manufacturing or shoe retailing?  Although competing manufacturers
will not be able to sell their products through the ten shoe retailers now
owned by the vertically integrated manufacturer, the ninety remaining
independent shoe retailers should now have extra capacity from the with-
drawal of sales from the vertically integrated manufacturer sufficient to
cover all of the other manufacturers’ output.  In other words, the compet-
itive manufacturers who produce 90% of the market are not excluded
from the market at all, since they will still have 90% of the retail distribu-
tion capacity available to them.  In this case, vertical integration simply
realigns the patterns of distribution without affecting the market shares
of either the manufacturers or the retailers.  Nor is it likely that the verti-
cally integrated manufacturer could foreclose the retail market by
purchasing more than 10% of the available retailing capacity.  In the ab-
sence of entry barriers, any such attempt would only cause existing play-
ers to expand their production and stimulate entry by new retail outlets
ready and willing to distribute the products of the other manufacturers.
Later scholarship associated with the post-Chicago school of antitrust
law and economics has used game theory to identify circumstances under
which input producers can engage in vertical exclusion.  Interestingly,
these models assume dominant-firm and oligopoly market structures that
presuppose that the relevant markets are highly concentrated and pro-
tected by entry barriers.60  In the absence of such structural features,
these formal models recognize that vertical integration may be just as
58. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Antitrust Economics 416–17 (1985)
(noting requirement of barriers to entry in secondary market); Sam Peltzman, Issues in
Vertical Integration Policy, in Public Policy Toward Mergers 167, 174 (J. Fred Weston &
Sam Peltzman eds., 1969) (noting requirement of concentration in secondary market).
59. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
60. See Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, 1990
Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity:  Microeconomics 205, 207 (using successive duopoly
model); Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 127,
129 (1990) (same); Michael H. Riordan, Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a
Dominant Firm, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 1232, 1232 (1998) (assuming existence of dominant
firm); Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers:  A Post-Chicago
Approach, 63 Antitrust L.J. 513, 527–46 (1995) (requiring at least oligopolistic market
conditions in both primary market and vertically related market); Michael A. Salinger,
Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. Econ. 345, 349 (1988) [hereinafter
Salinger, Market Foreclosure] (assuming existence of successive oligopoly); Steven C.
Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 267,
268 (1983) (applying dominant firm model).
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likely to lower price and increase welfare and that the ability of existing
players or new entrants to expand their outputs will be sufficient to defeat
any attempt to increase price above competitive levels.61  In other words,
the post-Chicago literature presupposes the satisfaction of the same struc-
tural preconditions discussed above before vertical integration can harm
competition.
The primary exception to this conclusion is a scenario contained in
Michael Whinston’s seminal analysis of tying, in which an input producer
assumed to face competition from an inferior product uses a credible
precommitment to tying in order to harm competition in an adjacent
market, a situation that Whinston recognized was equivalent to vertical
integration.62  Interestingly, however, this model incorporates some of
the structural preconditions discussed above by assuming that scale econ-
omies have rendered the vertically related market oligopolistic.63  Fur-
thermore, Whinston found that even when vertical exclusion was possi-
ble, the welfare implications were ambiguous.64  Whinston accordingly
concluded that the normative implications of his model were unclear and
that even when tying led to vertical exclusion, permitting it might actually
benefit consumers.65  Consequently, any court considering an antitrust
claim based on the exception identified by Whinston must ensure that its
restrictive assumptions are met and should undertake a complete analysis
of the welfare implications before imposing liability.
2. The Incentive to Engage in Vertical Exclusion. — At the same time,
economic theorists have questioned the input monopolist’s incentive to
engage in vertical exclusion.  The driving force behind this critique is the
so-called “one monopoly rent theorem,” which holds that there is only
61. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 60, at 538–41 (describing how competition in R
output markets can prevent prices from rising even if vertical exclusion raises prices in
input markets); Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers in Multi-Product Industries and
Edgeworth’s Paradox of Taxation, 39 J. Indus. Econ. 545, 550 (1991) [hereinafter Salinger,
Edgeworth’s Paradox] (noting absence of welfare loss when both upstream and
downstream markets are perfectly competitive).
62. See Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 Am. Econ. Rev.
837, 852–54, 856 (1990).  The analysis of Whinston that follows is based on Christopher S.
Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network Neutrality Debate?, 1 Int’l J. Comm.
493, 507 (2007), available at http://www.ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/153/
97 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Yoo, What Can Antitrust
Contribute].
63. See Whinston, supra note 62, at 850.  All of the other scenarios Whinston R
discusses incorporate all of the structural preconditions by assuming that the tying firm
holds a monopoly over the tying product.  See id. at 841–52.
64. See id. at 852–54.
65. See id. at 855–56; see also Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic
Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J.
Econ. 194, 215–16 (2002) (extending Whinston’s work and similarly concluding that
possibility that exclusion could benefit consumers justifies cautioning against “trying to
turn the theoretical possibility for harm shown here into a prescriptive theory of antitrust
enforcement”).
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one monopoly profit to be gained in any vertical chain of production.66
As a result, the input monopolist can capture all of the available profit
without vertically integrating into another level of production simply by
selling the input to all comers at the monopoly price.  The fact that the
input monopolist can already enjoy all of the economic benefits associ-
ated with its monopoly without vertically integrating raises serious ques-
tions about the input monopolist’s incentive to obtain a second monop-
oly in a vertically adjacent market.
A simple numerical example, based on a classic court of appeals
opinion authored by then-Chief Judge Stephen Breyer,67 illustrates the
intuitions underlying the one monopoly rent theorem.  Suppose that a
firm holds a patent on a process for refining copper ore that gives it a
monopoly over the market for copper ingot.  It sells its output to firms
that fabricate the ingot into copper pipe.  Suppose further that the mar-
ket for pipe fabrication is competitive, the cost of refining ore into ingot
is $40, the cost of fabricating the ingot into pipe is $35, and the profit-
maximizing price for the final good is $100.
If the ingot monopolist were to vertically integrate into pipe
fabrication, it would charge $100 for the final good and thereby earn a
profit of $25 per unit (i.e., $100 - $40 - $35).  The monopolist need not
vertically integrate to capture this profit, however.  It could earn the same
amount of profit simply by setting the price of ingot at $65.  This would
allow it to earn the same profit of $25 on each unit of ingot sold ($65 -
$40) without having to vertically integrate into fabrication.  Because the
pipe fabrication firms operate in a competitive market, they will set their
price equal to the input price plus a markup equal to their costs of pro-
duction ($65 + $35).  As a result, the final goods will still be sold at the
profit-maximizing price.  Thus, consumers are no better off if the input
monopolist is forced to share its monopoly; absent direct regulation of
prices, “price and output [will be] the same as they were when one mo-
nopolist used the input alone.”68  Furthermore, forcing a dominant firm
to deal with its rivals runs the risk of facilitating collusion.69
66. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,
67 Yale L.J. 19, 20–21 (1957) (providing seminal statement of this principle).
67. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 32 (1st Cir. 1990).
68. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 771(b), at 171–72; accord id. ¶ 774(b), R
at 215 (“[S]imple refusal to share a monopoly is not antitrust injury . . . . [T]here may be
cases where the refusal to share seems anticompetitive because there is little hope of
competitive alternatives . . . . Even here, however, a mere order forcing the defendant to
share does nothing to increase market output or decrease price.”).
69. See id. ¶ 772(c)(4), at 191–92.  Indeed, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., the Colorado Attorney General had previously filed a complaint against the
parties to the litigation for price fixing.  See 472 U.S. 585, 591 n.9 (1985).  Ski Co. thus
found itself caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place, in that participation in
the joint marketing scheme risked running afoul of section 1 of the Sherman Act, whereas
refusal to participate in the joint marketing scheme risked running afoul of section 2.
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In the absence of some anticompetitive explanation for vertical ex-
clusion, what explains why firms engage in the practice?  Even post-Chi-
cago economic theorists recognize that vertical exclusion can yield sub-
stantial efficiencies.70  Some efficiencies are attributed to technological
effects.  Building on the example of copper ingot introduced above, if the
input monopolist sold ingot into the open market, purchasers would have
to incur the costs of reheating the ingot before fabricating it into pipe.  A
vertically integrated operation could reduce costs by beginning the pipe
fabrication process while the ingot was still hot, although presumably
these arrangements could be made between independent firms absent
transaction costs.  To use another example more closely related to the
telecommunications industry, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) attempted to promote competition in so-called “enhanced” tele-
communications services (i.e., services that went beyond mere voice com-
munication) by requiring that they be provided on a vertically dis-
integrated basis.  The digitization of telephone switches means that
certain enhanced services, such as caller ID, call forwarding, and call wait-
ing, are most efficiently provided through the data processing capacity
already built into the switch itself.  Forcing these services to be provided
on a vertically disintegrated basis delayed introduction of these services
by several years.71
Other efficiencies are more price theoretic.  For example, commen-
tators have long recognized that vertical integration between two succes-
sive levels of production that are not fully competitive can increase eco-
nomic welfare.72  In such a case of successive monopolies, firms in each
70. See Hart & Tirole, supra note 60, at 212–13 (arguing that vertical merger in R
imperfectly competitive markets may avoid hold-up problem and encourage investment);
Michael W. Klass & Michael A. Salinger, Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide
Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases?, 40 Antitrust Bull. 667,
673 (1995) (describing ability of vertical mergers to reduce transaction costs associated
with contracting); Riordan & Salop, supra note 60, at 522–27, 564 (discussing efficiency R
gains arising from optimal coordination between suppliers and purchasers, prevention of
free riding, proper allocation of resources, and elimination of successive monopolies);
Salinger, Market Foreclosure, supra note 60, at 349–50, 354–55 (acknowledging efficiency R
gains associated with elimination of double marginalization); Ian Ayres, Vertical
Integration and Overbuying:  An Analysis of Foreclosure Via Raised Rivals’ Costs 17–20,
23–24 (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 8803, 1988) (discussing potential efficiency
gains arising from increased production and more proper allocation of resources); see also
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:  Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209, 277–80 (1986) (conducting similar
analysis with respect to vertical restraints).
For discussions of the potential efficiencies associated with vertical exclusion in the
context of the essential facilities doctrine, see 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, R
¶¶ 757–758, at 23–32, ¶ 787(b), at 298–99; Werden, supra note 4, at 462–65; Gerber, supra R
note 4, at 1085–87. R
71. See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1,
24–25 (2005) [hereinafter Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality].
72. For the seminal analysis of successive monopolies, see generally Joseph J.
Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 347 (1950).  For
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level of production have the incentive to try to extract the lion’s share of
the available supracompetitive returns.  This so-called “double marginal-
ization” causes the aggregate price to be even higher than the price that a
vertically integrated monopoly would charge.  A company that spans both
levels of production would avoid the uncoordinated action that can cause
final good prices to exceed monopoly pricing.  Thus, under these circum-
stances, vertical integration would be unambiguously welfare
enhancing.73
Vertical integration may also enhance welfare if inputs can be used
in variable proportions, although such welfare benefits are not inevita-
ble.74  The fact than a monopolist charges supracompetitive prices for an
input creates incentives for firms to use alternative inputs whenever possi-
ble.  The resulting input substitution promotes economic welfare by limit-
ing the input monopolist’s ability to exercise market power.  At the same
time, input substitution creates an alternative potential source of ineffi-
ciency by causing production processes to deviate from the most efficient
input mix.  The net effect is that the ultimate impact on welfare is ambig-
uous.  Determining which of the two countervailing effects will dominate
can be quite difficult.75  And even when input substitution harms compe-
important extensions, see M.L. Greenhut & H. Ohta, Related Market Conditions and
Interindustrial Mergers, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 267, 274 (1976) (arguing that vertical mergers
between monopolistic input supplier and oligopolistic final good producers bring about
greater output and lower prices); M.L. Greenhut & H. Ohta, Vertical Integration of
Successive Oligopolists, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 137, 138–41 (1979) (finding that vertical
mergers between successive oligopolists increase output and lower prices in market for
final product); Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly,
and Vertical Integration, 27 Economica 101, 114–16 (1960) (arguing that vertical merger
between successive monopolists or oligopolists, even in absence of monopsony or
oligopsony, may increase output); Salinger, Market Foreclosure, supra note 60, at 352–54 R
(arguing that vertical merger between successive oligopolists increases output and has
indeterminate effect upon price of final good).
73. See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 563 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (“A merger of the two monopolists therefore makes consumers better off.
Propositions about the economics of mergers often are filled with ifs and maybes;
competing schools of thought produce different prescriptions.  That successive
monopolies injure consumers is a proposition on which there is unanimous agreement.”
(citations omitted)); Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 177 (1988)
(“[W]elfare is unambiguously increased by the elimination of the double
marginalization.”).
74. On the profitability of using vertical integration to stem input substitution, see
Bowman, supra note 66, at 25–27; M.L Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U. R
L. Rev. 62, 68, 77–83 (1960); Lionel W. McKenzie, Ideal Output and the Interdependence
of Firms, 61 Econ. J. 785 (1951).  For the seminal welfare analysis of input substitution, see
John M. Vernon & Daniel A. Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical
Integration, 79 J. Pol. Econ. 924, 924–25 (1971).
75. See F.M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance 523–24 (3d ed. 1990) (“The mathematical conditions underlying this result
are complex . . . .”); Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 54, at 189–91 (reviewing R
literature on welfare effects).
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tition, economists estimate that the impact is likely to be small.76  The
consensus is that any effect upon welfare from preventing input substitu-
tion is likely to be sufficiently small as not to pose a problem significant
enough to be worth redressing.77
Finally, scholars, building on Ronald Coase’s seminal work on the
theory of the firm, have argued that vertical integration can create fur-
ther efficiencies by reducing transaction costs.  Coase found that firms
will vertically integrate into a business activity when the various transac-
tion costs of market purchases exceed the costs of managing that activity
within the firm.78  If so, the firm will choose to produce the input itself
rather than purchasing the input on the open market.  Market transac-
tion costs include search, negotiation, and monitoring of performance of
trading partners.
Much of the literature focuses on how opportunism can increase the
transaction costs of contracting out.79  According to this view, an input
producer can sell its input into the open market to other firms who com-
bine it with other inputs to produce a finished good.80  The problem is
that no contract can anticipate every possible contingency, and as a re-
sult, all contracts are necessarily incomplete to some degree.  Further-
more, rendering contracts more complete is quite costly.  Should the in-
put producer find that the transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing
contracts with its customers exceed the transaction costs of internally
monitoring and managing the resources and employees needed to pro-
duce the finished good itself, it would find vertical integration to be the
preferred institutional form.81
The provision of information and specialized services in distribution
can require vertical coordination. Suppose that a firm offers a technically
76. See Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration:  Determinants and Effects, in 1
Handbook of Industrial Organization 183, 192 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig
eds., 1989) (noting that percentage welfare loss from input substitution appears to be less
than “a couple of percent”).
77. See id. (“[I]t is not clear that variable proportions raises a major policy issue on
vertical integration.”); David Reiffen & Michael Vita, Comment, Is There New Thinking on
Vertical Mergers?, 63 Antitrust L.J. 917, 923 (1995) (“The variable proportions models of
vertical integration seldom have been regarded as providing a sound basis for guiding
vertical merger enforcement policy.”); Salinger, Edgeworth’s Paradox, supra note 61, at R
554–55 (“[I]t is hard to imagine [the variable proportions] model as a serious basis for any
public policy concern with vertical mergers.”).
78. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).
79. See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies:  Analysis and Antitrust
Implications 26–30 (1975) (noting increase in contractual transaction costs associated with
“selective or distorted information disclosure” and “self-disbelieved promises regarding
future conduct”).
80. See Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 54, at 192–200 (reviewing literature). R
81. See Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ.
297, 298–99, 302–04 (1978) (discussing threat of opportunistic behavior, associated
transaction costs, and resulting attractiveness of vertical integration).
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complicated product that requires significant presale services (such as the
demonstration of the product).  Retailers have the incentive to shirk in
providing such services in the hopes that customers will obtain the
presale services from other retailers.  Retailers who free ride on the
presale services provided by others may then sell the product at a lower
price that does not reflect the cost of having to provide those services.
The problem is that if all retailers act in this manner, customers will re-
ceive suboptimal levels of information about these new, potentially wel-
fare enhancing products.82  A producer facing the possibility of such free
riding can rely on a vertical contractual restraint that specifies the level of
presale services provided by each retailer83 or eliminates the incentive to
free ride by granting territorial exclusivity.84  If the transaction costs of
contracting become too high, the producer may instead vertically inte-
grate into distribution.85  Either solution effectively aligns the retailers’
incentives with that of the manufacturers, with transaction costs deter-
mining the ultimate choice of institutional form.
The presence of regulation can also affect incentives to integrate ver-
tically.  Regulators may explicitly encourage or discourage vertical inte-
gration into particular lines of business.  The effect of regulation on in-
centives is illustrated by the classic example sometimes called the “Bell
Doctrine” or “Baxter’s Law” because of the role it played in the breakup
of AT&T during Stanford law professor William Baxter’s tenure as head
of the Antitrust Division.86  It relies upon the fact that an input producer
cannot extract all of the available profit simply by charging the monopoly
price when the government limits the price it can charge for that input.
Vertical integration into an unregulated market allows the monopolist to
earn the profits denied to it in the regulated market by charging higher
82. See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ.
86, 91 (1960).
83. See id. at 94 (“[The manufacturer] may refuse to sell his product to any retailer
who does not provide the requisite special services.”).
84. See G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, An Economic Theory of Vertical
Restraints, 15 RAND J. Econ. 27, 36 (1984) (arguing that territorial exclusivity can
ameliorate free riding problem).
85. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  Klein, Crawford, and Alchian’s prime R
example of the need for vertical integration instead of a vertical contractual restraint is
GM’s acquisition of Fisher Body.  For other analyses that correct their account of this
episode, see Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43
J.L. & Econ. 67 (2000); R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43
J.L. & Econ. 15, 24–30 (2000); Robert F. Freeland, Creating Holdup Through Vertical
Integration:  Fisher Body Revisited, 43 J.L. & Econ. 33 (2000).
86. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and
Open Access Policies:  Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet
Age, 17 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 85, 107 (2003) (noting Baxter’s role in articulating principle);
Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine:  Applications in Telecommunications,
Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1249 (1999) (discussing
centrality of doctrine to eventual judgment against AT&T).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\107-8\COL802.txt unknown Seq: 21 20-NOV-07 8:19
1842 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107:1822
prices in the unregulated market.87  Such rate regulation, therefore, po-
tentially gives monopoly producers the incentive to vertically integrate
into an unregulated market and require all of their customers to
purchase both products at prices that include the full monopoly
markup.88  These incentives can be offset by competitive incentives to at-
tract business in the unregulated market.
A more subtle version of this argument exists when a firm subject to
cost-of-service rate regulation provides an unregulated service that shares
joint costs with the regulated service.89  In that case, it is alleged that the
monopolist can attempt to allocate a disproportionate amount of the
joint costs onto the regulated service and recover those costs through its
regulated rates, which is a real possibility given the inherent arbitrariness
and uncertainty surrounding methodologies for allocating joint costs.
Shifting a disproportionate amount of the joint costs onto the regulated
market allows firms to reduce the size of the markup to cover joint costs
included in the prices charged in the unregulated market.  The firm’s
nonvertically integrated competitors, however, will have to charge prices
that reflect the genuine allocation of the joint costs to the unregulated
87. 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.23, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,836 (June 29, 1984)
(“Non-horizontal mergers may be used by monopoly public utilities subject to rate
regulation as a tool for circumventing that regulation.”).
88. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 n.4 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“In a regulated industry a firm with market
power may be unable to extract a supercompetitive profit because it lacks control over the
prices it charges for regulated products . . . . Tying may then be used to extract that profit
from the sale of the unregulated, tied products . . . .”); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W.
Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing incentive of provider of
regulated service to avoid regulation by requiring purchase of vertically related service);
Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 861 (6th Cir. 1979) (“[R]efusal to deal as part of
a vertical integration scheme is anti-competitive . . . where integration facilitates evasion of
regulation of monopoly profits.”); Bowman, supra note 66, at 21–23 (describing use of R
tying arrangement to avoid price regulation); Timothy J. Brennan, Why Regulated Firms
Should Be Kept Out of Unregulated Markets:  Understanding the Divestiture in United
States v. AT&T, 32 Antitrust Bull. 741, 746–64 (1987) (same); Farrell & Weiser, supra note
86, at 105–07 (“[T]he platform provider can compensate for the fact that its platform is R
priced below the profit-maximizing price by taking additional—and perhaps otherwise
inefficient—profits in the applications market.”); Joskow & Noll, supra note 86, at 1249–50 R
(“[R]egulated monopolies have the incentive and opportunity to monopolize related
markets in which their monopolized service is an input . . . .”); Ratner, supra note 4, at 354 R
(“[Denial of access to an input] allows a regulated monopolist to skirt regulation by
integrating into a downstream market and using its input monopoly to monopolize the
downstream market.”).
89. See, e.g., Daniel L. Brenner, Law and Regulation of Common Carriers in the
Communications Industry 171–72 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that monopolist may be able to
extract supracompetitive profit through misallocation of common costs); Peter W. Huber
et al., Federal Telecommunications Law § 2.2.1, at 92–96 (2d ed. 1999) (same); Joseph
Farrell, Creating Local Competition, 49 Fed. Comm. L.J. 201, 206–07 (1996) (same);
Joskow & Noll, supra note 86, at 1267 (same); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Elusive Goals Under R
the Telecommunications Act:  Preserving Long Distance Competition upon Baby Bell
Entry and Attaining Local Exchange Competition:  We’ll Not Preserve the One Unless We
Attain the Other, 25 Sw. U. L. Rev. 487, 518–27 (1996) (same).
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market.  As a result, some commentators have argued that the essential
facilities doctrine has greater potential relevance in the context of regu-
lated industries.90
Although the Bell Doctrine was once an important consideration
with respect to telecommunications, economic and technological pro-
gress has undercut its significance.  As an initial matter, it has no applica-
bility to wireless and broadband communications, which are not subject
to rate regulation.91  The emergence of competitive wireline alternatives
has caused federal and state regulators to deregulate almost all aspects of
conventional wireline telephone service provided to businesses.92  Com-
petition from wireless providers and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
has led state regulatory authorities to begin the process of deregulating
wireline residential telephone services as well.93  Once this transforma-
tion is complete, the Bell Doctrine will cease to have any continuing ap-
plication to the telecommunications industry.
3. Dynamic Efficiency Considerations. — The discussion up to this point
has focused exclusively on courts’ consideration of how best to allocate
the network that exists today.  In so doing, these rationales overlook the
impact that the essential facilities doctrine can have on incentives to in-
vest in the network of tomorrow.  In other words, the current policy de-
bate has placed too much focus on static efficiency and given too little em-
phasis to the maximization of dynamic efficiency.
When competitive entry is possible, the essential facilities doctrine
can have a detrimental impact on incentives to invest in alternative net-
work capacity.  Exogenous factors—such as shifts in demand, cost-saving
changes in technology, and developments of new substitutes and comple-
ments—frequently cause markets to deviate from their long-run equilib-
rium.  Antitrust law solves this problem through what one leading treatise
calls “a uniquely American, market-affirming response to [market]
power.”94  It “assumes that strong incentives promote efficiency” and that
in the absence of entry barriers, market power “will erode under the pres-
90. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 787(b), at 295–98, ¶ 787(c)(1), at R
307–10 (arguing that essential facilities doctrine has increased importance in regulated
industries as result of limitations it places upon monopolist’s ability to exert power in
downstream market); Ratner, supra note 4, at 354 (same); Werden, supra note 4, at R
466–67, 470, 478 (same); Gerber, supra note 4, at 1087–88 (same). R
91. See Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 4685, 4791 (2005) (“[W]ireless networks . . . have not
previously been subject to cost-based rate regulation.”); Glenn A. Woroch, Open Access
Rules and the Broadband Race, 2002 Mich. St. L. Rev. 719, 728 (noting that broadband has
remained largely free of rate regulation).
92. See Timothy J. Tardiff, Changes in Industry Structure and Technological
Convergence:  Implications for Competition Policy and Regulation in Telecommuni-
cations 16–17, 26–28 (Oct. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 34th
Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, on file with the Columbia Law
Review), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/560/tprc06art.pdf.
93. See id.
94. Sullivan & Grimes, supra note 3, § 3.1(b)(1), at 84. R
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sure of market developments.”95  Tolerating a degree of short-run dise-
quilibrium plays an essential role in this process of reequilibration.  In-
deed, “where supracompetitive pricing accompanies power, erosion of
the power is thought to be more likely because high prices signal the
need, and promise a reward, for entry.”96
This emphasis on allowing monopolists to charge supracompetitive
prices in the short run is sometimes mistaken for the type of competition
envisioned by Joseph Schumpeter, in which the market is dominated by a
succession of monopolists and firms compete by vying to discover the
next breakthrough innovation that will give them a cost or quality advan-
tage decisive enough to allow them to displace the current monopolist
and dominate the market in its place.97  This characterization, however,
ignores the key role that short-run supracompetitive returns play in the
horizontal competition within a market characterized by perfect competi-
tion in which multiple players offer substitute products to consumers and
in which any supracompetitive returns will prove transient and quickly
dissipate.98  Thus, short-run supracompetitive returns not only allocate
the scarce network resources, they signal industry participants that the
market is in short-run disequilibrium and provide incentives to invest in
additional network capacity.
The essential facilities doctrine threatens to derail this process of ree-
quilibration.  Those forced to pay supracompetitive prices for a monop-
oly input or denied access to that input altogether have powerful incen-
tives to invest in alternative sources of supply.  As a result, essential
facilities plaintiffs are natural candidates either to develop independent
capacity themselves or to enter into strategic partnerships with firms in-
terested in becoming alternative suppliers of the input.  Rather than sim-
ply requiring that the monopoly be shared, entry by independent provid-
ers of the input would break up the monopoly, which in turn would lead
to long-run, sustainable consumer benefits without any continuing over-
sight by antitrust authorities.  Conversely, anything that discourages in-
vestments in alternative sources of supply threatens to impede rather
than promote technological and economic development.
The problem is that the essential facilities doctrine threatens to
dampen investment incentives in two ways.  First, investing in alternative
capacity is quite risky and can require substantial capital investment.
Forcing the monopolist to share its input rescues other firms from having
to undertake the risks associated with supplying the relevant input for
95. Id. at 85.
96. Id.
97. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 84 (1942).  For
an example of commentary describing Trinko as Schumpeterian, see Philip J. Weiser, The
Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatory Era, 50 Antitrust Bull. 549,
551–54 (2005).
98. See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 71, at 58–60. R
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themselves.99  Second, if the essential facilities doctrine is to yield any
consumer benefits, it necessarily requires subjecting the owner of the bot-
tleneck facility to some form of price regulation.  This reduction in price
reduces the incentives for others to invest in the development of alterna-
tive sources of supply of the input.  Instead of entering under a price
umbrella created by the input monopolist’s efforts to maximize its own
profits, any new entrant will confront a market with lower price-cost mar-
gins, which in turn makes sustainable entry even more difficult.100  As a
result, compelled access can entrench the supposed bottleneck facility by
forestalling the emergence of the substitute sources of supply of the in-
put, which in turn has the perverse effect of cementing the input owner’s
monopoly position into place.
Compelled access also dampens the incentives of the essential facili-
ties defendant to invest in improvements in its facilities, since price regu-
lation will limit the returns it can earn on such investments and force it to
share successful investments with its competitors.101  Furthermore, be-
cause the monopoly is never displaced, the essential facilities doctrine
implicitly presumes that supervision by antitrust courts will be indefinite.
This is particularly problematic in technologically dynamic industries.
Even if the court strikes the proper balance at the time it renders its deci-
sion, subsequent developments may alter the appropriate input price or
may render competition in the input market possible.  At best, economic
welfare will suffer from some degree of delay, as the legal processes adjust
to catch up with these changes.  At worst, the disincentives created by the
essential facilities doctrine will prevent competition from ever emerging.
Of course, concerns about dampening incentives for investing in al-
ternative sources of supply only make sense if competitive entry is feasi-
ble.  If not, competition policy’s traditional response is to abandon the
first-order policy goal of using antitrust law to break up the input monop-
oly and instead subject the input monopoly to rate regulation and pursue
the second-order policy goal of promoting competition in complemen-
tary markets through access requirements.  This explains the rationale
underlying the breakup of AT&T.  The court’s assumption that competi-
tion in local telephone service was not viable caused it to focus on pro-
moting competition in complementary services, such as long distance, in-
99. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 771(b), at 172–73, ¶ 773(a), at 198, R
¶ 773(b)(2), at 200–01, ¶ 774(c), at 216–17 (arguing that compelled access reduces
incentive to develop independent capacity and, thereby, undermines potential for
increased future competition); Hylton, supra note 4, at 1261, 1266 (discussing how sharing R
can discourage investments in cost-reducing facilities).
100. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 771(b), at 172, ¶ 774(c), at R
216–17 (arguing that, in absence of price regulation, compelled access does not preclude
supracompetitive pricing); Ratner, supra note 4, at 373 (noting that monopoly pricing is R
stimulus to develop independent capacity).
101. See 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 720(b), at 256 (discussing decrease R
in incentive to develop facilities arising from price regulation).
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formation services, and customer premises equipment (CPE).102  Once
technological progress renders competition in the input market feasible,
antitrust courts should abandon the second-order policy goal of promot-
ing competition in complementary services and return to the first-order
policy goal of promoting competition in the last mile.  The problem is
that mandating access will make it difficult for antitrust courts to deter-
mine when it is possible to do so.  In the worst case, the investment disin-
centives created by mandated access can cause it to be a source of, rather
than the solution to, market failure by forestalling last-mile competition
from emerging long after it has become viable.
For this reason, commentators have consistently insisted that the al-
legedly essential facility not be duplicable or available from other
sources.103  It is not sufficient that duplication of the facility might re-
quire significant capital investment and take a long time.104  Simply put,
late is better than never.
4. Empirical Studies of Vertical Exclusion. — The theoretical literature
thus suggests that vertical exclusion is much less problematic than ini-
tially believed.  More recent studies have moved beyond theoretical
claims and have begun to study empirically the impact of vertical exclu-
sion on consumer welfare.  For example, one survey of the empirical liter-
ature conducted by four members of the staff of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) showed that of the seventeen empirical studies of vertical
exclusion, only one found consumer harm, and even in that case the
magnitude of the harm was quite small.105
A different survey of the empirical literature on vertical restraints
found that only three of the eleven published empirical studies on verti-
cal exclusion concluded that privately imposed vertical restraints reduced
consumer welfare.106  Conversely, this survey found no improvement in
consumer welfare when the government intervened to mandate or pro-
hibit the use of a particular vertical restraint, which generally leads to
“higher prices, higher costs, shorter hours of operation, and lower con-
sumption.”107  Although the small number of studies made it difficult to
102. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 14171,
14173–74 ¶ 4 (1996).
103. See Areeda, supra note 4, at 852. R
104. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 774(c), at 216 (showing that R
essential facilities doctrine can be anticompetitive when “the facility can be duplicated or
some substitute developed, even in the relatively long run” (emphasis added)).
105. See James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23
Int’l J. Indus. Org. 639, 648–58 (2005).
106. See Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical
Restraints:  Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in Handbook of Antitrust Economics
(Paolo Buccirossi ed., forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 21–22, on file with the Columbia
Law Review), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/
slade/wp/ecsept2005.pdf.
107. Id.
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make definitive claims about robust empirical findings and suggested fur-
ther study, the authors of this second study described the strength of the
support for the proposition that privately imposed vertical restraints ben-
efit consumers—or at least do not harm them—to be “quite striking,”
“consistent and convincing,” and “compelling.”108
Thus, even though a theoretical possibility exists that vertical exclu-
sion will reduce consumer welfare, the empirical literature strongly sug-
gests that the likelihood of any such anticompetitive harm is remote.  Al-
though the welfare implications of vertical exclusion are ambiguous as a
theoretical matter, the empirical evidence indicating that vertical exclu-
sion tends to promote competition justifies placing the burden of proof
on those challenging a particular vertical arrangement to demonstrate
actual harm to competition before imposing liability.
5. The Evolution of the Law of Vertical Exclusion Prior to Trinko. — Prior
to the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court was quite receptive to vertical exclu-
sion claims.109  In case after case, the Court struck down vertical mergers
by firms controlling as little as 5% of the market, largely out of concern
that vertical integration would reduce competition in the downstream
market.110  This hostility toward vertical exclusion became enshrined in
the initial Merger Guidelines issued by the Justice Department in 1968,
which disfavored any vertical merger involving firms controlling as little
as 6% to 10% of its market.111  The Supreme Court followed a similar
pattern with respect to vertical contractual restraints, either holding them
illegal per se112 or striking them down at such low levels of concentration
as to be tantamount to the same thing.113  In one decision, the Court
108. Id. (manuscript at 21–23).
109. For overviews of this literature, see Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and
the Economics of Congestion, 94 Geo. L.J. 1847, 1885–87 (2006) [hereinafter Yoo,
Network Neutrality and Congestion]; Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 54, at 187–205. R
110. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568, 578 (1972) (striking
down vertical merger resulting in 10% foreclosure); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 303, 327, 331–34 (1962) (striking down vertical merger between shoe
manufacturer with 4% of U.S. market and shoe retailer with less than 2% of U.S. market).
111. Merger Guidelines § 12 (May 30, 1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 13,101 (1988), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
112. On resale price maintenance, see Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149–54
(1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 398–409 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).  On tying, see Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498–99 (1969); United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45
(1962); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1958); Int’l Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396–98 (1947); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134–40
(1936).  On territorial exclusivity, see United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,
607–08 (1972); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1967),
overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
113. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295, 314 (1949)
(holding that exclusive dealing contracts may be held illegal even absent proof of any
tendency to create monopoly and that foreclosure of 16% of market was sufficient to
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went so far as to indicate that liability could lie even in the absence of any
intent or ability to acquire a second monopoly in another market.114  The
Second Circuit took a similar position in a decision indicating that “the
use of monopoly power attained in one market to gain a competitive ad-
vantage in another is a violation of § 2, even if there has not been an
attempt to monopolize the second market.”115  These decisions spawned
a circuit split over whether section 2 requires at least proof that the verti-
cally related market was structured in a way that made the threat of mo-
nopolization credible.116
Over time, however, antitrust law began to reflect the characteriza-
tion of vertical exclusion found in the scholarly commentary.  Of particu-
lar relevance for our discussion are the Court’s most recent tying deci-
sions, which like the essential facilities decisions are based on unilateral
conduct and thus fall within section 2.  In those decisions, the Supreme
Court has begun to require proof that the structural preconditions dis-
cussed above are met before finding liability.  For example, the Supreme
Court has required that a tying defendant possess monopoly power in a
properly defined market.117  Lower courts have followed the Supreme
Court’s lead and have begun to incorporate these structural precondi-
tions into the essential facilities doctrine.  These decisions have always
required the practical unavailability of the input from other sources,118
now formalized into the requirement of proof of a monopoly position in
a properly defined market.119  The need for proof of concentration in
render exclusive dealing contract illegal); Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679, 687 ¶ 10, 691
¶ 33 (1963) (invalidating exclusive dealing arrangement even though it only foreclosed
less than 1% (766 of nearly 100,000) of retail outlets), rev’d, 339 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1964),
rev’d, 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
114. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106–08 (1948).
115. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979).
116. See Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003, 1024 n.11 (10th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing circuit split); Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, 213 F.3d 198,
206 n.16 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).  See generally 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, R
¶ 652(b)(2), at 93–95 (collecting cases).
117. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34–35 (2006); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462, 464, 481 (1992); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12–15 (1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner
Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977); accord Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac.
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296–97 (1985) (applying equivalent requirement
to group boycotts).
118. See, e.g., MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983)
(including among requirements of essential facilities doctrine “competitor’s inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility”); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570
F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that doctrine applies only “‘where facilities cannot
practicably be duplicated by would-be competitors’” (quoting Neale, supra note 23, at R
67)); 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 773(b)(2), at 200–01 (collecting cases). R
119. See Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The
owner of an essential facility is defined as one who, for all practical purposes, possesses a
monopoly . . . .”), vacated, 499 U.S. 944 (1991); City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d
157, 160 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting requirement of “possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market” in essential facilities claim); Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co., 805 F.2d
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the primary market draws further support from AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Board,120 in which the Court addressed a statutory provision re-
quiring incumbent local telephone companies to provide competitors
with access to any element of their networks that was “necessary” and
without which competitors would be “impair[ed]” in their ability to pro-
vide service.121  The majority declined to decide whether this provision
incorporated the standard embodied in the essential facilities doc-
trine,122 but Justice Breyer found the two principles to be “analogous.”123
Tellingly, both the majority and Justice Breyer declined to compel access
to any input that was available from other sources.124  Courts implement-
ing other statutory access mandates have been similarly reluctant to com-
pel access to inputs that are available from other sources.125  Acceptance
of this structural precondition is also reflected in the Non-Horizontal
Merger Guidelines issued by the Justice Department, which now require
that the primary market must surpass a certain threshold level of concen-
tration before antitrust authorities will seriously consider challenging a
vertical merger.126
These decisions also incorporated another of the structural precon-
ditions suggested by the economic theory by requiring proof of substan-
tial foreclosure in the secondary market before subjecting a restraint to
antitrust scrutiny.127  The Supreme Court was even more explicit in
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, holding that even concededly bad con-
490, 494–95 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that, even with regard to essential facilities claim,
“relevant market must be proven” in which “defendant has market power”).
120. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999).
121. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (2000).
122. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 388.
123. Id. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. See id. at 389–92 (majority opinion); id. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
125. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1001–02 (2005) (upholding FCC’s decision that availability of broadband services from
other sources justified refusal to impose access requirements on cable modem systems);
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting order
requiring unbundling of DSL-compatible portion of telephone lines because of order’s
failure to take into account competition from cable modem systems).
126. 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.213, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,836 (June 29, 1984)
(“The Department is unlikely to challenge a merger on this ground unless overall
concentration of the primary market is above 1800 HHI . . . .”).  The 1992 statement that
accompanied the issuance of the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines indicated that section
4 of the 1984 Guidelines continued to provide the relevant guidance for nonhorizontal
mergers.  See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,552 (Sept. 10,
1992).  The Clinton Administration considered revising the Non-Horizontal Merger
Guidelines but chose not to do so.  See Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 54, at 201 R
n.122.
127. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462, 464,
481 (1992) (noting that tying arrangement will constitute antitrust violation “if the
arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market”); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12–16 (1984) (noting requirement that
“substantial volume of commerce [be] foreclosed” by tying arrangement).
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duct cannot support a monopolization claim in the absence of evidence
of actual monopolization, or a dangerous threat of monopolization, of
the secondary market.128  Lower courts have similarly made a threat to a
vertically related market a structural precondition of the essential facili-
ties doctrine,129 while the 1984 Guidelines require that the secondary
market be concentrated and protected by entry barriers.130
Furthermore, in at least one case four Justices of the Court explicitly
recognized the one monopoly rent theorem,131 as have some lower
courts implementing the essential facilities doctrine.132  The Supreme
Court has also shown greater willingness to entertain efficiency justifica-
tions for vertical restraints.133  The Court’s willingness in Aspen Skiing to
consider possible business justifications for apparently anticompetitive
conduct established that efficiencies can justify monopolization.134  As a
result, lower courts applying the essential facilities doctrine have consid-
ered whether possible efficiencies might justify a monopolist’s unilateral
refusal to deal.135  The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines also explicitly
recognize that vertical mergers that violate the structural preconditions
may nonetheless be permitted if they create sufficient efficiencies.136
Finally, courts have exhibited greater sensitivity to dynamic effi-
ciency.  In the words of the Ninth Circuit in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United
128. 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993); accord Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224–25 (1993) (“Earlier this Term, we held in the Sherman
Act § 2 context . . . that the plaintiff [must] prove ‘a dangerous probability that [the
defendant] would monopolize a particular market.’” (quoting Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at
459)).
129. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 546–47 (9th Cir.
1991) (requiring evidence that defendant “obtain[ed], or attempt[ed] to attain, a
monopoly in the downstream . . . market”).
130. 1984 Merger Guidelines §§ 4.211–4.212, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,835–36.
131. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“The
existence of a tied product normally does not increase the profit that the seller with market
power can extract from sales of the tying product.”).
132. See, e.g., Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 861 (6th Cir. 1979)
(“[T]here exists one profit-maximizing monopoly price to the consumer of any given
product.”).
133. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997) (rejecting treatment of vertical
maximum price restraints as per se violation of antitrust laws); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1984) (recognizing promotion of sales training and
presale services as justification for vertical restraint); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 54–55 (1977) (recognizing that vertical restraints can “allow[ ] the
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products,” such as
recruiting new distributors and encouraging promotional, service, and repair services).
134. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 609–11
(1985).
135. See, e.g., City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1365–67 (9th Cir.
1992) (allowing legitimate business justification as defense for refusal to deal); Illinois ex
rel. Burris v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1481–82 (7th Cir. 1991) (same);
Byars, 609 F.2d at 862–63 (same); 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 773(e), at R
209–13 (collecting cases).
136. 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.24, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,837 (June 29, 1984).
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Airlines, Inc., “[e]very time the monopolist asserts its market dominance”
by denying rivals access to a bottleneck input gives the rival “more incen-
tive to find an alternative supplier, which in turn gives alternate suppliers
more reason to think that they can compete with the monopolist.  Every
act exploiting monopoly power to the disadvantage of the monopoly’s
customers hastens the monopoly’s end by making the potential competi-
tion more attractive.”137
Thus, by the time the Supreme Court decided Trinko, the law had
begun to reflect the theoretical critique of the essential facilities doctrine
set forth in the scholarly literature.  As we shall see, Trinko gave this cri-
tique an additional, albeit modest, endorsement.138
B. The Allocation of Authority Between Antitrust Courts and Regulatory
Agencies
Courts and commentators have also expressed concern about the
proper division of responsibility between antitrust courts and regulatory
agencies.  Responding to these concerns, courts have developed a num-
ber of doctrines to prevent conflicts between antitrust law and regulatory
regimes from arising.139  Two doctrines determine whether federal or
state law provides outright immunity from antitrust scrutiny.  Two addi-
tional doctrines address the timing of judicial consideration by postpon-
ing it until after a state or federal regulatory agency has had a chance to
consider the issues in the first instance.  As a general matter, these doc-
trines have not been particularly restrictive and have tended to give anti-
trust courts wide latitude to entertain antitrust claims requesting access to
telecommunications networks.  Scholarship on the essential facilities doc-
trine, however, has begun to question whether current law strikes the cor-
rect balance.140
1. Immunity from Antitrust Scrutiny.
a. Displacement of the Antitrust Laws by a Federal Regulatory Scheme. —
Courts have long recognized that the enactment of a federal regulatory
scheme can immunize particular conduct from antitrust scrutiny.  In rare
cases, a federal regulatory statute explicitly repeals the antitrust laws with
respect to certain conduct.  For example, from 1921 until 1996, federal
law gave the FCC the authority to exempt telephone company mergers
from antitrust scrutiny by the Justice Department and the FTC.141  Such
137. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 549 (9th Cir. 1991).
138. See infra Part III.B.
139. For an overview of these doctrines, see Huber et al., supra note 89, §§ 4.3.2–.6, at R
338–49.
140. See infra Part II.B.4.
141. This provision was originally enacted as part of the Willis-Graham Act, ch. 20, 42
Stat. 27, 27–28 (1921).  It was subsequently incorporated into the Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 221(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1080 (previously codified at 47 U.S.C. § 221(a)
(1994)).  It was eventually repealed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, § 601(b)(2), 110 Stat. 56, 143.
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explicit repeals are relatively rare, though, and courts have construed
them narrowly.142
In the absence of statutory language explicitly exempting conduct
from the antitrust laws, defendants can still argue that the regulatory
scheme is so pervasive as to give rise to implied immunity from the anti-
trust laws.143  The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that
“[r]epeal of the antitrust laws by implication is not favored and not casu-
ally to be allowed.”144  As a result, courts have generally insisted that there
be “a ‘plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provision’”
before holding conduct impliedly immune from the antitrust laws,145 and
upheld implied immunity “even then only to the minimum extent neces-
sary” to make the regulatory scheme work.146
Satisfying the “plain repugnancy” standard requires that the agency
have imposed affirmative obligations on the regulated entity.  Mere
agency jurisdiction over particular conduct is not enough.147  Thus in
United States v. Radio Corp. of America (RCA), the Supreme Court held that
the fact that conduct was subject to FCC regulation under the public in-
terest standard was not enough to exempt it from the antitrust laws.148
Similarly, in Otter Tail, the Court held that a federal agency’s residual
authority to compel access as “necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest” in the electric power industry did not satisfy the requisites for im-
plied exemption from the antitrust laws.149  On the contrary, in forgoing
direct agency regulation of interconnection, Congress had “rejected a
pervasive regulatory scheme . . . in favor of voluntary commercial rela-
tionships.  When these relationships are governed in the first instance by
business judgment and not regulatory coercion, courts must be hesitant
to conclude that Congress intended to override the fundamental national
policies embodied in the antitrust laws.”150
As a result, a wide range of lower courts have rejected claims that the
federal regulatory scheme overseen by the FCC immunizes telephone
142. See, e.g., Indus. Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 505 F.2d 152, 156
(9th Cir. 1974) (noting that exemptions have been read narrowly and do not create
unconditional immunity).
143. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2392 (2007)
(offering Court’s most recent statement of this principle).
144. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975).
145. Id. (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963)).
146. Id. at 683 (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)); accord
Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kan. City, 452 U.S. 378,
388–89 (1981) (calling these general principles “well established”).
147. See, e.g., Gordon, 422 U.S. at 692–93 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The Court has
never held . . . that the antitrust laws are inapplicable to anticompetitive conduct simply
because a federal agency has jurisdiction over the activities of . . . the defendants. . . . The
mere existence of the Commission’s reserve power of oversight . . . does not necessarily
immunize those rules from antitrust attack.”).
148. 358 U.S. 334, 345–46 (1959).
149. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372–75 (1973).
150. Id. at 374.
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companies’ refusals to allow other companies to interconnect with their
networks from antitrust scrutiny.151  Although the Communications Act
of 1934 authorizes the FCC to mandate interconnection if it finds that
doing so is “necessary or desirable in the public interest,”152 Otter Tail
established that such residual authority to order interconnection is insuf-
ficient to confer implied immunity.153  Even though the FCC has the
right to review tariff filings presenting the terms and conditions under
which telephone companies will permit others to interconnect with their
networks, in practice it can only investigate a small percentage of
them.154  The fact that the vast majority of tariff filings go into effect with-
out FCC review and approval renders antitrust immunity improper, since
the tariffs are the result of the telephone companies’ business judgment
rather than regulatory coercion.155
b. State Action Immunity. — Since its landmark decision in Parker v.
Brown,156 the Supreme Court has also recognized that state regulatory
151. For cases holding that regulations governing the interconnection of local and
long distance services did not impliedly immunize conduct from the antitrust laws, see S.
Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. AT&T Co., 740 F.2d 980, 999–1000 (D.C. Cir. 1984); MCI Commc’ns
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1101–05 (7th Cir. 1983); Mid-Tex. Commc’ns Sys., Inc.
v. AT&T Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1377–81 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. AT&T Co., 461 F.
Supp. 1314, 1320–30 (D.D.C. 1978).  For a similar decision regarding the interconnection
of paging systems, see Indus. Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 505 F.2d 152, 156
(9th Cir. 1974).  For similar decisions regarding the interconnection of CPE, see
Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 664 F.2d 716, 726–35 (9th Cir. 1981), modified, 1982 WL
11277 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1982); Ne. Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 82–84 (2d Cir.
1981); Sound, Inc. v. AT&T, 631 F.2d 1324, 1327–31 (8th Cir. 1980); Essential Commc’ns
Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 610 F.2d 1114, 1116–25 (3d Cir. 1979); Jarvis, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 481
F. Supp. 120, 123–24 (D.D.C. 1978); Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 449
F. Supp. 1158, 1163–69 (D. Haw. 1978); Macom Prods. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 359 F. Supp.
973, 976 (C.D. Cal. 1973).  The only exceptions are two district court decisions that were
later overturned on appeal, see Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 435 F. Supp. 207 (C.D. Cal.
1977), rev’d, 664 F.2d 716; Dasa Corp. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,610
(C.D. Cal. May 10, 1977), rev’d sub nom. Phonetele, 664 F.2d 716, and a third, thinly
reasoned decision that relied entirely on the authority of the two previous decisions, see
Monitor Bus. Machs. v. AT&T Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 62,030 (C.D. Cal. May 5,
1978) (relying on Phonetele and Dasa).
152. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
153. See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text. R
154. See United States v. AT&T Co., 461 F. Supp. at 1326.
155. See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1103–05 (holding antitrust immunity inapposite because
“the initial decision whether to interconnect rests with the utility, and the record shows
that the FCC did not control or approve of AT & T’s actions here”); Phonetele, 664 F.2d at
733–34 (rejecting antitrust immunity when FCC permitted tariff to go into effect while
agency conducted its own review of interconnection-related issues); Sound, 631 F.2d at
1330–31 (finding that decisions based upon the business judgment of firm rather than
regulatory mandate are not exempted from antitrust laws); Essential Commc’ns, 610 F.2d at
1124 (drawing support for lack of exemption from agency failure to rule on tariff
application); United States v. AT&T Co., 461 F. Supp. at 1326–28 (describing inability of
FCC to review all tariff filings and weakness of FCC’s regulatory regime); Jarvis, 481 F.
Supp. at 123–24 (noting lack of formal approval of tariffs by FCC).
156. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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schemes can confer antitrust immunity in much the same manner as fed-
eral regulatory schemes.  The Supreme Court has identified two stan-
dards that must be satisfied before state action immunity can attach.
“First, the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed as state policy’; second, the policy must be ‘actively
supervised’ by the State itself.”157  The Court noted in a later case:
The [active supervision] requirement is designed to ensure that
the state-action doctrine will shelter only the particular anticom-
petitive acts of private parties that, in the judgment of the State,
actually further state regulatory policies.  To accomplish this
purpose, the active supervision requirement mandates that the
State exercise ultimate control over the challenged anticompeti-
tive conduct.  The mere presence of some state involvement or
monitoring does not suffice.158
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that for state action immunity to
apply, the state must actively review the rate increases in question; mere
authority to review those rates is not sufficient.159  Although some courts
have concluded that the state tariffing process is enough to immunize
retail access,160 others have refused to confer state action immunity on
the refusals of local telephone companies to open their networks to inde-
pendent providers of long distance services and CPE.161  In addition, the
enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 gave the federal gov-
ernment jurisdiction over areas of local telephone service that had previ-
ously been the exclusive province of the states, further narrowing the po-
tential scope of state action immunity.162  Moreover, as noted earlier, the
emergence of competition in last-mile distribution has led state public
utility commissions to begin deregulating retail services.163  As this pro-
157. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
158. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988) (citations omitted).
159. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992) (“The mere potential
for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State. . . . In the
absence of active supervision in fact, there can be no state-action immunity for what were
otherwise private price-fixing arrangements.”).
160. See DFW Metro Line Servs. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1267, 1269 n.6 (5th Cir.
1990); Davis v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1532, 1539–42 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Metro
Mobile CTS, Inc. v. NewVector Commc’ns, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1504, 1508–21 (D. Ariz.
1987), aff’d on other grounds, 892 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1989); Sonitrol of Fresno, Inc. v.
AT&T Co., 629 F. Supp. 1089, 1094–1101 (D.D.C. 1986).
161. For long distance services, see Mid-Tex. Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 615
F.2d 1372, 1381–82 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. AT&T Co. (Modification of Final
Judgment), 552 F. Supp. 131, 156–59 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).  For CPE, see Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 664 F.2d
716, 735–37 (9th Cir. 1981); Sound, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 631 F.2d 1324, 1331–35 (8th Cir.
1980); Essential Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 610 F.2d 1114, 1125 (3d Cir. 1979);
Jarvis, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 481 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D.D.C. 1978).
162. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999).
163. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. R
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cess proceeds to its logical conclusion, the basis for state action immunity
will eventually disappear.
2. Doctrines Affecting the Timing of Antitrust Scrutiny. — The foregoing
discussion reveals that the existing state and federal regulatory schemes
are unlikely to insulate telecommunications companies from claims seek-
ing access to their networks under the antitrust laws.  Although the pres-
ence of regulatory schemes may not provide antitrust immunity, it may
nonetheless forestall judicial consideration of the merits of claims until
after the relevant agency has had the opportunity to address the issues in
the first instance.
a. Abstention. — When the regulatory regime at issue arises under
state law, the timing of judicial consideration is determined by one of two
abstention doctrines.  The first, known as administrative or Burford ab-
stention,164 applies when “the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal court
would disrupt a state administrative process.”165  The Supreme Court re-
cently described Burford abstention as follows:
Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a fed-
eral court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the
proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies:  (1)
when there are “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance tran-
scends the result in the case then at bar”; or (2) where the “exer-
cise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar
cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.”166
Lower courts have generally declined to apply Burford abstention to
challenges to denial of access to telecommunications networks either be-
cause the state law at issue was relatively clear167 or because the issue was
purely a question of federal law that may result in the overturning of a
state policy.168  As a result, there was little risk of disrupting the policies
reflected in the state administrative processes.
164. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317–18 (1943) (establishing doctrine);
Paul M. Bator et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1364
(3d ed. 1988) (calling form of abstention initiated by Burford “administrative abstention”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
165. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959); accord
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 n.11 (1967) (noting possibility of abstention “in cases
involving possible disruption of complex state administrative processes”); Lumbermen’s
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53 (1954) (characterizing Burford as decision “to avoid
a potential interference with a state’s administrative policy-making process”).
166. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)
(quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
167. See GTE N., Inc. v. Strand, 209 F.3d 909, 920–21 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]o abstain
pending state review of GTE’s claims would be inappropriate because the dictates of [state
law] are clear . . . .”).
168. See Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 107 F. Supp. 2d 653, 665–66
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding Burford abstention inapplicable where issue concerned assertion
of federal control over state regulation).
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The second, known as Younger abstention, is based on the premise
that the federal government should not interfere with those governmen-
tal functions that are more properly regarded as falling within the prov-
ince of the states under the system of federalism established by the
Constitution.169  The paradigmatic state function into which the federal
government should not intrude, illustrated by the Younger case itself, is
the prosecution of state crimes.170  Subsequent decisions have extended
Younger to state administrative proceedings implicating important state
interests, including attorney malpractice,171 claims of sex discrimina-
tion,172 and misconduct by state police and prosecutors.173  The Supreme
Court has noted that Younger has only been applied to administrative pro-
ceedings that were essentially backward looking.  Forward-looking pro-
ceedings, such as ratemaking, are more closely allied with the legislative
than the judicial process and thus are poor candidates for Younger absten-
tion.174  As a result, lower courts have generally declined to subject chal-
lenges to denial of access to telecommunications networks to Younger
abstention.175
b. Primary Jurisdiction. — When the regulatory regime at issue is a
federal one, the timing of judicial consideration is determined by a doc-
trine known as “primary jurisdiction,” which requires courts to permit
agencies responsible for administering federal regulatory schemes the op-
portunity to be the first to address issues within their competence.  As a
result, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires the federal courts to
stay its proceedings or dismiss a claim without prejudice until the relevant
agency has had a chance to address the issue.176
169. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
170. See id. at 46.
171. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,
431–37 (1982) (finding that bar disciplinary hearings implicate important state interests,
justifying abstention).
172. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
627–28 (1986) (treating elimination of sex discrimination as significant state interest).
173. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–80 (1976) (discussing federalism concerns
raised by federal judicial interference with state criminal proceeding).
174. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 370–71
(1989) (discussing analytical framework for determining whether agency action is
legislative or judicial in nature).
175. See GTE N., Inc. v. Strand, 209 F.3d 909, 921 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding Younger
abstention inapplicable where only forward-looking state agency proceedings are
ongoing); Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 107 F. Supp. 2d 653, 666 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (same).
176. See, e.g., Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 302–06 (1973) (staying
action pending resolution of agency proceeding where certain facets of dispute fell within
statutory jurisdiction of agency and resolution would aid overall resolution); Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 309–12 (1963) (dismissing claim more
properly falling within statutory jurisdiction of agency); United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352
U.S. 59, 65–69 (1956) (allocating responsibility for undertaking initial resolution of
disputed issues to agency where disputed facts fall within agency, and outside judicial,
competence).
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The Supreme Court examined the foundations of primary jurisdic-
tion in RCA, which addressed whether the existence of FCC regulation
prevented federal courts from considering an antitrust claim:
[W]hen rates and practices relating thereto were challenged
under the antitrust laws, the agencies had primary jurisdiction
to consider the reasonableness of such rates and practices in the
light of the many relevant factors including alleged antitrust vio-
lations, for otherwise sporadic action by federal courts would
disrupt an agency’s delicate regulatory scheme, and would
throw existing rate structures out of balance.177
Primary jurisdiction is the only doctrine ever to serve as a meaningful
limit on antitrust courts’ jurisdiction over claims seeking access to tele-
communications networks.  A number of early courts relied on primary
jurisdiction to require that antitrust courts defer their consideration of
requests for access until after they had been addressed by the FCC.178
Later decisions have accorded antitrust courts a greater scope of author-
ity.  For example, the district court hearing the case that would lead to
the breakup of AT&T took a narrower view of primary jurisdiction, per-
mitting the antitrust case to go forward while reserving the right to refer
issues to the FCC at a later point in the litigation.179  This position had
the effect of bringing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction more into line
with the other doctrines discussed above.
3. The Rationales Underlying the Balance Between Antitrust and Regula-
tion. — Over the years, the Supreme Court has offered several justifica-
tions for its doctrines allocating decisionmaking authority between anti-
trust courts and administrative agencies.  First and foremost is the need to
avoid conflict between the mandates of the antitrust courts and those of
the relevant regulatory regime.  With respect to immunity implied from
other federal statutes, the Court has held that the law must ensure that
“the federal agency entrusted with regulation in the public interest could
carry out that responsibility free from the disruption of conflicting judg-
ments that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under the
177. United States v. Radio Corp. of Am. (RCA) 358 U.S. 334, 348 (1959).
178. For an invocation of primary jurisdiction in an antitrust suit challenging AT&T’s
refusal to allow independent long distance companies to connect with its network, see MCI
Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 496 F.2d 214, 219–24 (3d Cir. 1974).  For invocations of
primary jurisdiction in the context of CPE, see Carter v. AT&T Co., 250 F. Supp. 188,
190–92 (N.D. Tex. 1966), aff’d, 365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966); Huber et al., supra note 89, R
§ 8.4.1.1, at 664–65 (collecting cases); see also Carter, 365 F.2d at 498 n.23 (citing four
unreported district court cases in which courts invoked doctrine of primary jurisdiction
when confronted with antitrust challenge to foreign attachments tariff).
179. See United States v. AT&T Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1329, 1336, 1349–50 (D.D.C.
1978); United States v. AT&T Co., 427 F. Supp. 57, 61–62 (D.D.C. 1976).
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antitrust laws.”180  It has invoked similar rationales in the context of state
action immunity,181 Burford abstention,182 and primary jurisdiction.183
In the context of state action immunity, the Supreme Court also has
invoked federalism as an additional consideration.  As the Court noted in
Parker, “In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution,
the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally sub-
tract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s con-
trol over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress.”184  The Court based Younger abstention on notions of “comity”
and “Our Federalism,” which it described as “a proper respect for state
functions, a recognition . . . that the entire country is made up of a Union
of separate [States], and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States . . . are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways.”185  The inclusion of federalism
as a justification with respect to these two doctrines, though, did not
make them any broader than when federalism was not implicated.  As the
Court noted, “Congress could hardly have intended state regulatory agen-
cies to have broader power than federal agencies to exempt private con-
duct from the antitrust laws.  Therefore, . . . the standards for ascertain-
ing the existence and scope of [this] exemption surely must be at least as
severe as those applied to federal regulatory legislation.”186
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s decisions on primary jurisdiction
and Burford abstention added a third consideration:  the differences in
institutional competence between antitrust courts and regulatory agen-
cies.  For example, the Court’s opinion in RCA underscored that, in addi-
tion to the need to avoid conflicting mandates, primary jurisdiction was
also based in part on “the need for administrative skill ‘commonly to be
found only in a body of experts’ in handling the ‘intricate facts’” needed
180. United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975).
181. In the words of the Supreme Court:
In this case we are asked to hold that private conduct required by state law is
exempt from the Sherman Act.  Two quite different reasons might support such a
rule.  First, if a private citizen has done nothing more than obey the command of
his state sovereign, it would be unjust to conclude that he has thereby offended
federal law.  Second, if the State is already regulating an area of the economy, it is
arguable that Congress did not intend to superimpose the antitrust laws as an
additional, and perhaps conflicting, regulatory mechanism.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592 (1976).
182. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943) (observing how “double
system” of state administrative and federal judicial review can lead to “[d]elay,
misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with the state policy”).
183. See United States v. Radio Corp. of Am. (RCA), 358 U.S. 334, 346 (1959) (noting
that primary jurisdiction was “grounded on the necessity for administrative uniformity”);
id. at 347–48 (noting that some primary jurisdiction decisions “emphasized the need for
administrative uniformity and uniform rates” (citing Keogh v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S.
156 (1922))).
184. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
185. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
186. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 596–97 (footnote omitted).
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to regulate an industry.187 Burford similarly relied on the need to allow
state agencies and the state courts reviewing those agencies’ decisions “to
acquire a specialized knowledge which is useful in shaping the policy of
regulation of the ever-changing demands in this field.”188  Concerns
about institutional capabilities also appeared in lower court decisions ap-
plying primary jurisdiction to the telecommunications industry, which
based the doctrine in part on “the court’s lack of expertise with the sub-
ject matter of the agency’s regulation.”189
4. Implications for the Essential Facilities Doctrine. — Considerations of
institutional competence have particular resonance for the essential facil-
ities doctrine.  Commentators have recognized that the doctrine necessa-
rily presupposes some form of price regulation.190  In the absence of
price regulation, the owner of the bottleneck facility would simply pro-
vide access at the monopoly price.  While such access would be beneficial
to the monopolist’s competitors, simply requiring that the monopoly be
shared would provide no benefits to consumers, since the monopoly
would be left intact without any improvements in price or output.191
Setting prices is not a function to which antitrust courts are institu-
tionally well suited.  If courts were to adopt a role in setting prices, they
would be forced to address the problems of valuing assets, distinguishing
between prudent and imprudent investments, separating capital from op-
187. RCA, 358 U.S. at 346 (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs.’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S.
285, 291 (1922)); accord id. at 348 (emphasizing “the need for administrative experience
in distilling the relevant facts in a complex industry as a foundation for later court action”
(citing United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Far E.
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Fed. Mar. Bd. v. Isbrandsten Co., 356
U.S. 481, 497–99 (1958))).
188. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943).
189. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 496 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1974).
190. See, e.g., 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 774(3), at 223–24 (noting R
that the essential facilities doctrine requires courts to oversee disputes over the price of
access to the facility); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, § 7.7(d)(1), at 313 (“[C]ompelling a R
single firm to deal requires a court to set terms and conditions of the sale, thus turning it
into a kind of regulatory agency.”); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law:  An Economic
Perspective 208, 211 (1976) [hereinafter Posner, Antitrust Law] (noting that “[i]t is
difficult to understand how [the decree in Terminal Railroad] protects the public; its
purpose and effect are, rather, to let the defendants’ competitors share in the monopoly
position enjoyed by the defendants” and that by ordering the defendant to deal, “[t]he
antitrust court becomes charged with the detailed and continuous supervision of an
ongoing commercial relationship, a function that courts are ill equipped to perform
effectively”); Sullivan & Grimes, supra note 3, § 3.4(b)(3), at 125 (“[W]ithout some control R
on rates, the relief accorded to [plaintiffs] could be meaningless.”).
191. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 771(b), at 171–73 (arguing that R
compelled sharing fails to decrease price or to increase output while perpetuating the
monopoly by reducing or removing incentives to invest in alternative network capacity);
Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 190, at 208 (noting that decree mandating R
nondiscriminatory access merely accomplishes distribution of monopoly profit without
social benefit); Areeda, supra note 4, at 852 (claiming that compelled sharing is unlikely to R
increase competition where “the plaintiff merely substitutes itself for the monopolist or
shares the monopolist’s gains”).
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erating expenses, allocating shared costs across multiple products, and
determining the appropriate rate of return that have long plagued the
administrative ratemaking process.192  This difficulty explains why the
Supreme Court noted in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. that “[t]he
reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business
changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow” and warned
against “placing on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the
burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has become unreasona-
ble through the mere variation of economic conditions.”193  The Court
continued:
[I]n the absence of express legislation requiring it, we should
hesitate to adopt a construction making the difference between
legal and illegal conduct in the field of business relations de-
pend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasona-
ble—a determination which can be satisfactorily made only after
a complete survey of our economic organization and a choice
between rival philosophies.194
Subsequent decisions by both the Supreme Court and lower courts
have reiterated the difficulties that antitrust courts face in determining
what constitutes a reasonable price.195
Commentators have invoked the difficulties that antitrust courts face
in implementing access mandates when criticizing the essential facilities
doctrine.  As Philip Areeda notes in his now-classic critique of the essen-
tial facilities doctrine, “No court should impose a duty to deal that it can-
not explain or adequately and reasonably supervise.  The problem should
192. See 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 720(b), at 256–58. R
193. 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927).
194. Id. at 398.
195. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (citing Trenton
Potteries, 273 U.S. at 397–98, and United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290,
340–41 (1897), as authorities for declining to evaluate the reasonableness of prices);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 281–82 (1942) (“As in case of an appraisal
of the reasonableness of prices which are fixed, such a determination could satisfactorily
be made ‘only after a complete survey of our economic organization and a choice between
rival philosophies’ and only after weighing a host of intangibles.” (quoting Trenton Potteries,
273 U.S. at 398)); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212–14 (1940)
(reiterating principle that determination of reasonable price involves broad and sweeping
factual investigation beyond competence of court); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445,
462–63 (1927) (same); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.
1996) (“[T]he antitrust laws do not deputize district judges as one-man regulatory
agencies.”); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990)
(“[H]ow is a judge . . . to determine a ‘fair price?’  Is it the price charged by other
suppliers . . . ?  None exist.  Is it the price that competition ‘would have set’ were the
primary level not monopolized?  How can the court determine this price . . . without acting
like a rate-setting regulatory agency . . . ?”); cf. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 331–42
(pre-Trenton Potteries decision citing difficulties in determining reasonableness of rates as
justification for “leav[ing] the question of reasonableness to the companies themselves”).
See generally 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 720(b), at 256–58 (reviewing these R
arguments and collecting cases).
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be deemed irremedial by antitrust law when compulsory access requires
the court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory
agency.”196
Areeda elaborated on this critique in his treatise.  As the current ver-
sion (now coauthored with Herbert Hovenkamp) notes, if access is com-
pelled without placing any restrictions on the price charged, the essential
facilities doctrine will provide no benefits to consumers through de-
creases in price and increases in output, as the monopolist will simply
charge the full monopoly price.197  Antitrust courts will likely find, how-
ever, that their attempts at regulating prices are likely to be extremely
difficult to administer.  Since the monopolist has already evinced a lack of
willingness to deal with its competitor, it is likely that disputes over the
terms and conditions of the compelled access will surround the
relationship:
The plaintiff is likely to claim that the defendant’s price for ac-
cess to an essential facility is (1) so high as to be the equivalent
of a continued refusal to deal, or (2) is unreasonable, or (3)
creates a “price squeeze” in that the defendant charges so much
for access and so little for the product it sells in competition
with the plaintiff that the latter cannot earn a reasonable
profit.198
The disputes, moreover, will not be limited just to price.  The parties
are likely to disagree on nonprice terms and conditions as well.199
Should the demand outstrip the existing capacity, compelled access
would force network owners not merely to sell out of excess capacity, but
to reduce their own output or expand their plants in order to service
rivals.200  As a result, mandating access requires “price regulation of the
kind undertaken by regulatory agencies—something for which both the
federal courts and the antitrust litigation process are extremely ill-suited
and which is, in any event, inconsistent with antitrust’s fundamental ‘mar-
ket’ orientation to problems of lack of competition.”201  Other commen-
196. Areeda, supra note 4, at 853.  Areeda acknowledged that compelling access is R
more justifiable where the monopolist is a consortium that can admit additional members
or where a regulatory agency already exists to control the terms of dealing.  See id.
197. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 771(b), at 171–72, ¶ 773(a), at R
197; see also id. ¶ 765(c), at 101, ¶ 774(e), at 224–27 (describing inability of courts to
determine proper price and judicial reluctance to even attempt to do so).
198. Id. ¶ 774(e), at 224; see also id. ¶ 765(c), at 101–02, ¶ 772(d), at 194 (noting
that remedies inevitably involve regulating prices and terms of sale and that courts are ill
suited to such tasks).
199. See id. ¶ 774(e), at 227 n.44, ¶ 782(k), at 281–82 (listing cases in which parties
litigated nonprice terms of compelled access and describing potential of monopolists to
abuse litigation).
200. See id. ¶ 774(e), at 223.
201. Id. ¶ 771(b), at 172; accord id. ¶ 772(d), at 194, ¶ 773(a), at 198, ¶ 774(e), at
227–28 (favoring alternative remedies or even no remedy at all when courts would
otherwise be required to undertake regulatory functions).
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tators have drawn similar conclusions.202
These criticisms of antitrust courts’ institutional competence to over-
see access mandates are part of a broader debate about the relative merits
of structural and conduct remedies.203  Richard Posner’s statistical study
of antitrust enforcement distinguished between “once-for-all” decrees
that render a market structurally competitive and thereafter do not re-
quire continuing judicial oversight, and “regulatory” decrees, which re-
quire antitrust courts to maintain continuing supervisory relationships.204
Posner questioned the institutional competence of courts to superintend
regulatory decrees.  In addition to requiring scrutiny over price, regula-
tory decrees require antitrust courts to allocate market share and restrict
the lines of business that the entities subject to the decree may enter,
actions that require an extraordinary level of intervention into the mar-
ket and can limit competition.205  Most importantly, Posner questioned
the expedience of creating ad hoc regulatory regimes administered by
scattered district courts.  Indeed, he found that “the entry of such a de-
cree is tantamount to a confession that the antitrust action has not suc-
202. See Hylton, supra note 4, at 1283–84 (proposing presumption against plaintiffs R
where claim requires court to engage in problems as difficult as price regulation); Werden,
supra note 4, at 460–61 (noting conclusion of various commentators that difficulty of R
providing relief should cause courts to avoid intervention in absence of regulation).  But
see Ratner, supra note 4, at 370–72, 376–78 (recognizing that antitrust courts are not well R
suited to regulate price, but arguing that intervention is only meaningful remedy available
to increase output toward competitive levels).
203. Compare Kevin J. O’Connor, The Divestiture Remedy in Sherman Act § 2 Cases,
13 Harv. J. on Legis. 687, 692–93 (1976) (advocating structural over conduct remedies),
with Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act
Monopolization Cases, 80 Or. L. Rev. 109, 109–15 (2001) (arguing that structural remedies
provide insufficient benefit to consumers), and Thomas A. Piraino, Identifying
Monopolists’ Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 809, 879–83
(2000) (criticizing judicial use of structural remedies as failing to consider underlying
market conditions and requiring expertise lacking in courts).  This debate has gained new
salience with the proposal of structural relief in the Microsoft case.  See John E. Lopatka &
William H. Page, Devising a Microsoft Remedy That Serves Consumers, 9 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 691, 707–08 (2001) (arguing that structural remedies in Microsoft are ineffective and
counterproductive); Piraino, supra, at 883–91 (noting proposal of structural remedies, but
arguing for imposition of conduct remedies); R. Craig Romaine & Steven C. Salop, Slap
Their Wrists?  Tie Their Hands?  Slice Them Into Pieces?  Alternative Remedies for
Monopolization in the Microsoft Case, Antitrust, Summer 1999, at 15, 16–22 (discussing
proposed structural and conduct remedies); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak,
Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 73–90 (2001) (arguing
that lack of necessary information renders choice between structural and conduct
remedies on economic efficiency grounds impossible).
204. See Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. &
Econ. 365, 386–88 (1970) [hereinafter Posner, Statistical Study].  For an updated analysis,
see Richard A. Posner & Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust:  Cases, Economic Notes and
Other Materials 761–63 (2d ed. 1981).
205. See Posner, Statistical Study, supra note 204, at 388. R
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ceeded in restoring competitive conditions.”206  Posner later elaborated
in the casebook he coauthored with Frank Easterbrook:
There is a sense in which the entry of a regulatory decree signi-
fies that the case should never have been brought.  The decree
is an acknowledgement that competition will not work in the
particular circumstances of the case. . . . The question is thus
posed whether antitrust enforcement, the cardinal purpose of
which is to prevent and destroy monopolies, is also a suitable
tool for domesticating those monopolies that are ineradicable at
acceptable cost.207
The remedial difficulties associated with the essential facilities doc-
trine have led courts granting relief under the doctrine to be rather
vague regarding the terms and conditions of access.208  The resulting de-
gree of ongoing supervision required by a regulatory decree is aptly
demonstrated by Terminal Railroad, in which the Supreme Court was con-
stantly called upon to adjudicate the application of the decree.209  Al-
though such problems might be minimized if the monopolist already sells
the product to other customers, since an antitrust court could simply or-
der that it provide access on a nondiscriminatory basis,210 administering
such a remedial scheme would still be extremely difficult.  In any event,
this solution is completely unavailing if the bottleneck owner does not
sell its input externally and instead devotes all available capacity to its own
output.
It is easy to make the case that complex subjects like telecommunica-
tions should be the province of administrative agencies and not courts.
Agencies enjoy advantages that go beyond technical expertise.  Unlike
courts, agencies can set their own agendas and are less dependent on the
parties for the development of the factual record and legal arguments
than are courts.  Administrative processes also provide greater opportuni-
ties for public participation than do judicial processes, in which inter-
ested third parties are generally limited to filing amicus briefs.  Agencies
are also in a better position to take all aspects of a regulatory scheme into
account than are courts, which by their nature will limit their considera-
tion to the dispute at hand.  Permitting courts to entertain antitrust suits
might simply invite disappointed parties who failed to obtain relief from
the agency to try to take a second bite of the apple.
206. Id.
207. Posner & Easterbrook, supra note 204, at 762–63. R
208. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 774(e), at 225 (“[T]he few R
decisions that have granted relief never offer detailed directives for dealing.”); Werden,
supra note 4, at 460–61 (noting that courts generally have not addressed difficulties of R
providing remedies).
209. See Terminal R.R. Ass’n v. United States, 266 U.S. 17, 27 (1924); Terminal R.R.
Ass’n v. United States, 236 U.S. 194, 195–96 (1915); Ex parte United States, 226 U.S. 420,
421 (1913); see also Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 4, at 1196–98 (discussing continuing R
judicial involvement and repeated interpretation of original decree).
210. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 772(d), at 194. R
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These considerations suggest that regulatory agencies are in a better
position to supervise access mandates than are antitrust courts.  As we
shall see, these concerns would find voice in the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Trinko.
III. THE IMPACT OF TRINKO
The Supreme Court’s Trinko decision arose out of a dispute over the
speed with which Verizon and its predecessors211 were meeting the obli-
gation that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 imposed on existing lo-
cal telephone companies, called incumbent local exchange carriers
(LECs), to provide access to all of their network elements on an unbun-
dled basis.  The specific source of concern was the computer system that
Verizon used to process requests for service, known as its operations sup-
port system (OSS).  Verizon’s competitors complained that Verizon was
not fulfilling the orders that they placed through the OSS in a timely
manner.  Parallel investigations by both federal and state regulatory au-
thorities led both agencies to adopt orders providing some relief.  A cus-
tomer of one of Verizon’s competitors filed an antitrust suit arguing that
the same conduct violated section 2.212
The Supreme Court rejected the customer’s claims in an opinion
that accepted many of the criticisms of the essential facilities doctrine
discussed above.213  In so doing, the opinion has touched off a lively de-
bate about the proper scope of section 2 liability and in particular about
the future of the essential facilities doctrine.
A. The Economics of Vertical Exclusion
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the substantive antitrust claim
began by noting that the antitrust laws do not penalize the mere posses-
sion of monopoly power absent proof of exclusionary conduct.214
Indeed:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
important element of the free-market system.  The opportunity
to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what
attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk tak-
ing that produces innovation and economic growth.215
211. Over the course of the litigation, the company originally named NYNEX first
merged with Bell Atlantic and then merged with GTE to form a new corporation called
Verizon.  We will follow the Supreme Court’s convention by referring to all of these entities
as Verizon.  See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 402 n.1 (2004).
212. Id. at 402–05.
213. See id. at 406–10, 411–15 (discussing economic and institutional criticisms of
judicial intervention in context of unilateral refusal to deal).
214. Id. at 407.
215. Id.
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Because investments in telecommunications networks represent a le-
gitimate form of competition on the merits,216 antitrust principles must
be structured so as not to deter such procompetitive conduct.217  As the
Court noted later in the opinion, expansions of section 2 liability that
penalize procompetitive conduct can be particularly harmful “‘because
they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’”218
The Court’s concern was that requiring a monopolist to share its bot-
tleneck facility could impede dynamic efficiency.  The Court noted,
“Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage . . . may
lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in
those economically beneficial facilities.”219  Later portions of the opinion
emphasized “the uncertain virtue of forced sharing” and how mandating
access under section 2 “seem[ed] destined to distort investment.”220  It is
for this reason that “as a general matter, the Sherman Act ‘does not re-
strict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent dis-
cretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’”221
At the same time, the Court recognized that “‘[t]he high value that
we have placed on the right to refuse to deal with other firms does not
mean that the right is unqualified,’”222 although the Court “ha[s] been
very cautious in recognizing such exceptions.”223  The Court noted that
the leading case supporting antitrust liability for a refusal to cooperate
with a rival is the Aspen Skiing decision summarized above, which the
Court described as “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.”224  Ac-
cording to the Court, the fact that Ski Co. was willing to terminate unilat-
erally “a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing sug-
gested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an
anticompetitive end,” as did the fact that Ski Co. was unwilling to renew
the all-Aspen ticket even if compensated at full retail price.225  Verizon, in
contrast, had never dealt with its rivals voluntarily, but instead did so only
under regulatory compulsion at regulated, wholesale prices.226  In the ab-
sence of a preexisting relationship, Verizon’s actions did not reveal any
216. See id. (“Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure
that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.”).
217. Id. at 407–08 (noting that some monopoly power is necessary to preserve
principles of free market system).
218. Id. at 414 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 594 (1986)).
219. Id. at 407–08.
220. Id. at 408, 414.
221. Id. at 408 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
222. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985)).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 409.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 409–10.
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“anticompetitive bent.”227  The Court also distinguished Otter Tail as a
case in which the network owner “was already in the business of providing
a service to certain customers . . . and refused to provide the same service
to certain other customers.”228  This fact rendered Otter Tail inapposite,
as Verizon had never publicly marketed the wholesale access to the OSS
at issue in Trinko in the absence of regulation.229
These distinctions represent sharp limitations on the scope of liabil-
ity for a network’s unilateral refusal to deal.  They clearly suggest that
liability will not lie in the absence of a preexisting joint venture or a
demonstrated willingness to offer the service to others at a full retail
price, since Trinko regarded the willingness to sacrifice profits as a key
indicator that the conduct in Aspen Skiing was anticompetitive.  Some
commentators have argued that the presence of a preexisting course of
dealing reveals little, if anything, about a practice’s likely competitive im-
pact230 and that attaching significance to the abandonment of an initial
willingness to deal ignores the fact that circumstances change231 and risks
discouraging firms from dealing in the first place.232  Others have sug-
gested that a preexisting willingness to deal provides at least some evi-
dence that the joint venture was efficient.233
There is also language in the opinion that appears to recognize the
structural preconditions that are necessary for vertical exclusion to be
plausible.  For example, as noted earlier, the Court recognized that “the
indispensable requirement for invoking the doctrine is the unavailability
of access to the ‘essential facilities’” and the doctrine “serves no purpose”
when the input in question is available through other means.234  In so
227. Id. at 409.
228. Id. at 410.
229. See id.
230. See Tom Campbell & Nirit Sandman, A New Test for Predation:  Targeting, 52
UCLA L. Rev. 365, 388 (2004) (noting lack of economic significance attached to existence
of prior business relationship); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Bargaining and
Monopolization:  In Search of the “Boundary of Section 2 Liability” Between Aspen and
Trinko, 73 Antitrust L.J. 115, 142–44 (2005) (discussing several reasons for disregarding
prior existence of business relationship, focusing primarily upon dynamic market
conditions and lack of impact of short-term actions).
231. See MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004)
(noting that defendant changed prior business practice after determining that it was
causing “significant[ ] negative impact on its own profitability” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
232. See Eleanor M. Fox, Is There Life in Aspen After Trinko?  The Silent Revolution
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 73 Antitrust L.J. 153, 160 (2005) (“Monopoly firms would
hesitate to cooperate in the first instance; the law would put a premium on old ways of
doing things.”).
233. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 772(c)(2), at 188 (noting that R
existence of prior arrangements in market under dispute, as well as similar arrangements
in other markets, “indicate[s] that [these arrangements] satisfy consumer desire and are
optimally efficient”); see also id. ¶ 772(c)(3), at 190–91 (proposing that limiting Aspen to
preexisting joint ventures renders scope of liability and remedies more tractable).
234. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
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holding, it implicitly recognized that proof of a monopoly over an input
is a necessary condition to stating a vertical exclusion claim.  The empha-
sis on monopoly power is further reinforced by the Court’s concern that
forced cooperation with rivals also risks becoming a focal point for collu-
sion.235  In addition, the opinion accepted the reading of Spectrum Sports
discussed above236 when it underscored that any claim that a monopolist
is attempting to use the leverage provided by its monopoly to attack a
second market must show “a ‘dangerous probability of success’ in mono-
polizing [the] second market.”237  This language has been widely inter-
preted as requiring proof of market concentration and entry barriers in
the secondary market before a monopolization claim will lie.238
Read together, this language represents a sweeping acknowledge-
ment of how compelling access to bottleneck facilities may impair eco-
nomic efficiency.  When alternative sources of supply exist, simply allocat-
ing the resource that exists is not the best solution.  The better course is
to allow any supracompetitive returns to serve as the signal and the incen-
tive for others to develop independent sources, which in turn will provide
sustainable benefits to consumers without the continuing oversight of the
terms and conditions of sharing by antitrust courts.
B. The Allocation of Authority Between Antitrust Courts and Regulatory
Agencies
Trinko directed its strongest language toward the proper division of
authority between antitrust courts and regulatory agencies.  As an initial
matter, the Court concluded that the Telecommunications Act of 1996
did not constitute an implied repeal of the antitrust laws.239  The Court
noted that extensive access requirements imposed by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 were sufficiently detailed to be “a good
candidate for implication of antitrust immunity, to avoid the real possibil-
ity of judgments conflicting with the agency’s regulatory scheme ‘that
might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust
laws.’”240  However, any such conclusion was vitiated by the fact the Act
contained an antitrust savings clause specifically providing that “nothing
in this Act . . . or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to
modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust
235. Id. at 408.
236. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. R
237. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415 n.4 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S.
447, 459 (1993)).
238. See Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 652, at 190,
¶ 773(g), at 302–03 (2d ed. Supp. 2007) (reading Trinko to require proof of “‘dangerous
probability of success’ in monopolizing the second market”) (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at
415 n.4)); Kauper, supra note 35, at 1629 (noting requirement of market concentration). R
239. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406.
240. Id. (quoting United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734
(1975)).
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laws.”241  Although some lower courts had initially held that the 1996 Act
represented more specific legislation that took precedence over the anti-
trust laws,242 the Supreme Court held that the antitrust savings clause
definitively foreclosed any suggestion that the 1996 Act could serve as the
basis for implied antitrust immunity.243
The balance of the opinion, however, adopted a quite narrow view of
antitrust courts’ institutional competence.  The Court noted, “Enforced
sharing . . . requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying
the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which
they are ill suited.”244  Moreover, the existence of a regulatory framework
capable of remedying the relevant harm dictated that subjecting the con-
duct in question to antitrust scrutiny would yield only slight benefits.245
In particular, disputes over access to telecommunications networks “are
difficult for antitrust courts to evaluate, not only because they are highly
technical, but also because they are likely to be extremely numerous,
given the incessant, complex, and constantly changing interaction of
competitive and incumbent LECs implementing the sharing and inter-
connection obligations.”246  Policing this “ ‘death by a thousand cuts’ . . .
would surely be a daunting task for a generalist antitrust court.”247  Also,
“[j]udicial oversight under the Sherman Act would seem destined to dis-
tort investment and lead to a new layer of interminable litigation, atop
the variety of litigation routes already available to and actively pursued by
competitive LECs.”248  Furthermore, “[m]istaken inferences and the re-
sulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly, because they chill the
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’”249
Because “[e]ffective remediation of violations of regulatory sharing
requirements will ordinarily require continuing supervision of a highly
detailed decree,” supervising access requirements “may be . . . ‘beyond
the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control.’”250  Indeed, the
Court cited with approval Areeda’s conclusion that “‘[n]o court should
241. 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2000).
242. See, e.g., Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp. 222 F.3d 390, 401 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The
antitrust laws would add nothing to the oversight already available under the 1996 law. . . .
[T]he 1996 Act imposes duties on the ILECs that are not found in the antitrust laws.”).
243. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406.
244. Id. at 408.
245. Id. at 412–13.
246. Id. at 414; see also id. (noting that mandating access under section 2 “‘can be
difficult’ because ‘the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition,
are myriad’” (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (per curiam))).
247. Id. (quoting Brief of New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
10, Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (No. 02-682)).
248. Id.
249. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986)).
250. Id. at 414–15 (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\107-8\COL802.txt unknown Seq: 48 20-NOV-07 8:19
2007] THE HIDDEN SIDE OF TRINKO 1869
impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably
supervise’” and that “‘[t]he problem should be deemed irremedia[ble]
by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to assume the
day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency.’”251  In short,
“[a]n antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective day-to-day enforcer of
these detailed sharing obligations.”252
C. Trinko’s Implications
Although Trinko did not explicitly repudiate the essential facilities
doctrine, commentators generally acknowledge that its reasoning cer-
tainly casts serious doubts on the doctrine’s continuing vitality.253 Trinko
also substantially narrowed the potential for antitrust law to serve as a
source of access mandates.  What is less clear is just how much narrower
the scope of antitrust law will be.
On the one hand, the Court’s acceptance of Areeda’s admonitions
that “‘[n]o court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or
adequately and reasonably supervise’” and that “‘[t]he problem should
be deemed irremedia[ble] by antitrust law when compulsory access re-
quires the court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regu-
latory agency’”254 represents a rejection of courts’ capacity to oversee ac-
cess mandates.  Indeed, Trinko’s challenge to the courts’ institutional
competence goes far beyond the critiques appearing in the earlier doc-
trines designed to allocate authority between courts and agencies.255
More than suggesting that courts should take advantage of agencies’ su-
perior expertise and factfinding capability by postponing judicial consid-
eration until after the agency had considered the matter, the language of
251. Id. at 415 (citing Areeda, supra note 4, at 853). R
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of
Patents and Copyrights:  Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox Decisions, 55 DePaul
L. Rev. 1211, 1228 (2006) (noting that Trinko called essential facilities doctrine “into
serious question”); Fox, supra note 232, at 154 (claiming that Trinko “nearly obliterated” R
essential facilities doctrine); Damien Geradin & Robert O’Donoghue, The Concurrent
Application of Competition Law and Regulation:  The Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in
the Telecommunications Sector, 1 J. Competition L. & Econ. 355, 396 n.104 (2005)
(arguing that Trinko “cast[s] serious doubt on future reliance on the ‘essential facilities’
doctrine”); Michael Jacobs, Introduction, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 1177, 1183 (2006) (noting that
Trinko “cast[s] very serious doubt on the vitality of [the essential facilities] doctrine”);
James A. Keyte, The Ripple Effects of Trinko:  How It Is Affecting Section 2 Analysis,
Antitrust, Fall 2005, at 44, 44 (noting that Trinko “clearly signaled that the demise of the
essential facilities doctrine . . . may be on the horizon”); Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and
Economic Policy, 72 Antitrust L.J. 589, 613 n.47 (2005) (noting that Trinko “all but
abandoned the essential facilities doctrine”); Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to
Competition:  Toward a New Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 Yale J. on Reg.
55, 101 (2007) (noting “the absence . . . of a meaningful essential-facilities doctrine in U.S.
antitrust law” after Trinko).
254. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415 (quoting Areeda, supra note 4, at 853). R
255. See supra Part II.B.
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the Trinko opinion, read for all it is worth, arguably takes mandating ac-
cess to essential facilities outside the scope of section 2 altogether.256
Alternatively, other scholars have advanced narrower readings of
Trinko.  Building on the requirement that state regulatory authorities be
actively supervising the conduct in question before courts will defer to
their jurisdiction,257 these scholars suggest that determining the proper
allocation of authority between antitrust courts and regulatory agencies
requires a closer assessment of the details of the regulatory regime.  The
stronger form of this argument, advanced by Philip Weiser, would require
courts to evaluate whether the regulatory regime is “reasonably effective
at addressing the relevant anticompetitive conduct” before yielding the
field to an agency.258  Weiser’s proposal is reminiscent of earlier propos-
als that would assess whether particular regulatory regimes furthered par-
ticular economic goals259 or were the result of failures in the political
process260 before conferring antitrust immunity.  Even taken on their
own terms, these proposals will require courts to determine whether a
particular regulatory scheme is socially beneficial, an assessment that will
vary depending on the assumptions employed.  Even if measured in
purely economic terms, determining the effectiveness of a regulatory pro-
gram is likely to be extremely controversial, and courts are understanda-
256. See George A. Hay, Trinko:  Going All the Way, 50 Antitrust Bull. 527, 528, 537,
539–47 (2005) (arguing that reasoning underlying Trinko, if fully adopted, renders judicial
interference with unilateral refusal to deal rarely, if ever, appropriate).
257. See supra Part II.B.
258. Weiser, supra note 97, at 562. R
259. See John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the “State-Municipal Action” Antitrust
Cases, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 481, 498 (1982) (arguing that antitrust immunity should be limited
to “scope of the substantial market failure” at which state action displacing competition is
directed); Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political
Economy:  A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1293, 1318–21 (1988)
(proposing economic efficiency as criterion for determining whether state or local
regulation supplants antitrust laws).
260. The leading article is John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust
Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 764–73 (1986).  For other prominent proposals, see
Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & Econ. 23,
45–46 (1983) (advocating revising state action immunity so as to promote regulatory
competition among states when each state bears entire cost of its enacted regulatory
scheme); Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 667,
696–729 (1991) (proposing that state action immunity be granted only to policies
established by financially disinterested and politically accountable decisionmakers and
rejecting capture theory as failing to articulate coherent analytical framework, inconsistent
with existing doctrine, and impossible to administer); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine:  Balancing Political
Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1203,
1250–71 (1997) (characterizing state action doctrine as process oriented and focusing
upon promoting political participation at state level); Richard Squire, Antitrust and the
Supremacy Clause, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 77, 111–23 (2006) (arguing in favor of allowing state
and local governments to regulate in such fashion as to benefit interest groups only if
interests of third parties are taken into account, generally through direct government
management of market).
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bly chary of making antitrust liability turn on their assessment of another
government entity’s performance.  Assessing the effectiveness of political
process is further complicated by the lack of any consensus normative
conception of a properly functioning regulatory system that can serve as a
benchmark for evaluation as well as the fact that regulation is often moti-
vated by multiple concerns that are often openly redistributive and
noneconomic in character.261
A more modest version of this proposal can be constructed from lan-
guage in the Supreme Court’s opinion in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,
which took the position that the active supervision requirement did not
require courts “to determine whether the State has met some normative
standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory practices.”262  Instead, in de-
termining whether an agency was actively supervising particular conduct,
courts should simply ask whether the regulation in question represents
the “independent judgment and control” of the state, and “not simply . . .
agreement among private parties.”263  Framed in this manner, “[t]he
question is not how well state regulation works but whether the anticom-
petitive scheme is the State’s own.”264  Under this standard, as developed
by Herbert Hovenkamp, it is not necessary that the conduct in question
“have been reviewed and approved by the agency”; it is sufficient if the
conduct is “under ongoing study” or if the agency has “manifested its
ability and will to evaluate the conduct if asked.”265
Finally, while many observers have assumed that Trinko effectively
eliminated section 2 liability in regulated industries such as telecommuni-
cations,266 some lower courts have read Trinko narrowly, concluding that
it barred essential facilities claims, but did not invalidate other types of
monopolization claims.267  Although these courts did not analyze the is-
sue in these terms, a close examination of the regulatory regime erected
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 reveals the complexity of these
261. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, § 20.2(b), at 740–41. R
262. 504 U.S. 621, 634 (1992).
263. Id. at 634–35.
264. Id. at 635.
265. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 Colum. Bus.
L. Rev. 335, 352.
266. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the
Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 Antitrust L.J. 311, 372 n.224 (2006) (“[Trinko]
suggested . . . that the [essential facilities] doctrine would be relevant only when access to
the facility is not regulated.”).
267. See Linkline Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., No. 05-56023, 2007 WL 2597258,
at *4–*7 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 2007) (holding that Trinko foreclosed refusal to deal and
essential facilities claims, but did not foreclose price squeeze claims); Covad Commc’ns Co.
v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1049–50 (11th Cir. 2004) (same); Z-Tel Commc’ns, Inc.
v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 535–43 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that Trinko
foreclosed essential facility claim, but did not foreclose claims based on Aspen Skiing and
monopoly leveraging); cf. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 670,
672–76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding dismissal of essential facilities claims, but reversing
dismissal of predation claims).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\107-8\COL802.txt unknown Seq: 51 20-NOV-07 8:19
1872 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107:1822
issues.  The Act envisions that interconnection will occur primarily
through voluntary agreements negotiated by the parties.268  Only if those
negotiations fail is the interconnection dispute submitted to binding arbi-
tration before the state public utility commission.269  The fact that the
terms of interconnection are more a reflection of business judgment than
regulatory coercion counsels against allowing immunizing this conduct
from antitrust scrutiny.270
D. The Impact of Trinko’s Varying Interpretations
The importance of how broadly to read Trinko is underscored when
one considers how it would apply to one of the most hotly debated issues
of the last Congress:  network neutrality.  Although the various network
neutrality proposals differ in their details, their basic thrust is to prohibit
cable modem and digital subscriber line (DSL) providers from discrimi-
nating against any particular content, applications, or devices.271  Formal
regulatory consideration of the issue began in March 2002, when the FCC
issued a declaratory ruling concluding that cable modem services were
not subject to the common carriage requirements imposed on conven-
tional telephone networks by Title II of the Communications Act of 1934
and seeking comment on whether it should impose access requirements
under the ancillary jurisdiction provided by Title I.272  As part of those
proceedings, several industry players requested that the FCC prohibit last-
mile broadband providers from imposing any restrictions on end users’
ability to run the applications, attach the devices, and access the content
of their own choosing.273
The inevitable judicial challenge to the FCC’s declaratory ruling was
not resolved until June 2005, when the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s
conclusion that cable modem systems fall within the agency’s ancillary
jurisdiction under Title I.274  Two months later, the FCC extended the
cable modem regulatory regime approved in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services to DSL.275  In so rul-
268. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1) (2000).
269. Id. § 252(b)(1).
270. See supra notes 147–155 and accompanying text. R
271. See Yoo, Network Neutrality and Congestion, supra note 109, at 1855–60 R
(providing overview of network neutrality debate).
272. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798,
4820–41 ¶¶ 34–74, 4843–48 ¶¶ 83–95 (2002).
273. See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help
or Hurt Competition?  A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. on Telecomm. & High
Tech. L. 23, 40–41 (2004).
274. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996
(2005).
275. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853,
14856 ¶ 2 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Access Order].
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ing, the FCC declined to adopt regulations prohibiting DSL and cable
modem providers from blocking or discriminating against particular con-
tent providers on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that
such practices were occurring.276  At the same time, the FCC issued a
policy statement announcing its general support for consumers’ right to
access content, run applications, and attach devices as they saw fit and
indicating that those principles would guide its future policymaking activ-
ities.277  The FCC also indicated that it would not hesitate to take action
against such conduct should such evidence emerge.278  Indeed, just five
months earlier, it had acted swiftly when a small, rural telecommunica-
tions carrier known as Madison River Communications blocked the ports
that its DSL customers needed to access VoIP services.279  In clearing a
number of recent mergers, the FCC noted the lack of record evidence
that network providers were discriminating against particular content and
applications providers and reaffirmed its conclusion that the broadband
market was sufficiently competitive to prevent network owners from dis-
criminating in a way that harmed economic welfare.280  The FCC did ac-
cept voluntary commitments regarding network neutrality offered by the
parties to the SBC-AT&T, Verizon-MCI, and AT&T-BellSouth mergers as
276. Id. at 14862–65 ¶¶ 12–17, 14904 ¶ 96.
277. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14987–88 ¶ 4 (2005).  These principles
were subject to certain exceptions, such as the needs of law enforcement and “reasonable
network management.”  Id. at 14987–88 ¶ 4 & n.15.
278. Wireline Broadband Access Order, supra note 275, at 14904 ¶ 96. R
279. See Madison River Communications, LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4295 (2005).
Because the action against Madison River preceded its order ruling that DSL was an
information service governed by Title I, the consent decree reserved the right to entertain
future complaints under its Title II authority.  Id. at 4298.
280. See AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5724–27 ¶¶ 116–120, 5738–39
¶¶ 151–153 (2007) [hereinafter AT&T-BellSouth Order] (concluding that “the strong and
increasing competition for mass market high-speed Internet access services will limit the
incentives and ability of the merged entity to discriminate” and noting lack of record
evidence of discrimination against any “content, service[ ], or application[ ]” provider);
Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses,
Adelphia Communications Corp., Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc., Assignees, et al.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203, 8296–99 ¶¶ 217–223 (2006)
(concluding that competition among broadband providers was sufficiently “vigorous” to
protect against exclusion of Internet content, services, or applications and noting absence
of evidence that access providers “willfully blocked a web page or other Internet content,
service, or application” outside of context of spam prevention); Verizon Communications,
Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18433, 18507–09 ¶¶ 139–142 (2005) [hereinafter
Verizon-MCI Order] (arguing that customers’ ability to switch access providers reduces
incentive to discriminate and that network architecture renders discrimination difficult, if
not impossible); SBC Communications, Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18290, 18366–68
¶¶ 140–143 (2005) [hereinafter SBC-AT&T Order] (same).
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being in the public interest.281  Most recently, the FCC issued a notice of
inquiry seeking specific examples on any deviations from network neu-
trality as well as commentary on the impact of any such deviations on
consumers.282
The impact of these actions on antitrust claims depends on how
broadly one reads Trinko.  The broadest reading of Trinko would hold
that antitrust courts’ institutional unsuitability to supervising access re-
quirements would bar such claims.283  The narrowest reading would hold
Trinko inapposite on the grounds that, unlike in Trinko, access to the bot-
tleneck input was not available through regulation.284  Finally, the read-
ing of Trinko that makes judicial authority to entertain antitrust claims
turn on the effectiveness of the agency’s efforts to address the anticompe-
titive conduct would require courts to evaluate the success and failure of
the FCC’s efforts.  The narrower version of this approach would find it
sufficient that the FCC is studying the issue and exhibited some willing-
ness to curb deviations from network neutrality.285  The broader version
would focus on the fact that the FCC has yet to impose any affirmative
obligations on broadband providers that could directly conflict with an
antitrust mandate and would also undertake a more specific assessment
of the impact of the steps the FCC has taken.286
It is too soon to say with any certainty which of these positions will
eventually emerge as the enduring reading of Trinko, with the early lower
court decisions evincing some desire to strike a middle ground.  Until
that issue is resolved, it remains possible that courts will be willing to en-
tertain claims that a telecommunications company’s refusal to provide
other firms with access to their networks violates the antitrust laws.
IV. TRINKO’S OVERLOOKED DIFFERENTIATION AMONG DIFFERENT TYPES
OF ACCESS
The real possibility that antitrust law will continue to serve as a basis
for compelling access to telecommunications networks counsels in favor
of plumbing the Trinko opinion for additional indications about precisely
how antitrust law might apply.  The existing commentary has largely over-
looked the fact that the Trinko opinion contains some tantalizing hints
about certain considerations that may play a key role in the analysis.  For
281. See AT&T-BellSouth Order, supra note 280, at 5726 n.339 (noting AT&T’s R
voluntary commitment to uphold network neutrality principles); Verizon-MCI Order,
supra note 280, 18,509 ¶ 143 (noting similar commitments by Verizon and MCI); SBC- R
AT&T Order, supra note 280, at 18,368 ¶ 144 (noting similar commitment by SBC). R
282. See Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894, 7896–98
¶¶ 8–11 (2007).
283. See supra notes 254–256 and accompanying text. R
284. See Jonathan L. Rubin, The Truth About Trinko, 50 Antitrust Bull. 725, 740–41
(2005) (noting potential limitations of Trinko arising from its reliance upon particular
regulatory scheme).
285. See supra notes 262–265 and accompanying text. R
286. See supra notes 257–261 and accompanying text. R
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example, the language in the opinion contrasting access provided to con-
sumers with access provided to rivals suggests that the application of the
antitrust law might depend on the nature of the party to whom access is
granted.287  The opinion also drew a distinction between access to ser-
vices that are already sold into the open market and access to network
elements that are only available to the public because of regulation.288  In
addition, Trinko indicated that unbundled access can only be provided
“at considerable expense and effort,” because network elements “exist
only deep within the bowels of Verizon” and because “[n]ew systems must
be designed and implemented” to make access to those network elements
possible.289  Later in the opinion, the Court mentioned that unbundled
access requirements “are difficult for antitrust courts to evaluate, not only
because they are highly technical, but also because they are likely to be
extremely numerous, given the incessant, complex, and constantly chang-
ing interaction of competitive and incumbent LECs implementing the
sharing and interconnection obligations.”290  This language suggests that
the application of the antitrust laws may depend on certain key aspects of
the type of access sought, such as whether access is to only a portion of
the network or to its entirety and whether the network owner already
offers the services sought to other customers.
The problem is that the Trinko opinion did not analyze these consid-
erations in a systematic manner.  Equally importantly, it failed to take into
account that networks are complex systems whose elements interact in
ways that can be sharply discontinuous and hard to predict.  The absence
of an analytical framework that captures the interaction among network
elements makes it impossible to assess how altering the costs of particular
elements and introducing additional flows into a network can affect net-
work design, capacity, and reliability.  It also prevents any realistic assess-
ment of the impact that different types of access can have on transaction
costs.
In this Part, we employ a conceptual framework that we have devel-
oped based on a branch of mathematics known as graph theory to ana-
lyze the impact of various types of access in a way that reflects one net-
works’ key attributes, i.e., the manner in which the whole exceeds the
sum of the parts.  We begin by laying out the basic concepts of network
analysis.  We then deploy the five-part system for classifying different
types of access that we have developed to analyze the various types of
access imposed under the antitrust laws.
287. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410 (2004) (“The unbundled elements . . . are . . . offered not to consumers but to
rivals . . . .”).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 414.
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A. Network Basics
Graph theory models networks as consisting of two types of ele-
ments.291 Nodes are the key points from which network traffic originates,
terminates, or is routed.  Connections between nodes are known as links.
In a conventional wireline telephone system, nodes consist of the cus-
tomer premises from which traffic originates and terminates as well as the
central offices, remote terminals, and other locations in which providers
maintain switching equipment.  The links are the wires connecting these
nodes.  In the Internet, the nodes consist of the individual computers
operating at the edges of the network from which traffic originates and to
which traffic terminates, as well as the routers that direct traffic within the
network, with links again being the wires connecting these nodes.  Each
network component varies in terms of cost, capacity, location, and under-
lying technology.
Graph theory provides tools that can help analyze network design.
One basic concept in network design is the spanning tree, which repre-
sents the network architecture that connects all of the nodes with the
fewest links.292  Because the costs and capacity of different potential links
and nodes vary, one basic optimization concept is to survey the entire
universe of possible spanning trees to identify the minimum spanning tree,
which is the architecture that connects all of the nodes at the least cost.
The fact that the number of spanning trees increases exponentially with
the number of nodes means determining cost-minimizing architecture
can be quite complicated even for small networks.293  Fortunately, algo-
rithms exist that can quickly determine which of the many spanning trees
is the minimum spanning tree.294
The total network demand determines how many links are necessary
to ensure that the network has sufficient capacity to carry all of the net-
work flows.  The availability of high-volume technologies can also change
the optimal network configuration.  For example, if network traffic along
a particular path is sufficiently large, a network designer may find it more
cost-effective to replace several low-capacity links with a single higher-ca-
pacity trunk line and allow the lower variable costs to offset the higher
fixed costs of installing the more sophisticated technology.295
291. For our initial discussion of these principles, see Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher
S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as Complex Systems:  A Graph Theory Approach,
99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1687, 1693–1707 (2005) [hereinafter Spulber & Yoo, Regulation of
Networks].
292. For a network of n nodes, a spanning tree would consist of n - 1 links.
293. According to Cayley’s Formula, the number of different spanning trees in a
network of n nodes is nn-2, where n is greater than or equal to two.  See Arthur Cayley, A
Theorem on Trees, 23 Q.J. Pure & Applied Mathematics 376, 376 (1889).  Thus for ten
nodes, there are 100 million possible different spanning trees.
294. See, e.g., R.C. Prim, Shortest Connection Networks and Some Generalizations,
36 Bell Sys. Tech. J. 1389, 1398–400 (1957) (describing one such algorithm).
295. See Spulber & Yoo, Regulation of Networks, supra note 291, at 1701–03. R
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Cost and capacity only represent two possible measures of network
performance.  Networks also vary in terms of their reliability.  One of the
weaknesses of spanning trees is that the path connecting any two nodes is
unique.  Since a malfunction in any element would necessarily disconnect
part of the network, cost-minimizing architectures are vulnerable to net-
work failure.  In addition, if the capacity of any network element becomes
saturated, quality of service may deteriorate as traffic is forced into a
queue.  Greater variability of traffic flows makes guaranteeing certain
levels of reliability all the more difficult.  Reliability can be enhanced by
adding links so that more than one path exists connecting particular
nodes.  While deviating from the cost-minimizing architecture, this level
of redundancy protects against outright network failure as well as deterio-
ration of network performance.296
The cost and capacity associated with different network components,
the magnitude and variability of demand for network capacity, and con-
sumer demand for reliability all interact to determine the optimal net-
work configuration.  Requiring a network owner to provide others with
access to its network can change each of these parameters.  Granting
other providers the right to access portions of the network can radically
change the network’s optimal configuration, either by occupying a por-
tion of the capacity of particular network elements, by effectively raising
their costs, or by introducing new flows into the network.297  In addition,
siphoning off a portion of the network flows can prevent the network
owner from using trunk lines to reduce cost by aggregating traffic.298
Graph theory provides a basis for modeling how networks can com-
pensate for changes in the effective cost or capacity of one network ele-
ment, either by taking advantage of excess capacity or by rerouting the
traffic along alternative paths.  The result of this systemic process of ad-
justments is that changes to one part of the network can degrade the
performance in areas of the network located far from the access point.  In
so doing, graph theory captures the extent to which networks are com-
plex systems in which each component can only be understood in light of
its relationship to other network components and the projected flows
through the network.
In addition, the fact that access forces a network to interconnect with
nodes outside of its own boundaries dramatically changes the transaction
costs of network management.  At a minimum, the fact that some traffic
will originate and terminate outside the network owner’s control will
make obtaining the information for creating the optimal network for to-
morrow’s needs all the more difficult.  More fundamentally, as Ronald
Coase first pointed out, transaction costs determine the natural bounda-
ries of a firm.299  Thus, forcing a network to interconnect with some net-
296. See id. at 1699–701.
297. See id. at 1698–99, 1709.
298. See id. at 1717.
299. See Coase, supra note 78, at 394–98. R
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work components that exist outside of its control interferes with the net-
work’s optimal institutional arrangement and disrupts the network’s
natural boundaries.
We capture some of these insights by offering a system for analyzing
the impact that different types of access have on network capacity, opti-
mal network configuration, and the transaction costs associated with net-
work management.300  This system classifies access regimes into five cate-
gories:  (1) retail access, (2) wholesale access, (3) interconnection access,
(4) platform access, and (5) unbundled access.  The different types of
access are depicted in Figure 1, with networks owned as unified facilities
by a particular company depicted by solid nodes and lines and networks
formed through access by the combination of market transactions and
network interfaces depicted by dotted lines.
The different categories of access depend on the type of entity to
whom access is provided (e.g., customers, competitors, or suppliers of
complementary products and services), as well as the specific network ele-
ments to which access is provided.  Retail access is provided to final cus-
tomers; platform access is provided to companies offering complemen-
tary services; while wholesale, interconnection, and unbundled access are
provided to competitors.  The categories also vary in terms of the extent
of the network.  Unbundled access involves isolated portions of the entire
network; retail access typically involves the entire network; while whole-
sale, interconnection, and platform access involves the entire physical
network minus certain key elements.  Finally, the categories vary in terms
of the type of access provided.  Platform access means that the network
facilities conform to a technological standard that allows other compa-
nies to provide complementary services.  Interconnection access refers to
reciprocal connection agreements between networks that provide access
to each other’s facilities, forming a larger network in the process.
As we shall see, different types of access can have different effects on
the network owner’s ability to manage its network in terms of cost, capac-
ity, and reliability.  In addition, the different types of access vary in terms
of their transaction cost implications.  Together these considerations pro-
vide a more systematic framework for courts to use when considering an-
titrust claims seeking access to telecommunications networks.
B. Application of the Different Types of Access to Antitrust
1. Retail Access. — Retail access is a right given to customers to use the
services provided by the entire network.301  It has its roots in the common
law duty to serve all customers applied to common carriers.  Typically,
retail access takes the form of a regulatory mandate implemented
300. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Network Regulation:  The Many
Faces of Access, 1 J. Competition L. & Econ. 635, 638–39 (2005) [hereinafter Spulber &
Yoo, Network Regulation].
301. For a more detailed analysis of the impact of retail access, see id. at 639–40,
647–50, 661–62.
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FIGURE 1.  THE FIVE FORMS OF ACCESS TO NETWORKS
through public tariffs, which announce the terms under which the carrier
will provide service to all comers.302  In its modern form, retail access
normally is justified by the theory of natural monopoly.  An industry is a
natural monopoly if one firm can serve the entire market demand at
lower cost than could two.  When that is the case, even markets that begin
as competitive will eventually come to be dominated by a single player.
Retail access protects consumers against denial of service under circum-
stances when alternative sources of supply are unlikely to exist.  In order
to ensure that consumers benefit from the mandated sharing of the mo-
nopoly, retail access is often accompanied by rate regulation, typically
based on the cost of providing service.303
302. See id. at 639–40.
303. See Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers
in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1233,
1271–73 (1998) (discussing price regulation of public utility monopolies).
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a. The Economics of Retail Access. — Retail access can interfere with a
network owner’s ability to manage its network.  As noted earlier, a net-
work owner will configure its network in a manner that minimizes costs,
brings capacity into line with demand, and guarantees the appropriate
level of reliability based on its prediction of the likely network demand.
Should the network demand exceed forecasted levels, a network owner
has four alternatives for restoring equilibrium.  First, the network owner
can increase network capacity.  Because capacity cannot be expanded in-
stantaneously, this solution is typically infeasible in the short run.  Sec-
ond, the network owner can simply refuse to meet the excess demand by
limiting the service provided to existing customers and by turning away
new customers.  A retail access mandate prevents a network owner from
employing this solution.  Third, the network owner can increase retail
price, which will reduce quantity demanded along the demand curve un-
til it no longer exceeds network capacity.  To the extent that the network
is subject to price controls that typically accompany a retail access man-
date, this solution is also foreclosed.  Fourth, the network owner can re-
store equilibrium by degrading the quality of service.  This will cause the
demand curve to shift backwards until demand is brought back into bal-
ance with network capacity.  While relatively unpalatable, the presence of
a retail access mandate may make degradation of quality the only viable
short-run option.304
A rational network owner faced with the infeasibility and unattrac-
tiveness of the four alternatives described above will be forced to carry
excess capacity to guard against the possibility that it will gain new cus-
tomers unexpectedly if its competitors fail.  In effect, retail access forces
the network to carry capacity as insurance against failure by its competi-
tors, with the premium for that insurance being paid by the network’s
customers.305  The resulting deviation from the optimal network config-
uration inevitably results in an increase in cost.  Subjecting the network to
the price controls associated with retail access also has the effect of reduc-
ing incentives for upgrading the existing network and for others to build
out alternative network capacity.
Retail access can also increase transaction costs by forcing network
owners to gather and format the information necessary to preannounce
and preclear all of their service offerings.  The tariff process also imposes
delays in service innovation and requires carriers to bear the costs of de-
fending their tariff filings against challenges filed by competitors.  Tarif-
fing also facilitates oligopolistic behavior by making prices and service
offerings both transparent and homogeneous.  To the extent that retail
access requires that all customers pay uniform rates for uniform services,
it also limits network owners’ ability to customize their offerings to the
needs of particular customers and bars potentially welfare-enhancing
304. See Spulber & Yoo, Network Regulation, supra note 300, at 647–50. R
305. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the
Regulatory Contract 119–27 (1997).
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forms of price discrimination.  A complete analysis of the issues raised by
price discrimination exceeds the scope of this Article.306  For our pur-
poses, it suffices to point out that price discrimination can be particularly
beneficial in industries like telecommunications, which involve large, up-
front fixed costs.  When fixed costs are so large relative to the variable
cost that the average cost curve lies above the marginal cost curve over
the entire industry output, the prices charged to individual customers
must cover a portion of the fixed cost as well marginal cost.  The fact that
prices necessarily exceed marginal cost makes some degree of dead-
weight loss inevitable.  Discriminatory pricing regimes, such as Ramsey
pricing,307 can take advantage of variations in different customer’s price
sensitivity to minimize those deadweight losses.  Customers who are ex-
tremely price sensitive (i.e., have highly elastic demands) are likely to cur-
tail their consumption in response to a price increase to a greater degree
than customers who are relatively price insensitive (i.e., have fairly inelas-
tic demands).  Firms can thus minimize deadweight loss by allocating a
smaller proportion of the fixed costs on price sensitive customers and
allocating a greater proportion of the fixed costs to price insensitive cus-
tomers.  If fixed costs are allocated in inverse proportion to each con-
sumer’s elasticity of demand, price discrimination can lead to the effi-
cient outcome.308
That said, retail access is not as disruptive as other forms of access.
Because access is provided only to the network in its entirety at locations
that the network already serves, the traffic patterns are likely to be quite
similar to those already in the network, and thus retail access may have
only a minimal impact on the network’s optimal configuration.  Retail
access also obviates the need for carriers to negotiate service contracts
with each customer.  In addition, because all of the traffic travels through
a single network, the network owner should be able to obtain all of the
information it needs to determine the optimal configuration fairly easily.
b. Retail Access and the Courts. — To our knowledge, no court has
ever mandated retail access under the essential facilities doctrine.  As
noted earlier, the essential facilities doctrine requires that network own-
ers provide competitors with access to the services of bottleneck inputs.  Re-
tail access, in contrast, provides customers with access to the services pro-
vided by the entire network.  Indeed, retail access does not fit naturally with
any aspect of antitrust law.  As noted earlier, antitrust law does not im-
pose liability on firms that obtain monopolies through natural features of
306. For an overview of price discrimination, see generally Hal R. Varian, Price
Discrimination, in 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization, supra note 76, at 597. R
307. See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 Econ. J. 47, 58–59
(1927) (arguing that price should be allocated between products in inverse relation to
elasticity of demand).
308. See Yoo, Network Neutrality and Congestion, supra note 109, at 1901–03. R
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the market.309  In the words of a leading court of appeals decision on the
subject, “a natural monopoly market does not of itself impose restrictions
on one who actively, but fairly, competes for it, any more than it does on
one who passively acquires it.”310  To hold otherwise, in the words of an-
other leading court of appeals decision, would be to “require the impossi-
ble—a competitive market under conditions of natural monopoly.”311  In
the absence of other anticompetitive behavior, such firms are generally
free to charge the full monopoly price and to refuse to deal with whom-
ever they wish.  Indeed, if the market is a natural monopoly, retail access
would simply dictate how the output of the monopoly is distributed.  Not
only would this require antitrust courts to make the type of regulatory
assessments that Trinko recognized they are ill suited to perform, but, in
addition, simply managing output falls outside antitrust’s purpose, which
is to make markets more competitive by breaking down monopolies
rather than merely requiring that they be shared.312
Judicial impositions of retail access have been based not on the anti-
trust laws, but rather on the common law duty to serve imposed on busi-
309. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  This is true regardless of whether the R
natural monopoly arises because of declining average costs or network economic effects.
See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
86 Cal. L. Rev. 479, 503 (1998) (“Courts cannot normally ‘undo’ network effects with the
tools of antitrust.  Network effects are an inherent part of certain markets, not a ‘market
failure’ for which the law must necessarily correct.”).
310. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 (1st
Cir. 1960).
311. Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir.
1982); see also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 548 (9th Cir.
1991) (“The Sherman Act . . . has not been interpreted to penalize natural monopolies.”);
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 990–91 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that particular
characteristics of natural monopoly make it unsuitable for application of antitrust laws
absent predatory conduct); Greenville Publ’g Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 397
(4th Cir. 1974) (“The characteristics of a natural monopoly make it inappropriate to apply
the usual rule that success in driving competitors from the market is evidence of illegal
monopolization.”); Lamb Enters., Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 515 (6th Cir.
1972) (“In a natural monopoly situation any successful competitor gets the market.  Thus,
it cannot be unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market
where such foreclosure is the natural result of success in a natural monopoly situation.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Am. Football League v. Nat’l Football
League, 323 F.2d 124, 131 (4th Cir. 1963) (“When one has acquired a natural monopoly by
means which are neither exclusionary, unfair, nor predatory, he is not disempowered to
defend his position fairly.”); 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 658(b), at 121 R
(defining and explaining natural monopoly).
312. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 771(b), at 171–72 (emphasizing R
that purpose of antitrust is to prevent and eliminate monopolies in order to improve
overall welfare and noting that mere forced sharing of monopoly input fails to improve
consumer welfare and decreases dynamic efficiency); James B. Speta, Resale Requirements
and the Intersection of Antitrust and Regulated Industries, 31 J. Corp. L. 307, 319–21
(2006) (arguing that retail access requirements cannot be justified by standard purposes of
antitrust).
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nesses “affected with the public interest.”313  This concept received its ful-
lest exposition when the Court established in Munn v. Illinois that
businesses affected with a public interest represented an exception to the
constitutional limits on regulation imposed by the Lochner era conception
of economic rights protected by substantive due process.314  The Court
abandoned this line of jurisprudence in its landmark opinion in Nebbia v.
New York, in which the Court concluded that “there is no closed class or
category of businesses affected with a public interest.”315  The Court fur-
ther elaborated:
In several of the decisions of this court wherein the expressions
“affected with a public interest,” and “clothed with a public use,”
have been brought forward as the criteria of the validity of price
control, it has been admitted that they are not susceptible of
definition and form an unsatisfactory test of the constitutionality
of legislation directed at business practices or prices.316
The collapse of the conceptual foundation for the common law duty
to serve essentially eviscerated it as a basis for judicial imposition of retail
access to telecommunications networks.317
2. Wholesale Access. — Wholesale access is a right given to a network
owner’s competitors to resell the network’s services to end users.318  As is
the case with retail access, under wholesale access the network’s elements
are kept together and purchased as a whole except for certain retail
merchant activities.  The key distinction is that in retail access, access is
provided to the customer, whereas in wholesale access, access is provided
to a competitor.
a. The Economics of Wholesale Access. — Wholesale access has two pri-
mary effects.  First, it changes the overall demand of the network, which
in turn changes its cost, capacity, reliability, and optimal configuration.
Wholesale access thus confronts network owners with the same quandary
as retail access, complicated still further by the fact that market demand
now depends on two prices—the price of wholesale access and the price
of retail service—rather than just one.  The existence of two prices makes
the net impact on demand ambiguous.319  To the extent that wholesale
access carries with it a nondiscrimination mandate, it can also prevent
313. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 71, at 56 (internal quotation marks R
omitted).
314. See 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
315. 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
316. Id.; see also Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (applying
same reasoning in context of public utility’s refusal to serve customer).
317. See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 71, at 56 (noting general R
abandonment of concept following Nebbia).
318. For a more detailed analysis of the impact of wholesale access, see Spulber &
Yoo, Network Regulation, supra note 300, at 640–41, 650–56, 662–69. R
319. See id. at 651–52.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\107-8\COL802.txt unknown Seq: 63 20-NOV-07 8:19
1884 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107:1822
network owners from using price discrimination to minimize welfare
losses.320
Second, wholesale access takes the marketing functions outside the
boundaries of the firm.  Forcing the externalization of functions is prob-
lematic from the standpoint of the theory of the firm because it forces the
network to deviate from the configuration that minimizes its transaction
costs.321  Forcing firms to externalize their marketing functions requires
the creation of mechanisms to allow those invoking wholesale access to
obtain the services of the network.  Although the fact that the network
owner already offers this service to its own customers means that systems
already exist for placing orders and requesting service, wholesale access
would still require that these systems be redesigned to make them accessi-
ble to outside personnel.322
The complexity of this analysis is demonstrated by the variety of dis-
tribution channels employed by the wireless industry, which typically sells
part of its output through proprietary outlets while simultaneously selling
part of its output through independent retailers, such as Circuit City,
Radio Shack, and Best Buy.  This system of “dual distribution,” in which
output is sold simultaneously through company-owned and independent
retailers, can reduce distribution costs, encourage the provision of
presale services, and provide manufacturers with better information
about customers’ responses to their products.  Although dual distribution
systems have raised anticompetitive concerns, commentators generally
agree that such concerns are misplaced.  In the words of one leading anti-
trust scholar:
A manufacturer who has no market power cannot use dual dis-
tribution to create it.  Furthermore, even a monopoly manufac-
turer generally cannot increase its market power by insulating its
wholly-owned retail outlets, even if the effect is to injure compet-
ing, independent retailers.  If the manufacturer has market
power, any monopoly profits earned at the retailer level could
also be earned at the manufacturer level.323
At the same time, dual distribution systems are less vulnerable to col-
lusion, since concerns about double marginalization will give the manu-
facturer-owned outlets no incentive to participate in a cartel seeking to
create market power at the retail level.324  That said, dual distribution
systems are more vulnerable to free riding, since independent dealers will
recognize that retail outlets owned by the manufacturer are essentially
guaranteed to provide the full range of presale services.  It is reasonable
to expect manufacturers employing dual distribution systems to impose
320. See supra notes 306–308 and accompanying text. R
321. See Spulber & Yoo, Network Regulation, supra note 300, at 662–69. R
322. See id. at 666–67.
323. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, § 11.6(e), at 490. R
324. Id.
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territorial restrictions on independent retailers and mandate a degree of
exclusivity in order to protect against free riding.325
The extent to which wholesale access would benefit consumers is
thus far from clear.  As noted in the passage from the Areeda and
Hovenkamp antitrust treatise quoted in Part I, antitrust law typically al-
lows manufacturers to sell their products directly if they so choose and
does not require them to sell their products to other retailers at wholesale
prices.326  As Areeda and Hovenkamp rightly conclude, “Why price regu-
lation of the output should make any difference is not clear, since cus-
tomers are no better off by the forced insertion of an intermediary and—
if costs increase as a result—they could be worse off.”327  The only excep-
tion is if wholesale prices were regulated, in which case vertical integra-
tion into retailing might be an attempt to evade rate regulation at the
wholesale level.328
b. Wholesale Access and the Courts. — Courts have been quite reluctant
to use the antitrust laws to mandate wholesale access.  The closest that the
Supreme Court has come to doing so is Otter Tail, in which the Court
required an electric power company to provide wholesale distribution of
power to cities seeking to replace the retail distribution franchises they
had previously granted to Otter Tail with municipally owned retail distri-
bution power grids.  The analogy to wholesale access is not perfect.  By
seeking to create the infrastructure needed to provide retail distribution,
the cities were seeking to do more than just replace the marketing func-
tions provided by Otter Tail.329  Even so, leading commentators have de-
scribed the situation presented in Otter Tail as being analogous to whole-
sale access.330
As noted earlier, scholarly commentators have raised serious doubts
about Otter Tail’s vitality as a precedent.331  The language in Trinko distin-
guishing Otter Tail on the grounds that “the defendant was already in the
business of providing a service to certain customers . . . and refused to
provide the same service to certain other customers”332 arguably suggests
a more limited version of wholesale access.  Although this reasoning does
not place network owners that are not currently offering wholesale access
under any obligation to provide such access, it can be read as requiring
325. Id.
326. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. R
327. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 787(c)(1), at 306. R
328. See id. at 304–05.
329. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. R
330. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 4, ¶ 787(c), at 306 (arguing that R
“[r]educed to essentials,” Otter Tail-type fact patterns amount to “the plaintiff’s claim of the
right to distribute the defendant’s product, charging an intermediate markup”).
331. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. R
332. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410 (2004) (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 370–71, 377–78
(1973)).
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firms that already offer wholesale access to do so on a nondiscriminatory
basis.333
That said, attempts to turn Otter Tail into a basis for imposing whole-
sale access must come to grips with the language in Trinko discussing
Aspen Skiing.  According to Trinko, the problem in Aspen Skiing was not
that Ski Co. refused to sell lift tickets to Highlands at wholesale prices, a
practice Ski Co. followed without drawing any criticism from the Trinko
Court.334  Instead, the problem was that Ski Co. was unwilling to sell lift
tickets to Highlands at the full retail price, which the Court believed “re-
vealed a distinctly anticompetitive bent.”335  This latter observation ap-
pears to be at least somewhat probative of anticompetitive behavior, since
the literature on transfer pricing indicates that a firm that offers a prod-
uct that is used both as a final good and as an input in making other
goods maximizes both its profits and welfare when it charges a uniform
price for the good.336  This language thus provides no support for a duty
by monopolists to permit competitors to access its network at wholesale
prices.  At most, this language suggests that monopolists may have some
duty to serve those who are willing to pay the full retail price.337  Moreo-
ver, to the extent that courts have been willing to mandate access at full
retail prices, the duty has been limited to customers and has not been
extended to competitors.338
Any arguments that firms providing wholesale access must do so on a
nondiscriminatory basis must address the long line of Supreme Court
precedent recognizing the benefit of allowing manufacturers to enter
into exclusivity arrangements with certain retailers.  Although the Su-
preme Court was once quite hostile to agreements giving preferential
333. See Z-Tel Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 536–39
(E.D. Tex. 2004) (claiming that Trinko, through discussion of Otter Tail, required
nondiscriminatory provision of wholesale services).
334. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 593 (1985)
(noting Ski Co.’s refusal to sell Highlands lift tickets at “tour operator’s discount or at
retail”).
335. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
336. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management
79–83 (1992) (“[A]dopting the outside market price as the transfer price both directs
divisional quantity decisions to maximize corporate profits and provides the right signals
regarding performance and investment.”).
337. See MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1132–34 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding Aspen Skiing inapplicable when network owner is willing to sell at full retail
price, even when retail price is discriminatory).
338. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. S. Express Co. (Express Cases), 117
U.S. 1, 26–29 (1886) (declining to impose duty upon railroads to grant access to
competitors); Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 F. 699, 703 (E.D. Wash. 1912)
(acknowledging telephone companies’ duty to serve consumers, but declining to extend
obligation to wholesale access for competitors); Huber et al., supra note 89, § 1.3.1, at R
13–16, § 5.1.1, at 406–08 (tracing history in which courts declined to require telephone
companies to deal with competitors).
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treatment to certain retailers over others,339 it has recognized over time
that restrictions on intrabrand competition can promote interbrand com-
petition.  As the Supreme Court reasoned in its landmark Continental
T.V., Inc. v. Sylvania decision:
Economists have identified a number of ways in which manufac-
turers can use . . . restrictions [on the distribution of their prod-
ucts] to compete more effectively against other manufacturers.
For example, new manufacturers and manufacturers entering
new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce compe-
tent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of
capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of
products unknown to the consumer.  Established manufacturers
can use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional activi-
ties or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the
efficient marketing of their products. . . . The availability and
quality of such services affect a manufacturer’s goodwill and the
competitiveness of his product.  Because of market imperfec-
tions such as the so-called “free rider” effect, these services
might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situa-
tion, despite the fact that each retailer’s benefit would be
greater if all provided the services than if none did.340
The Supreme Court has reiterated these concerns in subsequent
cases and has developed an elaborate jurisprudence to ensure that manu-
facturers remain free to enter into exclusivity agreements with some re-
tailers and to refuse to deal with others.341
Given the amount of information that customers interested in
purchasing telecommunications services need about service plans and
necessary equipment, telecommunications markets would seem suscepti-
ble to this type of market failure.  Conversely, limiting network owners’
ability to shift to proprietary sales forces or exclusive retail outlets would
only serve to give manufacturers the incentive to vertically integrate into
retailing or to enter into exclusivity arrangements from the outset, an
outcome that would have the perverse effect of harming retailers.342
339. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1966) (rejecting exclusive
dealing arrangement involving small fraction of retailers); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1948) (striking down exclusive dealing
contract that foreclosed 16% of market); Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. 359, 375 (1927) (invalidating exclusive dealing contract despite absence of direct
evidence of purpose to monopolize).
340. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54–55 (1977) (citation and
footnote omitted).
341. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723–25 (1988)
(quoting above language from Sylvania with approval); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1984) (recognizing legitimacy of using vertical restraints to
limit free riding).  For a discussion of other cases approving a manufacturers’ shift to an
exclusivity arrangement, see Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454–55
(1993).
342. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997) (claiming that limitations upon
vertical restraints have driven manufacturers to vertically integrate); Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at
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A wide range of justifications thus exists for providing wholesale ac-
cess in a discriminatory manner and permitting producers to internalize
or externalize marketing functions as they see fit.  The compelling nature
of these economic arguments and the weight of Supreme Court authority
make the imposition of wholesale access by an antitrust court very
unlikely.
3. Interconnection Access. — Interconnection access refers to reciprocal
connections between networks that provide similar services to similarly
situated customers.343  One example would be requiring all wireless tele-
phone networks operating in the same area to terminate calls originating
on other wireless telephone networks.  Another example would be requir-
ing top-level backbone providers to interconnect with all other top-level
backbone providers.
a. The Economics of Interconnection Access. — Interconnection access
complicates network management to a much greater degree than retail
and wholesale access.  Increasing the number of users causes the number
of possible connections to increase geometrically.344  The net effect on
the demand on any particular firm’s network is unclear, however.  Mak-
ing it possible to reach other firms’ customers may cause demand for
network capacity to increase.  On the other hand, the presence of other
networks can place downward pressure on network demand, as customers
substitute away and the other networks fulfill some of the functions previ-
ously provided by the primary network.
In addition, unlike retail and wholesale access, under which service is
provided at points at the edge of the network where service is already
available, interconnection access requires network owners to permit in-
terconnection at new points of entry in the middle of the network, al-
though they are likely to be at major nodes.  Not only does this require
designing new interfaces to permit interconnection at locations other
than customers’ premises; it also alters the traffic on the network by intro-
ducing flows into the network at points where flows would otherwise not
occur.  The resulting diversion of traffic to other networks can disaggre-
725 (arguing that imposing limitations upon vertical restraints will provide “perverse
incentive for manufacturers to integrate vertically”); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 n.26 (“To the
extent that a per se rule prevents a firm from using the franchise system to achieve
efficiencies . . . important to its successful operation, the rule creates an incentive for
vertical integration into the distribution system, thereby eliminating to that extent the role
of independent businessmen.”); Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 309–12 (arguing that
invalidation of moderate vertical restraint may bring about more serious anticompetitive
behavior); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that manufacturer can avoid rule against vertical price
restraints by integrating vertically), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
343. For a more detailed analysis of the impact of interconnection access, see Spulber
& Yoo, Network Regulation, supra note 300, at 641–42, 656–57, 669–70. R
344. See Spulber & Yoo, Regulation of Networks, supra note 291, at 1696 (noting that R
network consisting of n nodes has (1/2)n(n – 1) possible links).
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gate traffic to the point where it is no longer economical to take advan-
tage of the scale economies provided by higher volume networking tech-
nologies.345  The fact that traffic now originates and terminates outside of
a single network also increases the cost of obtaining the information nec-
essary for network planning and creates the possibility of strategic behav-
ior to take advantage of the information asymmetries.346
The impact of interconnection access on total network demand is
complicated by the presence of “network economic effects,” which arise
when the value of a network increases with the number of end users con-
nected to it.347  The increase in value caused by providing customers with
access to the customers of other networks can cause network traffic to
increase relative to a noninterconnected network.  At the same time, the
fact that some traffic now originates and terminates outside the incum-
bent’s network raises the possibility of diversion of traffic below the levels
that would exist under retail and wholesale access, in which all traffic
originates and terminates on a single network.  The impact of intercon-
nection access on the demand for network services is thus ambiguous.
Some commentators have also warned that networks can harm com-
petition by refusing to engage in interconnection access.348  Network eco-
nomic effects are often described as giving rise to demand-side econo-
mies of scale.  In the absence of interconnection, customers will naturally
flock to the largest network.  Once the market reaches its tipping point,
the value of the network of the dominant player will so far outstrip that of
its competitors that the market collapses into a natural monopoly.  Once
tipped, the difficulties that new entrants face in generating sufficient vol-
ume to untip the market can cause the resulting monopoly to become
locked in.
345. See Spulber & Yoo, Network Regulation, supra note 300, at 656–57. R
346. See id. at 669–70.
347. For an overview of the associated literature, see Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher
S. Yoo, Access to Networks:  Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 Cornell L. Rev.
885, 921–33 (2003) [hereinafter Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks].
348. See Nicholas Economides et al., Regulatory Pricing Rules to Neutralize Network
Dominance, 5 Indus. & Corp. Change 1013, 1014 (1996) (discussing incumbent carriers’
incentive to refuse to interconnect); Gerald R. Faulhaber, Bottlenecks and Bandwagons:
Access Policy in the New Telecommunications, in 2 Handbook of Telecommunications
Economics 487, 502–03 (Sumit K. Majumdar et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Faulhaber,
Bottlenecks and Bandwagons] (describing how dominant firm can use refusal to
interconnect to harm competition); Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common
Carriage Survive the Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 955, 973–74
(1997) (discussing means by which firms can use refusals to interconnect to harm
competition when markets are not competitive); Shelanski, supra note 253, at 99–100 R
(arguing that incumbents with asymmetric market share have little incentive to
interconnect); James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection,
54 Fed. Comm. L.J. 225, 268–79 (2002) (arguing in favor of interconnection requirement
for Internet carriers); Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. (forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 9, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing in favor of
mandating interconnection).
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Network owners presented with a request for interconnection access
are thus subject to conflicting impulses.  Interconnection would enable
its customers to reach a larger number of other end users, which would
increase the value of its network.  Refusing to interconnect, on the other
hand, would lead to a race to become the dominant player.  Firms will
choose among these conflicting strategies based on the skewness of the
potential returns from winning and losing the resulting competition and
the likelihood that they will emerge as the dominant player.349
Because so much of the literature on network economic effects fo-
cuses on the potentially anticompetitive consequences of tipping and
lock-in, it is often overlooked that the primary effect of network eco-
nomic effects is to provide powerful incentives in favor of interconnec-
tion.350  For example, in a market in which five equally sized players are
already interconnected, any player that refused to interconnect would
put itself at a tremendous competitive disadvantage.351  In addition, com-
mentators from a wide range of perspectives acknowledge that lock-in is
less likely in markets undergoing rapid growth, in which new entrants will
be able to compete for new users.352  Conversely, the formal models dem-
349. See Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete:  Strategies
and Tactics in Standardization, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1994, at 117, 119–21 (discussing
choice between competing to become dominant standard and voluntary cooperation with
competitors).  For an application to broadband, see generally Woroch, supra note 91. R
350. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J.
Econ. Persp., Spring 1994, at 93, 105 [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition]
(noting that “[i]n markets with network effects, there is natural tendency toward de facto
standardization”).
351. See Faulhaber, Bottlenecks and Bandwagons, supra note 348, at 501–02; see also R
Nicholas Economides, The Economics of the Internet Backbone, in 2 Handbook of
Telecommunications Economics, supra note 348, at 373, 390 (recognizing that network R
economic effects give firms strong incentives to interconnect); Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424,
429 (1985) (noting that “[a]s the number of firms becomes increasingly large,”
equilibrium in which all firms interconnect converges to perfectly competitive
equilibrium).  The theoretical literature does suggest that a network providing service
under a caller-pays regime may nonetheless be able to use its control over interconnection
to harm competition even though it faces competition.  When the calling party pays, the
originating network must compensate the terminating network through some form of
access charge.  In essence, originating networks make contributions to a common pool that
is used to compensate terminating networks.  Terminating networks that are free to
negotiate their own access charge arrangements have the incentive to free ride on the
contributions of others by withdrawing a disproportionate amount from the common pool.
This problem need not be solved by mandating interconnection access.  It can also be
solved through a system of reciprocity, or any form of uniform access charges, including
benchmarking and central office bill and keep.  For a more complete discussion, see Yoo,
What Can Antitrust Contribute, supra note 62, at 519–21. R
352. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network
Externalities, 40 J. Indus. Econ. 55, 67, 73 (1992) (showing that exponential market growth
renders lock-in impossible); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology
Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 283, 312 (1996) (noting that
markets can overcome lock-in “[i]f a market is growing rapidly” and thus “the number of
users who have made commitments to any standard is small relative to the number of
\\server05\productn\C\COL\107-8\COL802.txt unknown Seq: 70 20-NOV-07 8:19
2007] THE HIDDEN SIDE OF TRINKO 1891
onstrating how refusal to interconnect can harm competition have gener-
ally been based on duopoly and dominant firm market structures.353  In
the absence of such market concentration, a firm cannot plausibly use its
interconnection policies to harm competition.  Even if risks of anticom-
petitive conduct exist, private ordering offers a variety of potential solu-
tions aside from regulation.354  Furthermore, mandating access in an at-
tempt to redress such anticompetitive problems risks delaying entry by
additional providers and inducing the adoption of inefficient network
technology.355  Thus, when markets are sufficiently competitive, imposing
interconnection access is superfluous at best and may even be harmful.
This conclusion is reflected in the FCC’s current policy toward wire-
less-to-wireless interconnection, in which the FCC has concluded that, in
the absence of a dominant player, competition already provides wireless
providers with sufficient incentives to interconnect.356  The FCC took a
similar position with respect to backbone interconnection when approv-
ing the Verizon-MCI and SBC-AT&T mergers, concluding that “[s]o long
as there is ‘rough equality’ among backbone providers, each has an in-
centive to peer with the others to provide universal connectivity to the
Internet.”357  It reiterated this position when approving AT&T’s acquisi-
tion of BellSouth.358  Conversely, in approving WorldCom’s acquisition
of MCI, the FCC was concerned that the merged company would have a
sufficiently dominant market share to harm competition in the backbone
market.  Consequently, the FCC made divestiture of MCI’s backbone bus-
future users”); Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare:  Making Sense of Kodak,
63 Antitrust L.J. 483, 490 (1995) (“A manufacturer will find installed-base opportunism less
attractive, the greater is the growth rate of the market . . . .”); cf. Joseph Kattan, Market
Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62 Antitrust L.J. 1, 8, 11 (1993) (noting that
lock-in is most likely when “the installed base is large relative to the population of ‘new’
buyers” and that ability to exercise market power depends upon “ratio of ‘locked-in’
customers to ‘new’ purchasers”).
353. See Besen & Farrell, supra note 349, at 119–29 (examining interconnection R
payoffs in duopoly model); Jacques Crémer, Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Connectivity in the
Commercial Internet, 48 J. Indus. Econ. 433, 448–53 (2000) (same); Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. Pol.
Econ. 822, 824 (1986) (examining “industry evolution in a market with technological
change where there are two inherently incompatible technologies”).
354. See Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks, supra note 347, at 928–29. R
355. See Woroch, supra note 91, at 722–23, 733–41. R
356. Interconnection & Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio
Servs., Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 13523, 13534 ¶ 28 (2000).
357. Verizon-MCI Order, supra note 280, at 18496 ¶ 118; SBC-AT&T Order, supra R
note 280, at 18354 ¶ 117; accord Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake:  Connecting R
Internet Backbones 18–22, 31–32 (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y, Working Paper No. 32,
Sept. 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp32.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that larger market participants have
incentive to offer interconnection services to smaller competitors for fee, if not to
interconnect as peers).
358. See AT&T-BellSouth Order, supra note 280, at 5731 ¶ 129, 5734–36 ¶¶ 140–144. R
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iness a condition to its approval of the merger.359  At the same time, the
FCC declined to mandate interconnection as a separate merger condi-
tion.  The divestiture of MCI’s backbone business ensured that the mar-
ket would remain sufficiently competitive to make direct regulation of
interconnection unnecessary.360
The theoretical literature does identify one scenario in which partici-
pants in a market without a dominant player may nonetheless refuse to
interconnect.  If the market consists of two players of equal size, they may
reject compatibility and instead engage in a race for the market.361  Inter-
estingly, though, this type of competition does not necessarily lead to the
delays in technology adoption and supracompetitive returns associated
with refusals to interconnect by dominant firms.362  It also has the virtue
of promoting the rapid buildout of new network technologies.
The nature of this type of competition is illustrated by the often over-
looked competitive era in local telephone service that began when the
initial Bell patents lapsed in 1894.  During this period, entry by new local
telephone companies eroded the Bell monopoly, with the independents
capturing 51% of the market by 1907.363  After that point, the indepen-
dent telephone movement declined steadily until, by the time of the en-
actment of the Communications Act of 1934, the Bell System once again
controlled over 80% of the nation’s local telephone lines.364
Many scholars mistakenly suggest that the demand-side economies of
scale associated with network economic effects allowed the Bell System to
drive its competitors out of business simply by refusing to interconnect
with them.365  A close analysis of the market conditions renders this per-
spective implausible.  Because the independents had captured roughly
359. See Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI Communications Corp. for
Transfer of Control of MCI Communications Corp. to WorldCom, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 18025, 18108–11 ¶¶ 150–151 (1998).
360. Id. at 18115 ¶ 155.
361. See Besen & Farrell, supra note 349, at 122–24 (analyzing ways in which R
competition between two incompatible networks might unfold).
362. See id. at 119–20, 122–24 (noting how competition between incompatible
networks can accelerate as well as delay market growth, may dissipate any supracompetitive
returns, and may lead to penetration pricing and long-term commitments to lower prices).
363. See Robert Bornholz & David S. Evans, The Early History of Competition in the
Telephone Industry, in Breaking Up Bell:  Essays on Industrial Organization and
Regulation 7, 13 (David S. Evans ed., 1983); see also Richard Gabel, The Early Competitive
Era in Telephone Communications, 1893–1920, 34 Law & Contemp. Probs. 340, 344
(1969) (reporting 3.0 million independent lines in 1907, compared with 3.1 million Bell
lines).
364. See Gerald W. Brock, The Telecommunications Industry 177 (1981).
365. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem,
28 Conn. L. Rev. 1041, 1046 n.19 (1996) (arguing that refusal to interconnect allowed
AT&T to reassert dominance after telephone service became competitive in 1890s);
Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 203, at 8 (“The history of local telephone service in the first R
decades of the twentieth century, during which AT&T refused to connect with
independent competitors, illustrates how [network economic effects] can lead to
monopoly.”).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\107-8\COL802.txt unknown Seq: 72 20-NOV-07 8:19
2007] THE HIDDEN SIDE OF TRINKO 1893
half of the market by 1907, the independents could have defeated
whatever advantage the Bell System might have gained from its refusal to
interconnect simply by banding together to make a network of equal
size.366  The traditional account is also belied by the business strategy pur-
sued by the independents.  If the Bell System had been in a dominant
position, one would have expected the independents to have been
clamoring to interconnect with it.  In fact, the independents did not want
to interconnect with the Bell System any more than the Bell System
wanted to interconnect with the independents.367  In many cases, having
been the first to establish connections to surrounding areas, the in-
dependents were able to use network economic effects to their advan-
tage.368  Any suggestion that the Bell System was able to use refusal to
interconnect as a competitive weapon is further belied by the fact that the
Bell System began to regain its dominance only after it abandoned its
policy of refusing to interconnect with the independents.369
The more careful histories of the era reveal that between 1893 and
1907, the Bell System and the independent telephone systems engaged in
366. See Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation:
United States v. AT&T, in The Antitrust Revolution 290, 292 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. &
Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).  Noll and Owen suggest that it was the Bell System’s control
of certain long distance patents that allowed it to reassert its dominance.  See id. at 292; see
also Brock, supra note 364, at 117–19 (arguing that AT&T’s eventual success in developing R
long distance technology provided competitive advantage over geographically isolated
rivals); Gerald R. Faulhaber, Telecommunications in Turmoil 3–5 (1987) [hereinafter
Faulhaber, Telecommunications in Turmoil] (arguing that AT&T’s control of superior
long distance technology made assets of independent providers more valuable to AT&T
than to other entities, bringing about eventual sale to AT&T); John V. Langdale, The
Growth of Long-Distance Telephony in the Bell System:  1875–1907, 4 J. Hist. Geography
145, 155 (1978) (arguing that AT&T’s technological advantage in long distance market,
reinforced by network effects, created corresponding advantage in local markets).  The
argument that superior long distance service could provide a key competitive advantage is
belied by the fact that interstate calls constituted less than half a percent of all telephone
traffic.  See Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 147 (1930).  Even contemporary
businessmen conceded that long-haul long distance traffic was “of little commercial or
social importance.”  For short-haul long distance traffic, AT&T and the independents were
using the same technology.  AT&T’s real advantage lay not in technology, but rather in its
ability to leverage its greater regional density and better coordination to provide superior
short-haul long distance service.  See Milton L. Mueller, Jr., Universal Service 72–76
(1997).
367. See Mueller, supra note 366, at 10, 51, 78–79, 115–17, 121–22 (describing R
independent opposition to interconnection); Bornholz & Evans, supra note 363, at 25–27 R
(same); Gabel, supra note 363, at 353–54 (same). R
368. See Mueller, supra note 366, at 55–60 (describing independent telephone R
companies’ initial acquisition of dominant market shares in rural areas, small cities, and
suburban areas).
369. See id. at 76–80, 107–10 (describing AT&T’s success in regaining dominant
position through liberalization of interconnection with key independent phone
companies); David F. Weiman & Richard C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly?  The Case of
Southern Bell Telephone Company, 1894–1912, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 103, 115, 118 (1994)
(describing Southern Bell’s use of interconnection with select independent phone
companies to regain dominant position).
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what amounted to a race for the market by investing heavily in providing
service to the smaller cities, suburbs, and rural areas that the Bell System’s
focus on long distance commercial traffic had caused it to bypass.370  By
1907, the Bell System recognized that its attempt to outbuild the in-
dependents had failed.  The Morgan banking interests that took over the
Bell System installed Theodore Vail as president and turned to a strategy
that has long been part of the anticompetitive arsenal:  merger to monop-
oly.  If an independent refused to merge, the Bell System would instead
adopt the equally classic anticompetitive practice of dividing the market
with the independent by offering to withdraw from the territory in return
for the independent’s promise to restrict its activities to a “small and com-
pact” territory and to interconnect exclusively with the Bell System’s long
distance network.371  Dividing the markets gave both the Bell System and
the independents a welcome respite from the rigors of competition.  Un-
like competing telephone systems, geographically isolated monopolists
that are restricted to their service areas have strong incentives to inter-
connect, since doing so increases the value of their systems without affect-
ing the level of competition.372  The biggest problem with the disappear-
ance of competition was pricing.  Therefore, the Bell System dropped its
previous opposition to government intervention and instead embraced
regulation as an alternative to competition as a means for reining in
price.373  As part of this regulatory compact, the Bell System insisted on
protection against entry.374
The antitrust authorities and the independents were initially quite
skeptical of the Bell System’s new strategy.  This change in tactics
prompted the federal government to bring its first major antitrust suit
against the Bell System, which was ultimately settled by the so-called
Kingsbury Commitment, named after the AT&T vice president who nego-
tiated the terms of the consent decree with Attorney General J.C.
McReynolds.375  Under the Kingsbury Commitment, the Bell System
agreed to stop acquiring independent local telephone companies with
370. See Mueller, supra note 366, at 39–42, 55–60, 70–71, 74–75 (describing AT&T’s R
attempts to provide service to rural and residential areas and small cities it initially
neglected, as well as independent telephone companies’ extensive development of such
markets); Gabel, supra note 363, at 344–45 (describing “vigorous pursuit of new markets” R
by both AT&T and independents between 1895 and 1907).
371. Weiman & Levin, supra note 369, at 118 (internal quotation marks omitted); see R
also Mueller, supra note 366, at 78, 107–13 (describing AT&T’s practice of interconnecting R
with key independent local telephone companies).
372. See Noam, supra note 348, at 973. R
373. See Mueller, supra note 366, at 99–100, 127–28 (describing AT&T’s 1907 R
embrace of both local and national regulation as justification for permitting
reestablishment of monopoly); Gabel, supra note 363, at 355–58 (same); Weiman & Levin, R
supra note 369, at 120–25 (same). R
374. See Gabel, supra note 363, at 355–58. R
375. See Letter from Nathan C. Kingsbury, Vice President, AT&T Co., to Attorney
General J.C. McReynolds (Dec. 19, 1913), in AT&T Co., 1913 Annual Report 24, 24–26
(1914) [hereinafter Kingsbury Commitment]; see also Faulhaber, Telecommunications in
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which it competed, although the agreement permitted the Bell System to
acquire independent local telephone companies operating in areas that it
did not serve.376  AT&T also agreed to allow the independent telephone
companies to interconnect with its long distance network.377  Although
the Kingsbury Commitment ostensibly forbade the Bell System from ac-
quiring competing independent telephone systems, the government im-
mediately backtracked on this position, announcing that the settlement
was not meant to prevent communities from eliminating dual service if
they so chose.378  In practice, the government permitted Bell acquisitions
of competing independents so long as the Bell System and the independ-
ents swapped lines so that neither obtained a net increase in total sub-
scribers.379  As a result, during the time the Kingsbury Commitment was
in effect, the federal government nonetheless approved the Bell System’s
acquisition of a total of 241,000 additional stations while transferring
58,000 stations to the independents.380  The result was a division of mar-
kets in which both the Bell System and the independents ended up with a
monopoly within their service areas.
In the end, the regulatory regime created by the Kingsbury Commit-
ment was abolished (with the full support of the independents) by the
enactment of the Willis-Graham Act, which immunized telephone merg-
ers from antitrust scrutiny.381  Instead, antitrust mergers would be re-
viewed by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which effectively
became a rubber stamp that approved essentially all telecommunications
mergers.382  During this period, both the Bell System and the independ-
ents also endorsed rate regulation of local telephone services by state
public utility commissions.383
Turmoil, supra note 366, at 6, 18 n.6 (discussing resolution of government suit and R
involvement of Kingsbury therein).
376. See Kingsbury Commitment, supra note 375, at 24. R
377. See id. at 25.
378. See United States v. AT&T Co., No. 6082 (D. Or. Sept. 7, 1914) (order modifying
decree) (authorizing AT&T’s acquisition of competing local telephone company in
Spokane), reprinted in Decrees and Judgments in Federal Anti-Trust Cases, July 2,
1890–January 1, 1918, at 497 (Roger Shale ed., 1918).
379. See Mueller, supra note 366, at 133–34. R
380. See Gabel, supra note 363, at 353. R
381. See Ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921).
382. See Bureau of Statsitics, Interstate Commerce Comm’n, Interstate Commerce
Commission Activities, 1887–1937, at 201 (1937) (reporting that out of 288 merger
applications, “281 were approved, 4 were withdrawn, and 3 denied”); Glen O. Robinson,
The Federal Communications Act:  An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A
Legislative History of the Communications Act of 1934, at 3, 8 n.25 (Max D. Paglin ed.,
1989) (noting AT&T submission reporting ICC approval of 272 out of 275 proposed
mergers).
383. Mueller, supra note 366, at 99–100 (describing AT&T’s newfound commitment R
to government regulation); Gabel, supra note 363, at 357 (noting AT&T’s “promotion of R
regulatory authority in utility commissions” and provision of “legislative consultants to
‘help and advise’ state . . . legislators”); Robinson, supra note 382, at 6–7 (noting support R
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This history underscores the extent to which refusal to interconnect
need not be anticompetitive.  It may also yield some insights into current
broadband policy.  It suggests that refusing to require interconnection
could foster a race for the market between cable modem and DSL that
could help meet the FCC’s and state public utility commissions’ statutory
obligations to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely
basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”384
The primary worry is that the race logically ends with one of the two com-
petitors emerging as the dominant player.385  An end result with a single
dominant player, as noted earlier, no longer becomes a stable outcome if
a third (and possibly a fourth) competitor emerges.  According to Trinko,
therefore, solutions that alter market structure to make them competitive
are preferred to solutions like interconnection access, which require con-
tinuing price regulation.386  Furthermore, as the ongoing deployment of
broadband fiber optic service demonstrates, the pace of technological
change may dictate that the winner of an initial race may find its domi-
nance destabilized by a new race to deploy a new technology.387
Skepticism about mandating interconnection access does not re-
quire embracing this Schumpeterian vision of competition.  As one of us
has argued at length elsewhere, networks may deviate from perfect inter-
operability in order to distinguish their service offerings from those of
their competitors.  Not only does this differentiation allow the network to
provide new services that depend on a different network architecture, but
it also allows multiple players to survive notwithstanding the presence of
supply-side and demand-side economies of scale through a niche strategy
that targets subsegments of the market that place a particularly high value
on different types of network services.388  The result is not the promotion
of vertical competition in which a succession of monopolists competes for
the market, but rather the enhancement of more conventional horizontal
competition in which multiple providers compete in the market.389
b. Interconnection Access and the Courts. — Interconnection access
claims have not fared well under antitrust law, even when asserted against
a dominant firm.  For example, the literature often ignores the fact that
MCI’s private antitrust suit against AT&T involved two distinct essential
facilities doctrine claims.  The more celebrated claim, which we discuss in
greater detail in the next section, involved what we call platform access,
in which MCI sought access to a monopoly input controlled by AT&T
for regulation as means for avoiding “vigorous competition” among both AT&T and
independent telephone companies).
384. 47 U.S.C. § 157 note (2000).
385. See Mueller, supra note 366, at 25. R
386. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 414–15 (2004).
387. See Faulhaber, Bottlenecks and Bandwagons, supra note 348, at 506–08. R
388. See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 71, at 27–37 (arguing that R
network differentiation allows smaller service providers certain competitive advantages).
389. See id. at 58–60.
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(local telephone service) in order to sell a complementary service (long
distance telephone service).390  The often-overlooked claim is that MCI
also sought to interconnect its long distance network with portions of
AT&T’s long distance network that reached areas that it did not yet serve.
In this claim, MCI did not seek access to AT&T’s network to sell comple-
mentary services.  Instead, it sought connection with the larger network
in order to sell the same services to similarly situated customers.391  Its
concern was that its smaller network size put it at a competitive disadvan-
tage.  As a result, it sought interconnection to put itself on an equal foot-
ing with AT&T.  The court of appeals overturned a jury verdict in favor of
MCI on the interconnection access claim for the simple reason that
“[t]here was no sufficient explanation as to why MCI, on the one hand,
was building its own network, and, on the other, was entitled to access in
the interim to AT&T’s facilities.”392
At first glance, this answer seems somewhat anomalous.  AT&T was
clearly a dominant firm and thus arguably posed a serious anticompeti-
tive threat.  The court’s focus on the supply-side feasibility of constructing
alternative network capacity ignored the demand-side scale economies as-
sociated with network economic effects.  If refusing to allow MCI to inter-
connect with AT&T’s long distance network prevented MCI’s customers
from calling AT&T’s customers, the demand-side scale economies would
reinforce AT&T’s market dominance regardless of the feasibility of con-
structing a second long distance network.
The solution to this puzzle lies in the fact that AT&T did not have
complete control over long distance calls placed by its subscribers.  Long
distance calls also require the services of local telephone companies.
Those local telephone companies were required by a D.C. Circuit inter-
pretation of the specialized common carrier tariff that AT&T filed with
the FCC to terminate calls from MCI as well as AT&T,393 a conclusion
that would later be reinforced by the “equal access” provisions of the de-
cree ordering the breakup of AT&T.394  The fact that the local telephone
company, rather than AT&T, controlled access to the customer meant
that AT&T could not prevent MCI’s customers from calling AT&T’s cus-
tomers simply by refusing to allow MCI to interconnect with its long dis-
tance network.  The regulatory and antitrust obligations that prevented
local telephone companies from discriminating against MCI made man-
dating interconnection access unnecessary.
390. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983).
391. See id. at 1147.
392. Id. at 1148.
393. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590, 594–99 (D.C. Cir. 1978); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 378–79 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
394. See United States v. AT&T Co. (Modification of Final Judgment), 552 F. Supp.
131, 195–200 (D.D.C. 1982) (noting that operating companies will be required to provide
third parties with services equivalent to those provided to AT&T and its affiliates), aff’d
mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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The closest analogue to interconnection access in Supreme Court
precedent is Aspen Skiing.  Recall that in Aspen Skiing, the owner of one ski
area sought to compel the owner of three other ski areas located near
Aspen, Colorado, to continue marketing a multi-area pass good for all
four facilities.395  Although skiing facilities are not usually regarded as
networks, it is possible to conceive of this arrangement as a form of inter-
connection access.  The fact that the courts found Ski Co. liable thus pro-
vides some doctrinal support for mandating interconnection access.
As noted earlier, Aspen Skiing has been heavily criticized.396  Indeed,
the Trinko Court distanced itself from Aspen Skiing, calling it “at or near
the outer boundary” of antitrust liability.397  After Trinko, Aspen Skiing can
at most be read as imposing some obligation to assert a valid business
justification before discontinuing a preexisting business relationship and
refusing to allow a competitor to resell a monopolist’s services at the full
retail price.398  The Supreme Court thus flatly rejected the idea that Aspen
Skiing could serve as the basis for granting access to a competitor with
whom the network owner has not previously done business.  There is thus
little reason to believe that a court will mandate interconnection access.
4. Platform Access. — Platform access requires network owners to open
their networks to providers of complementary services sold through the
network.399  It requires a network owner to provide carriage to any pro-
vider of a complementary service that presents its traffic at a designated
interface in a standardized format.400  The early cases involved requests
to force local telephone systems to open their networks to providers of
long distance, information services, and CPE.401  The current debate over
network neutrality focuses on compelling broadband systems to provide
platform access to all Internet content and applications providers.402
a. The Economics of Platform Access. — It is widely recognized that net-
work owners already possess powerful incentives to provide platform ac-
cess.403  That is because enabling customers to reach the broadest possi-
395. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. R
396. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. R
397. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
409 (2004).
398. See id. (contrasting Ski Co.’s prior willingness to conduct business at retail price
with Verizon’s reluctance ever to do so).
399. For a more detailed analysis of the impact of platform access, see Spulber & Yoo,
Network Regulation, supra note 300, at 643–45, 657–58, 670–71. R
400. See Yoo, Network Neutrality and Congestion, supra note 109, at 1896 (discussing R
regulatory requirements necessary for network neutrality).
401. The classic example is, of course, the government’s 1974 case that led to the
breakup of AT&T.  See United States v. AT&T Co. (Modification of Final Judgment), 552
F. Supp. 131, 195–97 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983).  For other examples, see the cases cited in supra notes 151, 160–161, and R
178. R
402. See Yoo, Network Neutrality and Congestion, supra note 109, at 1850–51. R
403. As Joseph Farrell and Philip Weiser note, “the platform monopolist has an
incentive to be a good steward of the applications sector for its platform.”  Farrell &
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ble range of complementary services generally represents the best way to
maximize the network’s value (and thus the amount that the network
owner can charge for service).
At the same time, the standardization implicit in platform access im-
poses a number of costs.  For example, standardization decreases welfare
by reducing product variety by “prevent[ing] the development of promis-
ing but unique and incompatible new systems.”404  Indeed, incompatible
networks may simply represent the natural outgrowth of heterogeneous
consumer preferences.405  Equally importantly, the nature of the proto-
col on which the network standardizes has the inevitable effect of favor-
ing some applications and disfavoring others.  Consider TCP/IP, which
represents the de facto standard protocol for the Internet.  One of TCP/
IP’s distinguishing features is that it routes packets on a “first come, first
served” basis without giving priority to traffic associated with any particu-
lar application.  TCP/IP also routes traffic on a “best efforts” basis with-
out any guarantee as to if or when the packets will actually arrive.406
While such an approach was appropriate for applications such as e-mail
and web browsing, in which delays of half of a second are virtually un-
noticeable, it is less well suited to emerging applications such as stream-
ing media, online gaming, and VoIP, which are extremely sensitive to
delay.407
Standardization also has the inevitable effect of commoditizing net-
work services.  By preventing service differentiation, platform access
forces network owners to compete solely based on price and network size,
which are considerations that reinforce the advantages enjoyed by the
largest players.  Differentiation can play a particularly important role in
industries like telecommunications, in which the presence of fixed costs
that are large relative to marginal costs forces network providers to pro-
duce on the declining portion of the average cost curve.  As Edward
Chamberlin pointed out in his classic work on monopolistic competition,
product differentiation can create stable equilibria with multiple produc-
Weiser, supra note 86, at 104; see also Besen & Farrell, supra note 349, at 117 (“A firm’s R
strategy toward vertically related firms—the suppliers of complementary goods—normally
involves trying to encourage a generous supply of complements, while perhaps also trying
to discourage the supply of complements to rivals.”).
404. Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 350, at 110; accord Joseph R
Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. Econ.
70, 71 (1985) (counting “reduction in variety” as among “important social costs” of
standardization); Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 350, at 110 (noting that
“the primary cost of standardization is a loss of variety:  consumers have fewer
differentiated products to pick from”).
405. See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 350, at 106 (noting that R
“market equilibrium with multiple incompatible products reflects the social value of
variety”); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 352, at 292 (“Where there are differences in R
preferences regarding alternative standards, coexistence of standards is a likely
outcome.”).
406. See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 71, at 21. R
407. See id. at 21–22.
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ers each producing on the declining portion of the average cost curve.408
Thus, smaller players can survive despite cost and size disadvantages by
targeting subsegments of the market.409
Platform access also involves significant transaction costs, both in
terms of establishing the governing standards and in terms of reconfigur-
ing the network to open it to providers of complementary services.  The
breakup of AT&T provides a useful example.  Implementing the divesti-
ture decree’s equal access mandate required the local telephone compa-
nies to redesign their switches so that they could accommodate multiple
long distance providers, a process that entailed considerable cost and de-
lay as well as close regulation of both the price and nonprice terms and
conditions of interconnection.410  Such oversight is particularly onerous
when the interface and the information requirements needed to imple-
ment it are complex.411
In addition, the governing standard must be updated to reflect
changes in technology.  In the meantime, standardization locks the loca-
tion of the interface into place, an effect that is particularly problematic
in industries in which technological change is forcing the natural inter-
faces between firms to shift constantly.  Instead, the FCC and the court
overseeing the breakup of AT&T had to create an elaborate set of rules
forcing the local telephone companies to undertake certain modifica-
tions, limiting their ability to change their interfaces, and requiring them
to provide advance notice of any changes that would be approved.  Forc-
ing such decisions to be decided as a matter of regulation represented a
significant hindrance in such a technologically dynamic industry.412
Furthermore, like any form of compelled access, platform access re-
quires direct regulation of prices in order to be effective.  As Trinko rec-
ognized, price regulation is not a task to which antitrust courts are partic-
ularly well suited.413  For example, as noted earlier, the Kingsbury
Commitment required that AT&T make its long distance network availa-
ble to independent local telephone companies.414  The problem was that
the decree allowed AT&T to charge prices that were so unattractive as to
render this form of platform access useless.415
408. See Edward Hastings Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition:  A
Reorientation of the Theory of Value 97–100 (8th ed. 1962).
409. See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 71, at 29–33. R
410. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition:  The Telecommuni-
cations Experiments, 15 Info. Econ. & Pol’y 73, 82–84 (2003).
411. See id. at 77, 81.
412. See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 71, at 43–45 (noting how access R
requirements can stifle competition and innovation in technologically dynamic industries
by locking interfaces into place).
413. See supra notes 244–252 and accompanying text. R
414. See supra note 377 and accompanying text. R
415. See Mueller, supra note 366, at 131–32 (describing large surcharges, exclusive R
control arrangements, and use restrictions implemented by AT&T following Kingsbury
Commitment).
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Most problematic is platform access’s long-run impact on dynamic
efficiency.  As noted earlier, the primary policy goal should be to pro-
mote entry in those segments of the industry that are the least competi-
tive.416  Only if competition in a particular segment proves unsustainable
should policymakers pursue the second-best policy goal of promoting
competition in complementary services.
At the time of the consent decree settling the government’s 1974
antitrust suit against AT&T (known as the “Modification of Final
Judgment”), entry by competitive local telephone providers was thought
to be infeasible, making the promotion of competition in long distance
and information services a legitimate policy goal.417  After competition in
local telephone providers became feasible, platform access became
counterproductive.  Long distance providers were natural strategic part-
ners for companies wishing to enter into local telephone service, yet they
had no incentive to undertake such investments so long as the antitrust
decree breaking up AT&T provided them with access to the existing net-
work.418  The recent patterns of investment following the Supreme
Court’s Brand X decision bear out this dynamic.  Once the Supreme
Court made clear that regulation would no longer guarantee providers of
complementary services access to existing broadband networks, content
and application providers and device manufacturers began pouring capi-
tal into alternative network technologies such as wireless broadband and
broadband over powerline.419  Proper administration would thus require
the court to monitor technological developments in the telecommunica-
tions industry and to release the local telephone companies from their
equal access obligations the minute competition from other local tele-
phone companies became sustainable.  It is doubtful that any antitrust
court, no matter how well intentioned, would be up to such a task.
b. Platform Access and the Courts. — Despite these problems, platform
access represents the most common form of access imposed under the
antitrust laws.  For example, MCI’s antitrust suit against the Bell System
and the Modification of Final Judgment both attempted to promote com-
petition in the complementary service of long distance by mandating plat-
form access to the Bell System’s local telephone networks.420  The
Modification of Final Judgment also extended this equal access require-
ment to the predecessors to the providers of Internet content (then
416. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. R
417. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. R
418. See Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks, supra note 347, at 975–76. R
419. See Yoo, Network Neutrality and Congestion, supra note 109, at 1894–95. R
420. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983)
(requiring AT&T to provide MCI with platform access to local telephone networks for use
in developing competitive long distance telephone service); United States v. AT&T Co.
(Modification of Final Judgment), 552 F. Supp. 131, 195–97 (D.D.C. 1982) (requiring
AT&T to provide nondiscriminatory platform access to all long distance providers), aff’d
mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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called information service providers).421  Although the Modification of
Final Judgment did not initially address platform access for CPE, later
modifications brought CPE within the equal access mandate as well.422
The court also imposed similar equal access requirements on GTE, the
largest non-Bell provider of local telephone service, when approving its
merger with Sprint.423  The proposed consent decree that would have
approved AT&T’s 1994 acquisition of the largest cellular provider con-
tained a similar equal access requirement before the case was mooted by
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.424
To facilitate enforcement of equal access, the Modification of Final
Judgment included line of business restrictions prohibiting the newly
divested local telephone companies from offering long distance or infor-
mation services or from manufacturing CPE.425  To ensure that the local
telephone companies did not evade rate regulation by entering into an
unregulated complementary market, the Modification of Final Judgment
included a catch-all line of business restriction prohibiting them from
“provid[ing] any other product or service, except [local telephone ser-
vice], that is not a natural monopoly service actually regulated by
tariff.”426
There is considerable irony that platform access is where antitrust
plaintiffs have fared the best.  The economic logic suggests that the an-
ticompetitive risks surrounding platform access are much lower than that
of other forms of access and are in the process of being rendered nonex-
istent in the telecommunications industry by the emergence of wireless
and other alternatives to conventional local telephone service.  As noted
earlier, an exception exists when the underlying markets are subject to
rate regulation.427  This exception, however, is largely inapposite in the
telecommunications context as many telecommunications markets, such
as broadband and wireless, have never been subject to rate regulation,
and the others have already been rate deregulated or are now on their
way to becoming so.428
Indeed, the extent to which the emergence of last-mile competition
has undercut the justification for imposing platform access is well illus-
trated by the D.C. Circuit’s decision holding that the emergence of last-
421. See Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 195–97.
422. See Michael K. Kellogg et al., Federal Telecommunications Law § 5.3.2, at
259–63 (1992).
423. See United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730, 743–44 (D.D.C. 1984).
424. See Huber et al., supra note 89, § 4.4.5, at 385. R
425. See Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 227; see also United States v. W.
Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 529 (D.D.C. 1987) (referring to line of business restrictions as
Modification of Final Judgment’s “core restrictions”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 900 F.2d 283
(D.C. Cir. 1990).  The court imposed these line of business restrictions notwithstanding
the objections of the FCC.  See Huber et al., supra note 89, § 9.6.1, at 816. R
426. Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 228.
427. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. R
428. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. R
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mile alternatives justified waiving the Modification of Final Judgment’s
line of business restriction on information services429 as well as the catch-
all restriction on untariffed services.430  Controversies over the remaining
line of business restrictions continued until the Modification of Final
Judgment was superseded by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.431
The Justice Department’s and the FCC’s recent approvals of the
Verizon-MCI and SBC-AT&T acquisitions further attest to the extent to
which control of the local loop has ceased to be a justification for impos-
ing platform access.  Indeed, as recently as 1997, a merger between a long
distance company and one of the local telephone companies that used to
make up the Bell System was regarded as “unthinkable.”432  But the FCC
approved these two mergers, disposing of requests for platform access in
a few brief paragraphs finding that the level of competition and the exis-
tence of excess capacity were sufficient to guard against anticompetitive
harms.433  Indeed, the judicial decision evaluating the acquisitions under
the antitrust laws did not even mention platform access.434
The experience implementing the platform access provisions of the
Modification of Final Judgment provides an eloquent demonstration of
how difficult administering platform access can be.  The court overseeing
the decree was bombarded with complaints charging the local telephone
companies with failing to live up to their equal access obligations.435  The
technological dynamism of the telecommunications industry forced the
court to confront hundreds of requests to waive the line of business re-
strictions.436  These requests often took from three to four years to pro-
cess, with estimates of the total welfare loss associated with these delays
exceeding $1 billion.437
These developments provide a useful perspective on the ongoing de-
bate over platform access to the Internet, which goes by the name of “net-
work neutrality.”  One key question is whether antitrust law permits last-
mile broadband providers to give preferential access to particular content
and application providers.438  Indeed, the FTC recently held a public
429. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1578–80 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
430. See W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. at 599.
431. See Huber et al., supra note 89, § 9.6.12, at 823–30. R
432. Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Thinking About Why Some
Communications Mergers Are Unthinkable, Address Before the Brookings Institution
(June 19, 1997), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh735.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
433. See Verizon-MCI Order, supra note 280, at 18510–12 ¶¶ 145–152; SBC-AT&T R
Order, supra note 280, at 18368–71 ¶¶ 146–152. R
434. See United States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007).
435. See Kellogg et al., supra note 422, §§ 5.3–5.4, at 253–73. R
436. See id. § 7.1, at 52 (Supp. 1995).
437. See Paul H. Rubin & Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Costs of Delay and Rent-Seeking
Under the Modification of Final Judgment, 16 Managerial & Decision Econ. 385, 385–88,
397 (1995).
438. See Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute, supra note 62, at 511–17, 525–29 R
(exploring implications of antitrust for network neutrality).
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workshop exploring whether the antitrust laws should impose platform
access to the Internet.439  Just as the existence of alternative sources of
network capacity undercuts the justification for platform access on behalf
of information services, so too does competition between cable modem
and DSL systems and the imminent emergence of other broadband alter-
natives undercut the justification for imposing network neutrality.
5. Unbundled Access. — Unbundled access requires network owners to
lease portions of their networks to their competitors.440  Like wholesale
access, unbundled access is provided to competitors.  Rather than pro-
vide the services of the entire network, as is the case under wholesale
access, unbundled access involves the use of the services of selected
inputs.
a. The Economics of Unbundled Access. — Unbundled access has an im-
pact on the demand for network services that is similar in some ways to
that of wholesale access.  Because unbundled access can create new ser-
vices, it can cause demand to increase.  At the same time, diverting traffic
off the network can cause the demand for network services to decrease.
These changes in network demand can alter the optimal network design
by changing the cost of certain components, by changing the variability
of network flows, and by diverting traffic onto other networks to the point
where traffic-aggregating technologies will no longer be cost effective.
That said, unbundled access disrupts the network in ways that are far
more intrusive than wholesale access.  Unlike wholesale access, which in-
volves access to the entire network, unbundled access ties up only isolated
portions of the network.  Because networks are complex systems, tying up
network elements in one part of the network can have an adverse impact
on portions of the network located far from the element being ac-
cessed.441  Like interconnection access, unbundled access also introduces
new sources of network flows at places other than customers’ premises.
The problem is that the interconnection points for unbundled access are
far more varied than those for interconnection access.  Therefore, un-
bundled access’s impact on the network’s cost, capacity, and reliability is
likely to be quite unpredictable.
Unbundled access also requires the network owner to establish sys-
tems for provisioning and metering components deep within its system at
points that do not normally serve as external interfaces with other firms.
As the protracted litigation surrounding the provisions of the 1996 Act
demonstrates, implementation of unbundled access is unusually
complex.
439. See FTC, Public Workshop on Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/broadband/ (last updated Aug. 29, 2007) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing conference held Feb. 13–14, 2007, in
Washington, D.C.).
440. For a more detailed analysis of the impact of unbundled access, see Spulber &
Yoo, Network Regulation, supra note 300, at 645–46, 658–60, 671–73. R
441. See Spulber & Yoo, Regulation of Networks, supra note 291, at 1703–07. R
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b. Unbundled Access and the Courts. — Antitrust courts have enter-
tained requests for mandating unbundled access from time to time.  For
example, the court overseeing the Modification of Final Judgment was
asked to approve a proposed modification that would have provided un-
bundled access to Ameritech’s local telephone network in return for al-
lowing Ameritech to offer long distance service.442  As noted earlier, the
failure to provide unbundled access also formed the foundation for
Trinko.443
Courts have been quite critical of the effect that unbundled access
can have on dynamic efficiency.  For example, Justice Breyer noted in his
separate opinion in Iowa Utilities Board:
[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner’s in-
centive to keep up or to improve the property by depriving the
owner of the fruits of value-creating investment, research, or la-
bor. . . . [One cannot] guarantee that firms will undertake the
investment necessary to produce complex technological innova-
tions knowing that any competitive advantage deriving from
those innovations will be dissipated by the sharing
requirement.444
Justice Breyer also raised questions about administrability.  He
warned that “[e]ven the simplest kind of compelled sharing . . . means
that someone must oversee the terms and conditions of that sharing,”
which in turn can give rise to “significant administrative and social
costs.”445  Indeed,
The more complex the facilities, the more central their relation
to the firm’s managerial responsibilities, the more extensive the
sharing demanded, the more likely these costs will become seri-
ous.  And the more serious they become, the more likely they
will offset any economic or competitive gain that a sharing re-
quirement might otherwise provide.446
Thus, “[r]ules that force firms to share every resource or element of a
business would create not competition, but pervasive regulation, for the
regulators, not the marketplace, would set the relevant terms.”447
The Supreme Court’s Trinko decision offered similar criticisms of us-
ing the antitrust laws to compel unbundled access to a telecommunica-
tions network.  These critiques are discussed at length above and need be
442. See Huber et al., supra note 89, § 5.4.8, at 453–54. R
443. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. R
444. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428–29 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535
U.S. 467, 550–51 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
compelling incumbents to share cost-reducing benefits of successful innovation destroys
incumbents’ incentives to innovate).
445. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
446. Id. at 429 (citation omitted).
447. Id.
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revisited only briefly here.  Specifically, the Court rejected calls for impos-
ing unbundled access under the antitrust laws because “[c]ompelling [in-
frastructure] firms to share the source of their advantage is in some ten-
sion with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the
incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those econom-
ically beneficial facilities.”448
In addition, mandating unbundled access poses significant problems
of administrability.  In the words of the Court, “[e]nforced sharing also
requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper
price, quantity, and other terms of dealing.”449  Furthermore, because
unbundled access affects network elements “deep within the bowels” of a
local telephone network, they can only be made available if “[n]ew sys-
tems [are] designed and implemented simply to make that access possi-
ble.”450  Additionally, requests for unbundled access “are difficult for an-
titrust courts to evaluate, not only because they are highly technical, but
also because they are likely to be extremely numerous, given the inces-
sant, complex, and constantly changing interaction of competitive and
incumbent LECs implementing the sharing and interconnection obliga-
tions.”451  The “uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of
identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a single firm”
made the Court loath to mandate unbundled access under the antitrust
law.452
In sum, all five forms of access share a number of common charac-
teristics.  For example, access invariably has a dramatic impact on the
cost, capacity, and reliability of the network.  In addition, by requiring
networks to externalize certain functions that would otherwise be inter-
nalized, access forces networks to diverge from the natural boundaries
dictated by the Coasean theory of the firm.  Every form of access also has
the inevitable effect of reducing incentives for both incumbents and com-
petitors to invest in alternative network capacity.  Judicially imposed ac-
cess also inevitably requires antitrust courts to undertake price-setting
and output-allocation functions to which they are institutionally poorly
suited.
That said, these overarching similarities do not justify disregarding
the differences among the various types of access.  By capturing how vari-
ous network components interact with one another within the context of
a complex system, our framework shows how the nature and the magni-
tude of each of these problems varies with the precise type of access being
sought.  The saving grace is that the emergence of competition in the last
mile is in the process of undermining the conceptual justification for im-
448. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407–08 (2004).
449. Id. at 408.
450. Id. at 410.
451. Id. at 414.
452. Id. at 408.
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posing all forms of access, although the degree of competition and the
precise nature of the potential competitive problems vary across the dif-
ferent types.  Until the expansion of wireless and other alternative net-
work technologies renders access superfluous, courts and policymakers
will continue to need tools to analyze the unique problems that each type
of access poses.
CONCLUSION
The antitrust laws continue to represent an uncertain basis for man-
dating access to telecommunications networks.  Not only have the theo-
ries upon which the essential facilities doctrine rests long been under
conceptual attack; scholars have increasingly questioned courts’ institu-
tional competence to supervise access decrees.  Both of these concerns
came together in the Supreme Court’s decision in Trinko.  After that deci-
sion, the presence of a regulatory regime with authority to impose access
affects more than just the timing of judicial review; it may serve as a sub-
stantive bar to judicial imposition of access requirements.
The Trinko opinion also contains clues underscoring the mistake of
treating all types of access alike.  This Article offers a framework for or-
ganizing and analyzing different types of access.  To the extent that anti-
trust survived Trinko as a source of access requirements, we hope this
framework provides some guidance.  Interestingly, the courts have been
most sympathetic to platform access, particularly in opening up AT&T’s
local telephone networks to long distance competitors, and the issue has
taken center stage in the debates about network neutrality.  Based on our
analysis, this is the type of access to networks in which antitrust and regu-
latory intervention is the least justified.
